Results 1  10
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120
Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria
, 2002
"... Noncooperative game theory provides a normative framework for analyzing strategic interactions. ..."
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Cited by 130 (10 self)
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Noncooperative game theory provides a normative framework for analyzing strategic interactions.
Efficient Similarity Search and Classification Via Rank Aggregation
 In Proceedings of the 2003 ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Management of Data
, 2003
"... We propose a novel approach to performing efficient similarity search and classification in high dimensional data. In this framework, the database elements are vectors in a Euclidean space. Given a query vector in the same space, the goal is to find elements of the database that are similar to the ..."
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Cited by 122 (5 self)
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We propose a novel approach to performing efficient similarity search and classification in high dimensional data. In this framework, the database elements are vectors in a Euclidean space. Given a query vector in the same space, the goal is to find elements of the database that are similar to the query. In our approach, a small number of independent "voters" rank the database elements based on similarity to the query. These rankings are then combined by a highly efficient aggregation algorithm. Our methodology leads both to techniques for computing approximate nearest neighbors and to a conceptually rich alternative to nearest neighbors.
Complexity of Mechanism Design
, 2002
"... The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that the agents are motivated to report their preferences truthfull ..."
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Cited by 120 (24 self)
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The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that the agents are motivated to report their preferences truthfully and a (socially) desirable outcome is chosen. We propose an approach where a mechanism is automatically created for the preference aggregation setting at hand. This has several advantages, but the downside is that the mechanism design optimization problem needs to be solved anew each time. Focusing on settings where side payments are not possible, we show that the mechanism design problem is NPcomplete for deterministic mechanisms. This holds both for dominantstrategy implementation and for BayesNash implementation. We then show that if we allow randomized mechanisms, the mechanism design problem becomes tractable. In other words, the coordinator can tackle the computational complexity introduced by its uncertainty about the agents' preferences by making the agents face additional uncertainty. This comes at no loss, and in some cases at a gain, in the (social) objective.
Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard
, 2003
"... Voting is a general method for preference aggregation in multiagent settings, but seminal results have shown that all (nondictatorial) voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using voting protocols where determining a beneficial manipulation is hard computationa ..."
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Cited by 108 (24 self)
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Voting is a general method for preference aggregation in multiagent settings, but seminal results have shown that all (nondictatorial) voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using voting protocols where determining a beneficial manipulation is hard computationally.
Junta distributions and the averagecase complexity of manipulating elections
 In AAMAS
, 2006
"... Encouraging voters to truthfully reveal their preferences in an election has long been an important issue. Recently, computational complexity has been suggested as a means of precluding strategic behavior. Previous studies have shown that some voting protocols are hard to manipulate, but used N Pha ..."
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Cited by 91 (23 self)
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Encouraging voters to truthfully reveal their preferences in an election has long been an important issue. Recently, computational complexity has been suggested as a means of precluding strategic behavior. Previous studies have shown that some voting protocols are hard to manipulate, but used N Phardness as the complexity measure. Such a worstcase analysis may be an insufficient guarantee of resistance to manipulation. Indeed, we demonstrate that N Phard manipulations may be tractable in the averagecase. For this purpose, we augment the existing theory of averagecase complexity with some new concepts. In particular, we consider elections distributed with respect to junta distributions, which concentrate on hard instances. We use our techniques to prove that scoring protocols are susceptible to manipulation by coalitions, when the number of candidates is constant. 1.
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
 In Proceedings of the Ninth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC
, 2008
"... We introduce a class of voting rules called generalized scoring rules. Under such a rule, each vote generates a vector of k scores, and the outcome of the voting rule is based only on the sum of these vectors—more specifically, only on the order (in terms of score) of the sum’s components. This clas ..."
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Cited by 61 (18 self)
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We introduce a class of voting rules called generalized scoring rules. Under such a rule, each vote generates a vector of k scores, and the outcome of the voting rule is based only on the sum of these vectors—more specifically, only on the order (in terms of score) of the sum’s components. This class is extremely general: we do not know of any commonly studied rule that is not a generalized scoring rule. We then study the coalitional manipulation problem for generalized scoring rules. We prove that under certain natural assump), then tions, if the number of manipulators is O(n p) (for any p < 1 2 the probability that a random profile is manipulable is O(n p − 1 2), where n is the number of voters. We also prove that under another set of natural assumptions, if the number of manipulators is Ω(n p) (for any p> 1) and o(n), then the probability that a random pro2 file is manipulable (to any possible winner under the voting rule) is 1 − O(e −Ω(n2p−1)). We also show that common voting rules satisfy these conditions (for the uniform distribution). These results generalize earlier results by Procaccia and Rosenschein as well as even earlier results on the probability of an election being tied.
Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation
 In Proceedings of the 16th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation
, 2005
"... This paper addresses the problem of constructing voting protocols that are hard to manipulate. We describe a general technique for obtaining a new protocol by combining two or more base protocols, and study the resulting class of (voteonce) hybrid voting protocols, which also includes most previous ..."
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Cited by 55 (4 self)
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This paper addresses the problem of constructing voting protocols that are hard to manipulate. We describe a general technique for obtaining a new protocol by combining two or more base protocols, and study the resulting class of (voteonce) hybrid voting protocols, which also includes most previously known manipulationresistant protocols. We show that for many choices of underlying base protocols, including some that are easily manipulable, their hybrids are NPhard to manipulate, and demonstrate that this method can be used to produce manipulationresistant protocols with unique combinations of useful features. 1
Elections Can be Manipulated Often
"... The GibbardSatterthwaite theorem states that every nontrivial voting method between at least 3 alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with nonnegligible probab ..."
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Cited by 55 (1 self)
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The GibbardSatterthwaite theorem states that every nontrivial voting method between at least 3 alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with nonnegligible probability for every neutral voting method between 3 alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship.
Determining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders
"... Usually a voting rule or correspondence requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alternatives. It has been suggested to let agents submit partial orders instead. Then, given a profile of part ..."
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Cited by 48 (13 self)
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Usually a voting rule or correspondence requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alternatives. It has been suggested to let agents submit partial orders instead. Then, given a profile of partial orders and a candidate c, two important questions arise: first, is c guaranteed to win, and second, is it still possible for c to win? These are the necessary winner and possible winner problems, respectively. We consider the setting where the number of alternatives is unbounded and the votes are unweighted. We prove that for Copeland, maximin, Bucklin, and ranked pairs, the possible winner problem is NPcomplete; also, we give a sufficient condition on scoring rules for the possible winner problem to be NPcomplete (Borda satisfies this condition). We also prove that for Copeland and ranked pairs, the necessary winner problem is coNPcomplete. All the hardness results hold even when the number of undetermined pairs in each vote is no more than a constant. We also present polynomialtime algorithms for the necessary winner problem for scoring rules, maximin, and Bucklin.