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Logics of Formal Inconsistency
 Handbook of Philosophical Logic
"... 1.1 Contradictoriness and inconsistency, consistency and noncontradictoriness In traditional logic, contradictoriness (the presence of contradictions in a theory or in a body of knowledge) and triviality (the fact that such a theory ..."
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1.1 Contradictoriness and inconsistency, consistency and noncontradictoriness In traditional logic, contradictoriness (the presence of contradictions in a theory or in a body of knowledge) and triviality (the fact that such a theory
A Taxonomy of Csystems
, 2002
"... The logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs) are paraconsistent logics which permit us to internalize the concepts of consistency or inconsistency inside our object language, introducing new operators to talk about them, and allowing us, in principle, to logically separate the notions of contradictorin ..."
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Cited by 41 (15 self)
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The logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs) are paraconsistent logics which permit us to internalize the concepts of consistency or inconsistency inside our object language, introducing new operators to talk about them, and allowing us, in principle, to logically separate the notions of contradictoriness and of inconsistency. We present the formal definitions of these logics in the context of General Abstract Logics, argue that they in fact represent the majority of all paraconsistent logics existing up to this point, if not the most exceptional ones, and we single out a subclass of them called Csystems, as the LFIs that are built over the positive basis of some given consistent logic. Given precise characterizations of some received logical principles, we point out that the gist of paraconsistent logic lies in the Principle of Explosion, rather than in the Principle of NonContradiction, and we also sharply distinguish these two from the Principle of NonTriviality, considering the next various weaker formulations of explosion, and investigating their interrelations. Subsequently, we present the syntactical formulations of some of the main Csystems based on classical logic, showing how several wellknown logics in the literature can be recast as such a kind of Csystems, and carefully study their properties and shortcomings, showing for instance how they can be used to faithfully
Diamonds are a Philosopher's Best Friends. The Knowability Paradox and Modal Epistemic Relevance Logic (Extended Abstract)
 Journal of Philosophical Logic
, 2002
"... Heinrich Wansing Dresden University of Technology The knowability paradox is an instance of a remarkable reasoning pattern (actually, a pair of such patterns), in the course of which an occurrence of the possibility operator, the diamond, disappears. In the present paper, it is pointed out how the ..."
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Heinrich Wansing Dresden University of Technology The knowability paradox is an instance of a remarkable reasoning pattern (actually, a pair of such patterns), in the course of which an occurrence of the possibility operator, the diamond, disappears. In the present paper, it is pointed out how the unwanted disappearance of the diamond may be escaped. The emphasis is not laid on a discussion of the contentious premise of the knowability paradox, namely that all truths are possibly known, but on how from this assumption the conclusion is derived that all truths are, in fact, known. Nevertheless, the solution o#ered is in the spirit of the constructivist attitude usually maintained by defenders of the antirealist premise. In order to avoid the paradoxical reasoning, a paraconsistent constructive relevant modal epistemic logic with strong negation is defined semantically. The system is axiomatized and shown to be complete.
How to Build Your Own Paraconsistent Logic: An Introduction To . . .
"... The logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs) are logics that allow to explicitly formalize the concepts of consistency and inconsistency by means of formulas of their language. Contradictoriness, on the other hand, can always be expressed in any logic, provided its la nguage includes a symbol for negat ..."
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The logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs) are logics that allow to explicitly formalize the concepts of consistency and inconsistency by means of formulas of their language. Contradictoriness, on the other hand, can always be expressed in any logic, provided its la nguage includes a symbol for negation. Besides being able to represent the distinction between contradiction and inconsistency, LFIs are nonexplosive logics, in the sense that a contradiction does not entail arbitrary statements, but yet are gently explosive, in the sense that, adjoining the additional requirement of consistency, then contradictoriness does cause explosion. Several logics can be seen as LFIs, among them the great majority of paraconsistent logics developed under the Brazilian tradition, as well as the sytems developed under the Polish tradition. We present here their semantical interpretations by way of possibletranslations semantics, stressing their significance and applications to human reasoning and machine reasoning. We also give tableaux systems for some important LFIs: bC, Ci and LFI1.