This paper gives a survey on cryptographic hash functions. It gives an overview of all types of hash functions and reviews design principals and possible methods of attacks. It also focuses on keyed hash functions and provides the applications, requirements, and constructions of keyed hash functions.

In [1,2] we introduced the notion of differential cryptanalysis and described its application to DES[11] and several of its variants. In this paper we show the applicability of differential cryptanalysis to the Feal family of encryption algorithms and to the N-Hash hash function. In addition, we show how to transform differential cryptanalytic chosen plaintext attacks into known plaintext attacks. 1 Introduction Feal is a family of encryption algorithms, which are designed to have simple and efficient software implementations on eight-bit microprocessors. The original member of this family, called Feal-4[13], had four rounds. This version was broken by Den Boer[3] using a chosen plaintext attack with 100 to 10000 ciphertexts. The designers of Feal reacted by creating a second version, called Feal-8[12,9] in which the number of rounds was increased to eight, while the F function was not changed. Feal-8 was broken by the differential cryptanalytic chosen plaintext attack described in thi...

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Dedicated hash functions are cryptographically secure compression functions which are designed specifically for hashing. They intend to form a practical alternative for hash functions based on another cryptographic primitive like a block cipher or modular squaring. About a dozen of dedicated hash functions have been proposed in the literature. This paper discusses the design principles on which these hash functions are based.

A secure network achieves integrity and privacy in communication by employing a shared private key for generation of a MAC and for payload encryption respectively for its messages. A public key cipher method is used for authentication and secret key exchange among remote nodes. Lower layer security mechanisms currently available for ATM networks operate either at frame level or use a combined frame and cell approach that result in in exible and ine cient schemes. In this paper, we investigate network and cryptographic technology requirements and limitations encountered in designing an exclusively cell{based secure ATM network. We also present adesign for a cryptographic security device that can be transparently dropped{in between an ATM user device and network switch to provide secure virtual connections.