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Dynamic Power Allocation and Routing for Time Varying Wireless Networks
 IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
, 2003
"... We consider dynamic routing and power allocation for a wireless network with time varying channels. The network consists of power constrained nodes which transmit over wireless links with adaptive transmission rates. Packets randomly enter the system at each node and wait in output queues to be tran ..."
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Cited by 211 (50 self)
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We consider dynamic routing and power allocation for a wireless network with time varying channels. The network consists of power constrained nodes which transmit over wireless links with adaptive transmission rates. Packets randomly enter the system at each node and wait in output queues to be transmitted through the network to their destinations. We establish the capacity region of all rate matrices (# ij ) that the system can stably supportwhere (# ij ) represents the rate of traffic originating at node i and destined for node j. A joint routing and power allocation policy is developed which stabilizes the system and provides bounded average delay guarantees whenever the input rates are within this capacity region. Such performance holds for general arrival and channel state processes, even if these processes are unknown to the network controller. We then apply this control algorithm to an adhoc wireless network where channel variations are due to user mobility, and compare its performance with the GrossglauserTse relay model developed in [13].
Fairness and optimal stochastic control for heterogeneous networks
 Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, March 2005. TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING, VOL
, 2008
"... Abstract — We consider optimal control for general networks with both wireless and wireline components and time varying channels. A dynamic strategy is developed to support all traffic whenever possible, and to make optimally fair decisions about which data to serve when inputs exceed network capaci ..."
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Cited by 150 (29 self)
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Abstract — We consider optimal control for general networks with both wireless and wireline components and time varying channels. A dynamic strategy is developed to support all traffic whenever possible, and to make optimally fair decisions about which data to serve when inputs exceed network capacity. The strategy is decoupled into separate algorithms for flow control, routing, and resource allocation, and allows each user to make decisions independent of the actions of others. The combined strategy is shown to yield data rates that are arbitrarily close to the optimal operating point achieved when all network controllers are coordinated and have perfect knowledge of future events. The cost of approaching this fair operating point is an endtoend delay increase for data that is served by the network.
Performance management for cluster based web services
 in Proceedings of the 8th IFIP/IEEE International Symposium on Integrated Network Management
, 2003
"... Abstract: We present an architecture and prototype implementation of a performance management system for clusterbased web services. The system supports multiple classes of web services traffic and allocates server resources dynamically so to maximize the expected value of a given cluster utility fu ..."
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Cited by 47 (5 self)
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Abstract: We present an architecture and prototype implementation of a performance management system for clusterbased web services. The system supports multiple classes of web services traffic and allocates server resources dynamically so to maximize the expected value of a given cluster utility function in the face of fluctuating loads. The cluster utility is a function of the performance delivered to the various classes, and this leads to differentiated service. In this paper we will use the average response time as the performance metric. The management system is transparent: it requires no changes in the client code, the server code, or the network interface between them. The system performs three performance management tasks: resource allocation, load balancing, and server overload protection. We use two nested levels of management mechanism. The inner level centers on queuing and scheduling of request messages. The outer level is a feedback control loop that periodically adjusts the scheduling weights and server allocations of the inner level. The feedback controller is based on an approximate firstprinciples model of the system, with parameters derived from continuous monitoring. We focus on SOAPbased web services. We report experimental results that show the dynamic behavior of the system. 1.
A Unified Framework for MaxMin and MinMax Fairness with Applications
 in Proceedings of 40th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing
, 2002
"... Maxmin fairness is widely used in various areas of networking. In every case where it is used, there is a proof of existence and one or several algorithms for computing the maxmin fair allocation; in most, but not all cases, they are based on the notion of bottlenecks. In spite of this wide app ..."
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Cited by 39 (2 self)
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Maxmin fairness is widely used in various areas of networking. In every case where it is used, there is a proof of existence and one or several algorithms for computing the maxmin fair allocation; in most, but not all cases, they are based on the notion of bottlenecks. In spite of this wide applicability, there are still examples, arising in the context of mobile or peertopeer networks, where the existing theories do not seem to apply directly. In this paper, we give a unifying treatment of maxmin fairness, which encompasses all existing results in a simplifying framework, and extends its applicability to new examples. First, we observe that the existence of maxmin fairness is actually a geometric property of the set of feasible allocations (uniqueness always holds). There exist sets on which maxmin fairness does not exist, and we describe a large class of sets on which a maxmin fair allocation does exist. This class contains the compact, convex sets of , but not only. Second, we give a general purpose, centralized algorithm, called Maxmin Programming, for computing the maxmin fair allocation in all cases where it exists (whether the set of feasible allocations is in our class or not). Its complexity is of the order of linear programming steps in , in the case where the feasible set is defined by linear constraints. We show that, if the set of feasible allocations has the freedisposal property, then Maxmin Programming degenerates to a simpler algorithm, called Water Filling, whose complexity is much less. Free disposal corresponds to the cases where a bottleneck argument can be made, and Water Filling is the general form of all previously known centralized algorithms for such cases. Our derivations are based on the relation betwe...
Telecommunications Network Equilibrium with Price and QualityofService Characteristics
 In Proceedings of ITC
, 2003
"... We present a competitive model that describes the interaction between several competing telecommunications service providers (SPs), their subscribers, and a network owner. Competition between the service providers is assumed to take place in their pricing decisions as well as in terms of the quali ..."
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Cited by 19 (4 self)
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We present a competitive model that describes the interaction between several competing telecommunications service providers (SPs), their subscribers, and a network owner. Competition between the service providers is assumed to take place in their pricing decisions as well as in terms of the quality of service (QoS) they offer. In turn, the subscribers' demand for the service of an SP depends not only on the price and QoS of that SP but also upon those proposed by all of its competitors. We consider two types of games to describe the competitive interactions and analyze the resulting equilibria. As quality of service measures, we consider delay, packet losses and call rejections. We establish conditions for existence and uniqueness of the equilibria, compute them explicitly and characterize their properties.
Superfast delay tradeoffs for utility optimal fair scheduling in wireless networks
 IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, Special Issue on Nonlinear Optimization of Communication Systems
, 2006
"... Abstract — We consider the fundamental delay tradeoffs for utility optimal scheduling in a general multihop network with time varying channels. A network controller acts on randomly arriving data and makes flow control, routing, and resource allocation decisions to maximize a fairness metric based ..."
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Cited by 18 (10 self)
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Abstract — We consider the fundamental delay tradeoffs for utility optimal scheduling in a general multihop network with time varying channels. A network controller acts on randomly arriving data and makes flow control, routing, and resource allocation decisions to maximize a fairness metric based on a concave utility function of network throughput. A simple set of algorithms are constructed that yield total utility within O(1/V) of the utilityoptimal operating point, for any control parameter V> 0, with a corresponding endtoend network delay that grows only logarithmically in V. This is the first algorithm to achieve such “superfast ” performance. Furthermore, we show that this is the best utilitydelay tradeoff possible. This work demonstrates that the problem of maximizing throughput utility in a data network is fundamentally different than related problems of minimizing average power expenditure, as these latter problems cannot achieve such performance tradeoffs. Index Terms — Fairness, flow control, wireless networks, queueing analysis, optimization, delay, network capacity I.
Analysis of a Static Pricing Scheme for Priority Services
, 2004
"... We analyze a static pricing scheme for priority services. Users are free to choose the priority of their traffic but are charged accordingly. Using a game theoretic framework we study the case where users choose priorities to maximize their net benefit. For the single link case, we show that there a ..."
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Cited by 15 (0 self)
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We analyze a static pricing scheme for priority services. Users are free to choose the priority of their traffic but are charged accordingly. Using a game theoretic framework we study the case where users choose priorities to maximize their net benefit. For the single link case, we show that there always exists an equilibrium for the corresponding game; however, the equilibrium is not necessarily unique. Furthermore, we show that packet loss in equilibrium can be expressed as a function of the prices associated with the dierent priority classes. We provide a numerical case study to illustrate our results.
Wireless channel allocation using an auction algorithm
 IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS
, 2003
"... We develop a novel auctionbased algorithm to allow users to fairly compete for a wireless fading channel. We use the secondprice auction mechanism whereby user bids for the channel, during each time slot, based on the fade state of the channel, and the user that makes the highest bid wins use of ..."
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Cited by 14 (0 self)
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We develop a novel auctionbased algorithm to allow users to fairly compete for a wireless fading channel. We use the secondprice auction mechanism whereby user bids for the channel, during each time slot, based on the fade state of the channel, and the user that makes the highest bid wins use of the channel by paying the second highest bid. Under the assumption that each user has a limited budget for bidding, we show the existence of a Nash equilibrium strategy, and the Nash equilibrium leads to a unique allocation for certain channel state distribution, such as the exponential distribution and the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. For uniformly distributed channel state, we establish that the aggregate throughput received by the users using the Nash equilibrium strategy is at least 3/4 of what can be obtained using an optimal centralized allocation that does not take fairness into account. We also show that the Nash equilibrium strategy leads to an allocation that is Pareto optimal (i.e., it is impossible to make some users better off without making some other users worse off). Based on the Nash equilibrium strategies of the secondprice auction with money constraint, we further propose a centralized opportunistic scheduler that does not suffer the shortcomings associated with the proportional fair scheduler.
Cost Sharing and Strategyproof Mechanisms for Set Cover Games
"... We develop for set cover games several general costsharing methods that are approximately budgetbalanced, core, and/or groupstrategyproof. We first study the cost sharing for a single set cover game, which does not have a budgetbalanced core. We show that there is no cost allocation method that ..."
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Cited by 12 (3 self)
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We develop for set cover games several general costsharing methods that are approximately budgetbalanced, core, and/or groupstrategyproof. We first study the cost sharing for a single set cover game, which does not have a budgetbalanced core. We show that there is no cost allocation method that can of the total cost if we require the cost sharing being a core. Here n is the number of all players to be served. We give an efficient cost 1 allocation method that always recovers of the total cost, where dmax is ln dmax the maximum size of all sets. We then study the cost allocation scheme for all induced subgames. It is known that no cost sharing scheme can always recover more than 1 of the total cost for every subset of players. We give an efficient cost n sharing scheme that always recovers at least 1 of the total cost for every subset 2n of players and furthermore, our scheme is crossmonotone. When the elements to be covered are selfish agents with privately known valuations, we present a strategyproof charging mechanism, under the assumption that all sets are simple sets, such that each element maximizes its profit when it reports its valuation truthfully; further, the total cost of the set cover is no more than ln dmax times that of an optimal solution. When the sets are selfish agents with privately known costs, we present a strategyproof payment mechanism in which each set maximizes its profit when it reports its cost truthfully. We also show how to fairly share the payments to all sets among the elements. always recover more than 1 ln n 1