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The economic consequences of rising US government debt: privileges at risk”. Economics Working Paper Series qt7kz6v3zs, (2010)

by H Bohn
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A comparative-advantage approach to government debt maturity’,

by Robin Greenwood , Samuel G Hanson , Jeremy C Stein ,  We , Robert Barro , Markus Brunnermeier , John Campbell , Martin Eichenbaum , Michael Fleming , Ken Froot , Kenneth Garbade , Julio Rotemberg , Andrei Shleifer , Erik Stafford , Adi Sunderam , Matt Weinzierl - The Journal of Finance , 2015
"... Abstract We study optimal government debt maturity in a model where investors derive monetary services from holding riskless short-term securities. In a setting where the government is the only issuer of such riskless paper, it trades off the monetary premium associated with short-term debt against ..."
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Abstract We study optimal government debt maturity in a model where investors derive monetary services from holding riskless short-term securities. In a setting where the government is the only issuer of such riskless paper, it trades off the monetary premium associated with short-term debt against the refinancing risk implied by the need to roll over its debt more often. We then extend the model to allow private financial intermediaries to compete with the government in the provision of short-term, money-like claims. We argue that if there are negative externalities associated with private money creation, the government should tilt its issuance more towards short maturities. The idea is that the government may have a comparative advantage relative to the private sector in bearing refinancing risk, and hence should aim to partially crowd out the private sector's use of short-term debt.
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...apture all the concerns that government debt managers have in mind when they talk about the “rollover risk” associated with short-term financing. Specifically, one can imagine that even if the discount factor β were fixed, it might be imprudent for the Treasury to put itself in the extreme position of having to roll over all outstanding T-bills every night. Such a strategy might increase its vulnerability to bankrun-type problems, whereby a sudden fear about the government’s ability to service its debts leads to a sharp increase in borrowing costs and makes the run a self-fulfilling prophecy (Bohn (2011)). However, before one invokes run risk as a reason not to issue more T-bills, it is important to remember the core message of the model: what matters is not the absolute social cost created by a given government debt-maturity structure, but the government’s comparative advantage in bearing this cost. While it is one thing to argue that the government may face some amount of run risk when issuing a large quantity of short-maturity debt, it is quite another to argue that it is not better-suited than the private sector to bearing such run risk. VI. Conclusions A growing body of evidence suggests...

Financial Crises and the Politics of Adjustment and Reform Financial Crises and the Politics of Adjustment and Reform

by Thomas B Pepinsky
"... ABSTRACT This chapter is a critical survey of the literature on international financial crises and their consequences for national politics, with a focus on national-level policy choices and political outcomes. After distinguishing conceptually among adjustment, reform, and political change as thre ..."
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ABSTRACT This chapter is a critical survey of the literature on international financial crises and their consequences for national politics, with a focus on national-level policy choices and political outcomes. After distinguishing conceptually among adjustment, reform, and political change as three broad families of political consequences to financial crises, it reviews three broad analytical approaches to the study of post-crisis political outcomes. Interest-based approaches center on the specific economic consequences of different kinds of financial crises, and look to policy outcomes as a consequence of the interaction between distributional pressures and national political-economic profiles. Institutional approaches address the ways in which institutions mediate the articulation of interest group pressures. Ideational approaches emphasize the constitutive power of ideas in making sense of financial crises. The concluding section identifies several promising areas for future research, highlighting in particular the importance of international context for conditioning the effects of international financial crises on domestic politics. It also highlights some general methodological problems with studying the highly complex economic and political consequences of financial crises.
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...ll-covered (see Helleiner 2011 for a review). In characterizing the political effects of financial crises, it is helpful to catalog specific moments at which ideas shape the political effects of financial crises. First, conditional on the broad acceptance of that a country is experiencing a crisis at all (which may itself be contested), ideas shape understandings the crisis’s nature. The economic policy debate in the U.S. since 2008 illustrates this well. This debate involves sharp disagreements about whether the U.S. has experienced a banking crisis, or more seriously, a looming debt crisis (Bohn 2011). Policy debates around the debt ceiling showdown of mid-2011, and the fiscal cliff showdown of late 2012, reveal the centrality of ideas in diagnosing the “true” crisis facing the U.S. economy. If ideas shape understandings of the nature of crises, then they also shape the logic of policy responses. For example, if a financial crisis is understood to be just a banking crisis, then fiscal consolidation is unnecessary—the task is to adjust, and perhaps to implement some financial reforms. If the crisis is actually an incipient debt crisis, then the long term viability of 22 the economy is in qu...

A Service of zbw Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre for Economics The economic consequences of rising US government debt: privileges at risk

by Henning Bohn , Henning Bohn
"... Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, ..."
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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Economic Consequences of Rising U.S. Government Debt: Privileges at Risk Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may Abstract The rapidly growing federal government debt has become a concern for policy makers and the public. Yet the U.S. government has seemingly unbounded access to credit at low interest rates. Historically, Treasury yields have been below the growth rate of the economy. The paper examines the ramifications of debt financing at low interest rates. Given the short maturity of U.S. public debt -over $2.5 trillion maturing in 2010 -investor expectations are critical. Excessive debts justify reasonable doubts about solvency and monetary stability and thus undermine a financing strategy built on the perception that U.S. debt is safe. JEL-Code: H63, H62, E60.

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS Working Paper UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST Public debt, secular stagnation and functional finance Public debt, secular stagnation and functional finance

by Peter Skott , Peter Skott
"... Abstract: Fiscal policy and public debt may be required to maintain full employment and avoid secular stagnation. This conclusion emerges from a range of different models, including OLG specifications and stock-flow consistent (post-) Keynesian models. One of the determinants of the required long-r ..."
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Abstract: Fiscal policy and public debt may be required to maintain full employment and avoid secular stagnation. This conclusion emerges from a range of different models, including OLG specifications and stock-flow consistent (post-) Keynesian models. One of the determinants of the required long-run debt ratio is the rate of economic growth. Low growth leads to high debt, and empirical correlations between growth and debt may reflect this causal effect of growth on debt, rather than negative effects of debt on growth. A second result relates directly to austerity policies. The level of government consumption and the structure of taxation influence the required debt ratio and, paradoxically, austerity policies are counterproductive on their own terms: cuts in government consumption lead to an increase in the required level of debt. JEL numbers:E62, E22
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...atter plot of the real interest rate on 3‐month treasury bills against the debt‐gdp ratio for the US, 1939‐2014.14 The evidence fails to support crowding out. The US has seen large variations in the debt ratio but the correlation with interest rates is, if anything, negative. This lack of support for crowding out is confirmed by more detailed studies. In the words of Engen and Hubbard (2005, p.83), “some economists believe there is a significant, large, positive effect of government debt on interest rates, others interpret the evidence as suggesting that there is no effect on interest rates”. Bohn (2010, p.14) makes a similar statement about the difficulty of finding significant interest rate effects of debt. He goes on to 14 The picture is qualitatively similar for other interest rates. 14 suggest that a “leading explanation is Ricardian neutrality”. Imperfect functional finance, however, would seem a more plausible explanation. The relevance of functional finance can be questioned from another angle: policy makers may, it is suggested, be unable to control the real rate of interest on public debt. Chalk (2000, p. 319) argues that some OECD countries “have seen an explosion in their indebte...

A Service of zbw Labor Market Policy: A Comparative View on the Costs and Benefi ts of Labor Market Flexibility Labor Market Policy: A Comparative View on the Costs and Benefits of Labor Market Flexibility ABSTRACT Labor Market Policy: A Comparative View

by Lawrence M Kahn , Lawrence M Kahn
"... Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, ..."
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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

No 06/2013 Public debt and changing inflation targets

by Deutsche Bundesbank, Michael U. Krause, Stéphane Moyen, Klaus Düllmann, Heinz Herrmann, Christoph Memmel
"... Discussion Papers represent the authors ‘ personal opinions and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Deutsche Bundesbank or its staff. Editorial Board: ..."
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Discussion Papers represent the authors ‘ personal opinions and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Deutsche Bundesbank or its staff. Editorial Board:

By Soon Ryoo

by Peter Skott
"... Public debt and full employment in a stockflow consistent model of a corporate economy ..."
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Public debt and full employment in a stockflow consistent model of a corporate economy

The Fiscal Limit and Non-Ricardian Consumers ∗

by Er W. Richter, Dedication To , 2011
"... The U.S. federal government faces the prospect of exponentially rising entitlement obligations that threaten to push the debt-to-GDP ratio to historically unprecedented levels. I introduce a fiscal limit into a Perpetual Youth model to assess how intergenerational redistributions of wealth and the m ..."
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The U.S. federal government faces the prospect of exponentially rising entitlement obligations that threaten to push the debt-to-GDP ratio to historically unprecedented levels. I introduce a fiscal limit into a Perpetual Youth model to assess how intergenerational redistributions of wealth and the maturity structure of government debt impact the economic consequences of fiscal stress. Growing entitlement commitments require taking a stand on how future monetary and fiscal policies may adjust. When the economy hits its fiscal limit—the point at which increases in taxes are no longer feasible—either the fiscal authority must renege on its promised entitlement benefit or the monetary authority must adjust its policy to stabilize debt. I find that intergenerational transfers of wealth strengthen the expectational effects of the fiscal limit and magnify the likelihood of stagflation. A longer average maturity of government debt weakens these effects in the short and medium runs but still increases the risk of stagflation when taxes come due in the long-run. Dire scenarios never transpire, but delaying reform—legislation that places entitlement spending on a stable path—lengthens the stagflationary period.

GOVERNMENT DEBT MANAGEMENT AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND

by unknown authors , 2014
"... This paper re-examines government debt management policy in light of the U.S. experience with extraordinary fiscal and monetary policies since 2008. We first document that the Treasury’s decision to lengthen the average maturity of the debt has partially offset the Federal Reserve’s attempts to redu ..."
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This paper re-examines government debt management policy in light of the U.S. experience with extraordinary fiscal and monetary policies since 2008. We first document that the Treasury’s decision to lengthen the average maturity of the debt has partially offset the Federal Reserve’s attempts to reduce the supply of long-term bonds held by private investors through its policy of quantitative easing. We then examine the appropriate debt management policy for the consolidated government. We argue that traditional considerations favoring longer-term debt may be overstated, and suggest that there are several advantages to issuing greater quantities of short-term debt. Under current institutional arrangements, neither the Federal Reserve nor the Treasury is caused to view debt management policy on the basis of the overall national interest. We suggest revised institutional arrangements to promote greater cooperation between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve in setting debt management policy. This is particularly important when conventional monetary policy becomes constrained by the zero lower bound, leaving debt management as one of the few policy levers to support aggregate demand.
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... the government vulnerable to bank-runsproblems, whereby a growing fear about the government’s ability to service its debts leads to assharp rise in interest costs and makes the fear self-fulfilling (=-=Bohn 2011-=-). However, a variety ofsvalues to the same asset. Proofs of Ricardian equivalence also assume that agents have infinite horizons and this issoften cited as a reason why Ricardian equivalence may fail...

dependent fiscal reaction functions The South African case

by Marina Marinkov
"... Fiscal rules and regime- ..."
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Fiscal rules and regime-
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