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Fuzzy extractors: How to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data. Technical Report 2003/235, Cryptology ePrint archive, http://eprint.iacr.org, 2006. Previous version appeared at EUROCRYPT 2004
- 34 [DRS07] [DS05] [EHMS00] [FJ01] Yevgeniy Dodis, Leonid Reyzin, and Adam
, 2004
"... We provide formal definitions and efficient secure techniques for • turning noisy information into keys usable for any cryptographic application, and, in particular, • reliably and securely authenticating biometric data. Our techniques apply not just to biometric information, but to any keying mater ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 180 (19 self)
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We provide formal definitions and efficient secure techniques for • turning noisy information into keys usable for any cryptographic application, and, in particular, • reliably and securely authenticating biometric data. Our techniques apply not just to biometric information, but to any keying material that, unlike traditional cryptographic keys, is (1) not reproducible precisely and (2) not distributed uniformly. We propose two primitives: a fuzzy extractor reliably extracts nearly uniform randomness R from its input; the extraction is error-tolerant in the sense that R will be the same even if the input changes, as long as it remains reasonably close to the original. Thus, R can be used as a key in a cryptographic application. A secure sketch produces public information about its input w that does not reveal w, and yet allows exact recovery of w given another value that is close to w. Thus, it can be used to reliably reproduce error-prone biometric inputs without incurring the security risk inherent in storing them. We define the primitives to be both formally secure and versatile, generalizing much prior work. In addition, we provide nearly optimal constructions of both primitives for various measures of “closeness” of input data, such as Hamming distance, edit distance, and set difference.
Generalized Privacy Amplification
- IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
, 1995
"... This paper provides a general treatment of privacy amplification by public discussion, a concept introduced by Bennett, Brassard and Robert [1] for a special scenario. The results have applications to unconditionally-secure secret-key agreement protocols, quantum cryptography and to a non-asymptotic ..."
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Cited by 176 (20 self)
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This paper provides a general treatment of privacy amplification by public discussion, a concept introduced by Bennett, Brassard and Robert [1] for a special scenario. The results have applications to unconditionally-secure secret-key agreement protocols, quantum cryptography and to a non-asymptotic and constructive treatment of the secrecy capacity of wire-tap and broadcast channels, even for a considerably strengthened definition of secrecy capacity. I. Introduction This paper is concerned with unconditionally-secure secretkey agreement by two communicating parties Alice and Bob who both know a random variable W, for instance a random n--bit string, about which an eavesdropper Eve has incomplete information characterized by the random variable V jointly distributed with W according to PV W . This distribution may partially be under Eve's control. Alice and Bob know nothing about PV W , except that it satisfies a certain constraint. We present protocols by which Alice and Bob can us...
Secret Key Agreement by Public Discussion From Common Information
- IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
, 1993
"... . The problem of generating a shared secret key S by two parties knowing dependent random variables X and Y , respectively, but not sharing a secret key initially, is considered. An enemy who knows the random variable Z, jointly distributed with X and Y according to some probability distribution PX ..."
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Cited by 175 (18 self)
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. The problem of generating a shared secret key S by two parties knowing dependent random variables X and Y , respectively, but not sharing a secret key initially, is considered. An enemy who knows the random variable Z, jointly distributed with X and Y according to some probability distribution PXY Z , can also receive all messages exchanged by the two parties over a public channel. The goal of a protocol is that the enemy obtains at most a negligible amount of information about S. Upper bounds on H(S) as a function of PXY Z are presented. Lower bounds on the rate H(S)=N (as N !1) are derived for the case where X = [X 1 ; : : : ; XN ], Y = [Y 1 ; : : : ; YN ] and Z = [Z 1 ; : : : ; ZN ] result from N independent executions of a random experiment generating X i ; Y i and Z i , for i = 1; : : : ; N . In particular it is shown that such secret key agreement is possible for a scenario where all three parties receive the output of a binary symmetric source over independent binary symmetr...
Experimental Quantum Cryptography
- Journal of Cryptology
, 1992
"... We describe results from an apparatus and protocol designed to implement quantum key distribution, by which two users, who share no secret information initially: 1) exchange a random quantum transmission, consisting of very faint flashes of polarized light; 2) by subsequent public discussion of the ..."
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Cited by 173 (19 self)
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We describe results from an apparatus and protocol designed to implement quantum key distribution, by which two users, who share no secret information initially: 1) exchange a random quantum transmission, consisting of very faint flashes of polarized light; 2) by subsequent public discussion of the sent and received versions of this transmission estimate the extent of eavesdropping that might have taken place on it, and finally 3) if this estimate is small enough, distill from the sent and received versions a smaller body of shared random information, which is certifiably secret in the sense that any third party's expected information on it is an exponentially small fraction of one bit. Because the system depends on the uncertainty principle of quantum physics, instead of usual mathematical assumptions such as the difficulty of factoring, it remains secure against an adversary with unlimited computing power. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at Eurocrypt '90, May 21 ...
Simulating BPP Using a General Weak Random Source
- ALGORITHMICA
, 1996
"... We show how to simulate BPP and approximation algorithms in polynomial time using the output from a ffi-source. A ffi-source is a weak random source that is asked only once for R bits, and must output an R-bit string according to some distribution that places probability no more than 2 \GammaffiR on ..."
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Cited by 96 (17 self)
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We show how to simulate BPP and approximation algorithms in polynomial time using the output from a ffi-source. A ffi-source is a weak random source that is asked only once for R bits, and must output an R-bit string according to some distribution that places probability no more than 2 \GammaffiR on any particular string. We also give an application to the unapproximability of Max Clique.
Quantum cryptography
- Rev. Mod. Phys
, 2002
"... Quantum cryptography could well be the first application of quantum mechanics at the individual quanta level. The very fast progress in both theory and experiments over the recent years are reviewed, with emphasis on open questions and technological issues. Contents I ..."
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Cited by 77 (3 self)
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Quantum cryptography could well be the first application of quantum mechanics at the individual quanta level. The very fast progress in both theory and experiments over the recent years are reviewed, with emphasis on open questions and technological issues. Contents I
Secret-Key Reconciliation by Public Discussion
, 1994
"... . Assuming that Alice and Bob use a secret noisy channel (modelled by a binary symmetric channel) to send a key, reconciliation is the process of correcting errors between Alice's and Bob's version of the key. This is done by public discussion, which leaks some information about the secret key to an ..."
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Cited by 74 (3 self)
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. Assuming that Alice and Bob use a secret noisy channel (modelled by a binary symmetric channel) to send a key, reconciliation is the process of correcting errors between Alice's and Bob's version of the key. This is done by public discussion, which leaks some information about the secret key to an eavesdropper. We show how to construct protocols that leak a minimum amount of information. However this construction cannot be implemented efficiently. If Alice and Bob are willing to reveal an arbitrarily small amount of additional information (beyond the minimum) then they can implement polynomial-time protocols. We also present a more efficient protocol, which leaks an amount of information acceptably close to the minimum possible for sufficiently reliable secret channels (those with probability of any symbol being transmitted incorrectly as large as 15%). This work improves on earlier reconciliation approaches [R, BBR, BBBSS]. 1 Introduction Unlike public key cryptosystems, the securi...
Practical Quantum Oblivious Transfer
, 1992
"... We describe a protocol for quantum oblivious transfer , utilizing faint pulses of polarized light, by which one of two mutually distrustful parties ("Alice") transmits two one-bit messages in such a way that the other party ("Bob") can choose which message he gets but cannot obtain information about ..."
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Cited by 66 (12 self)
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We describe a protocol for quantum oblivious transfer , utilizing faint pulses of polarized light, by which one of two mutually distrustful parties ("Alice") transmits two one-bit messages in such a way that the other party ("Bob") can choose which message he gets but cannot obtain information about both messages (he will learn his chosen bit's value with exponentially small error probability and may gain at most exponentially little information about the value of the other bit), and Alice will be entirely ignorant of which bit he received. Neither party can cheat (ie deviate from the protocol while appearing to follow it) in such a way as to obtain more information than what is given by the description of the protocol. Our protocol is easy to modify in order to implement the All-or-Nothing Disclosure of one out of two string messages, and it can be used to implement bit commitment and oblivious circuit evaluation without complexity-theoretic assumptions, in a way that remains secure e...
A Quantum Bit Commitment Scheme Provably Unbreakable by both Parties
, 1993
"... Assume that a party, Alice, has a bit x in mind, to which she would like to be committed toward another party, Bob. That is, Alice wishes, through a procedure commit(x), to provide Bob with a piece of evidence that she has a bit x in mind and that she cannot change it. Meanwhile, Bob should not be ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 66 (12 self)
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Assume that a party, Alice, has a bit x in mind, to which she would like to be committed toward another party, Bob. That is, Alice wishes, through a procedure commit(x), to provide Bob with a piece of evidence that she has a bit x in mind and that she cannot change it. Meanwhile, Bob should not be able to tell from that evidence what x is. At a later time, Alice can reveal, through a procedure unveil(x), the value of x and prove to Bob that the piece of evidence sent earlier really corresponded to that bit. Classical bit commitment schemes (by which Alice's piece of evidence is classical information such as a bit string) cannot be secure against unlimited computing power and none have been proven secure against algorithmic sophistication. Previous quantum bit commitment schemes (by which Alice's piece of evidence is quantum information such as a stream of polarized photons) were known to be invulnerable to unlimited computing power and algorithmic sophistication, but not to arbitrary...
Reusable cryptographic fuzzy extractors
- ACM CCS 2004, ACM
, 2004
"... We show that a number of recent definitions and constructions of fuzzy extractors are not adequate for multiple uses of the same fuzzy secret—a major shortcoming in the case of biometric applications. We propose two particularly stringent security models that specifically address the case of fuzzy s ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 49 (2 self)
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We show that a number of recent definitions and constructions of fuzzy extractors are not adequate for multiple uses of the same fuzzy secret—a major shortcoming in the case of biometric applications. We propose two particularly stringent security models that specifically address the case of fuzzy secret reuse, respectively from an outsider and an insider perspective, in what we call a chosen perturbation attack. We characterize the conditions that fuzzy extractors need to satisfy to be secure, and present generic constructions from ordinary building blocks. As an illustration, we demonstrate how to use a biometric secret in a remote error tolerant authentication protocol that does not require any storage on the client’s side. 1

