Abstract-- This study reports experimental market power and efficiency outcomes for a computational wholesale electricity market operating in the short run under systematically varied concentration and capacity conditions. The pricing of electricity is determined by means of a clearinghouse double auction with discriminatory midpoint pricing. Buyers and sellers use a modified Roth-Erev individual reinforcement learning algorithm to determine their price and quantity offers in each auction round. It is shown that high market efficiency is generally attained, and that market microstructure is strongly predictive for the relative market power of buyers and sellers, independently of the values set for the reinforcement learning parameters. Results are briefly compared against results from an earlier study in which buyers and sellers instead engage in social mimicry learning via genetic algorithms. Index Terms – Wholesale electricity market, restructuring, repeated double auction, market power, efficiency, concentration, capacity, individual reinforcement learning, genetic algorithm social learning, agent-based computational economics. I.

The most likely way for the world to be destroyed, most experts agree, is by accident. That’s where we come in; we’re computer professionals. We cause accidents.- Nathaniel Borenstein1 Q. So just put it in all perspective [sic]. What’s the worst-case power scenario, power we’re talking here – power lines, power grid? A. Absolute worst? I won’t even say absolute, but a very worst case could be loss of power for six months or more. Q. Over how big an area? A. Big as you want.- Frontline interview with power expert Joseph Weiss regarding the possible damage of a cyber attack on the power grid. 2

Pricing schemes for Internet services have turned out to be of crucial influence for thecom!B!;"8EJR;q of Internet Service Providers (ISP). Despite of this urgentdemANN there is still no standard tariff schem that solves the so-called "feasibility problemJ i.e. ensures simq!B"8!//;q technical feasibility, economE efficiency and user acceptance. This paper investigates the reason for the apparent shortage of "new schemE under the sun"and deals with the inherent timJ;!!"8 based structure of Internet pricing schem/A Tariffs are viewed in term ofm"/qJN" between differenttim;JBA"8! that can be expressed in theform of Tariff Matrices with a particular tridiagonal form It turns out that all established proposals fit perfectly into the resulting fram work, and that on the other hand there is no room for novel approaches left until a new (temNE al)dimBEJ!" is added. Introducing thedimAREJE of "delay of charging"into the fram work gives rise to acom pletely new class ofdynamN tariffs, as is shown bym"AE of two prom/NE! examNB/ for the resulting schemA; i.e. the Cum"A; Pricing Schem (CPS) for the Differentiated Service (DiffServ) architecture and the Connection-Holder-is-Preferred -Schem (CHiPS) for dynamic multiprovider auctions.

In many countries throughout the world, regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries. This essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process. While stressing the importance of case-specific analyses, this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies.

Abstract not found

Poverty and citizenship: sociological perspectives on water services and publicprivate participation REVISED VERSION AFTER REFEREE COMMENTS

In this paper we analyze the equilibrium market structure, following liberalization, of an industry involving an essential facility. Two alternative modes of market entry are considered, in conjunction with vertical integration, namely: (i) full entry, which means building a new and more efficient facility at a positive fixed cost; and (ii) partial entry, which means purchasing existing capacity from the incumbent, at a fixed price per unit that is freely negotiated between the incumbent and the entrant. We show that vertical integration is a dominant strategy for each firm under either entry mode, and that upstream firms choose to share the incumbent's facility when the entrant's fixed cost exceeds a positive threshold. In addition, welfare analysis shows that in many situations the market can efficiently solve the trade-off between fixed-cost savings and softened downstream competition, thus providing a rationale for the liberalization of such industries. Several competition policy implications are discussed. Journal of Economic

This Guide has been written by a team selected by the Evaluation Unit, DG Regional Policy, European Commission, through a call for tenders by restricted procedure following a call for expressions of interest n. 2007.CE.16.0.AT.024. The selected team of TRT Trasporti e Territorio (Milano) in partnership with CSIL Centre for Industrial Studies (Milano), is composed of:

This paper offers a methodology to assess the internal productive efficiency of National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) based on the performances of regulated markets, measured in terms of the degree of market efficiency (either static or dynamic). The estimation procedure is based on a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), along with a smoothed bootstrap method and it is applied to telecommunications sector across 18 European countries, 5 of which are new accession countries, in 2005. After the discussion of several desirable outcomes for a telecom regulator, we construct an ad hoc database containing information about NRAs regulatory inputs and outputs. We run three bootstrapped DEAs in order to rank NRAs according to their efficiency in carrying out their regulatory activities. We find the NRAs in 2004 accession countries are more efficient in pursuing dynamic efficiency goals than the more experienced NRAs, while they perform generally worse when the regulatory outcomes are measured in terms of retail efficiency.

Issues and options for restructuring