Over the first year of life, infants gain conceptual skills which allow them to construe semantically related items as similar, even when they have few if any directly-perceived attributes in common. Moreover, this skill first encompasses only broad semantic categories, and only later extends to more subtle distinctions, when conceptual and perceptual similarity relations do not coincide. In this paper we suggest that a new mechanism must be added to the mix of possible bases for this observed developmental change. In agreement with many others, we suggest that infants’ earliest conceptual representations are organised with respect to certain especially useful or salient properties, regardless of whether such properties can be directly observed. However we suggest that in many cases this salience may itself be acquired, through domain-general learning mechanisms that are sensitive to the high-order coherent covariation of directly-observed stimulus properties across a breadth of experience. To support this argument we will describe simulations with a simple PDP model of semantic memory. When trained with backpropagation to complete queries about the properties of different objects, the model’s internal representations differentiate in a coarse-to-fine manner. As a consequence, different sets of properties come to be especially “salient” to the