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Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS
, 1999
"... This paper provides an elementary, nontechnical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. (The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), forthco ..."
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Cited by 354 (3 self)
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This paper provides an elementary, nontechnical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. (The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), forthcoming.) We begin with the most fundamental concepts, and then introduce the basic analysis of optimal auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, and marginal revenues. Subsequent sections address riskaversion, affiliation, asymmetries, entry, collusion, multiunit auctions, double auctions, royalties, incentive contracts, and other topics. Appendices contain technical details, some simple worked examples, and a bibliography for each section.
Truthful Mechanisms for OneParameter Agents
"... In this paper, we show how to design truthful (dominant strategy) mechanisms for several combinatorial problems where each agent’s secret data is naturally expressed by a single positive real number. The goal of the mechanisms we consider is to allocate loads placed on the agents, and an agent’s sec ..."
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Cited by 188 (4 self)
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In this paper, we show how to design truthful (dominant strategy) mechanisms for several combinatorial problems where each agent’s secret data is naturally expressed by a single positive real number. The goal of the mechanisms we consider is to allocate loads placed on the agents, and an agent’s secret data is the cost she incurs per unit load. We give an exact characterization for the algorithms that can be used to design truthful mechanisms for such load balancing problems using appropriate side payments. We use our characterization to design polynomial time truthful mechanisms for several problems in combinatorial optimization to which the celebrated VCG mechanism does not apply. For scheduling related parallel machines (QjjCmax), we give a 3approximation mechanism based on randomized rounding of the optimal fractional solution. This problem is NPcomplete, and the standard approximation algorithms (greedy loadbalancing or the PTAS) cannot be used in truthful mechanisms. We show our mechanism to be frugal, in that the total payment needed is only a logarithmic factor more than the actual costs incurred by the machines, unless one machine dominates the total processing power. We also give truthful mechanisms for maximum flow, Qjj P Cj (scheduling related machines to minimize the sum of completion times), optimizing an affine function over a fixed set, and special cases of uncapacitated facility location. In addition, for Qjj P wjCj (minimizing the weighted sum of completion times), we prove a lower bound of 2 p 3 for the best approximation ratio achievable by a truthful mechanism.
A crash course in implementation theory
 SOC CHOICE WELFARE
, 2001
"... This paper is meant to familiarize the audience with some of the fundamental results in the theory of implementation and provide a quick progression to some open questions in the literature. ..."
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Cited by 75 (2 self)
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This paper is meant to familiarize the audience with some of the fundamental results in the theory of implementation and provide a quick progression to some open questions in the literature.
Robust mechanism design
 ECONOMETRICA
, 2005
"... The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying implementation on richer type spaces, with more higher order uncertainty. We study the "ex post equivalence" question: when is interim im ..."
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Cited by 54 (6 self)
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The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying implementation on richer type spaces, with more higher order uncertainty. We study the "ex post equivalence" question: when is interim implementation on all possible type spaces equivalent to requiring ex post implementation on the space of payoff types? We show that ex post equivalence holds when the social choice correspondence is a function and in simple quasilinear environments. When ex post equivalence holds, we identify how large the type space must be to obtain the equivalence. We also show that ex post equivalence fails in general, including in quasilinear environments with budget balance. For quasilinear environments, we provide an exact characterization of when interim implementation is possible in rich type spaces. In this environment, the planner can fully extract players’ belief types, so the incentive constraints reduce to conditions distinguishing types with the same beliefs about others’ types but different payoff types.
Implementation Theory
 in Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen, and Kataro Suzumara, eds., Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, vol. I
, 2002
"... The implementation problem is the problem of designing a mechanism (game form) such that the equilibrium outcomes satisfy some criterion of social optimality. The early literature assumed that each agent would simply report his ..."
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Cited by 21 (1 self)
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The implementation problem is the problem of designing a mechanism (game form) such that the equilibrium outcomes satisfy some criterion of social optimality. The early literature assumed that each agent would simply report his
Currency and Credit in a Private Information Economy
 Journal of Political Economy
, 1989
"... you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, noncommercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact inform ..."
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Cited by 19 (1 self)
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you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, noncommercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
 Journal of Economic Theory
, 1999
"... antonio.cabrales econ.upf.es ..."
A Qualitative Vickrey Auction
"... Restricting the preferences of the agents by assuming that their utility functions linearly depend on a payment allows for the positive results of the Vickrey auction and the VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism. These results, however, are limited to settings where there is some commonly desired commodi ..."
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Cited by 11 (3 self)
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Restricting the preferences of the agents by assuming that their utility functions linearly depend on a payment allows for the positive results of the Vickrey auction and the VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism. These results, however, are limited to settings where there is some commonly desired commodity or numeraire—money, shells, beads, etcetera—which is commensurable with utility. We propose a generalization of the Vickrey auction that does not assume that the agents’ preferences are quasilinear, but nevertheless retains some of the Vickrey auction’s desirable properties. In this auction, a bid can be any alternative, rather than just a monetary offer. As a consequence, the auction is also applicable to situations where there is a fixed budget, or no numeraire is available at all (or it is undesirable to use payments for other reasons)—such as, for example, in the allocation of the task of contributing a module to an opensource project. We show that in two general settings, this qualitative Vickrey auction has a dominantstrategy equilibrium, invariably yields a weakly Pareto efficient outcome in this equilibrium, and is individually rational. In the first setting, the center has a linear preference order over a finite set of alternatives, and in the second setting, the bidders ’ preferences can be represented by continuous utility functions over a closed metric space of alternatives and the center’s utility is equipeaked. The traditional Vickrey auction turns out to be a special case of the qualitative Vickrey auction in this second setting.