Abstract not found

Nicholas Humphrey’s social intelligence hypothesis proposed that the major engine of primate cognitive evolution was social competition. Lev Vygotsky also emphasized the social dimension of intelligence, but he focused on human primates and cultural things such as collaboration, communication and teaching. A reasonable proposal is that primate cognition in general was driven mainly by social competition, but beyond that the unique aspects of human cognition were driven by, or even constituted by, social cooperation. In the present paper, we provide evidence for this Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis by comparing the social-cognitive skills of great apes with those of young human children in several domains of activity involving cooperation and communication with others. We argue, finally, that regular participation in cooperative, cultural interactions during ontogeny leads children to construct uniquely powerful forms of perspectival cognitive representation.

This paper argues that the Turing test implicitly rests on a `naive psychology,' a naturally evolved psychological faculty which is used to predict and understand the behaviour of others in complex societies. This natural faculty is an important and implicit bias in the observer's tendency to ascribe mentality to the system in the test. The paper analyses the effects of this naive psychology on the Turing test, both from the side of the system and the side of the observer, and then proposes and justifies an inverted version of the test which allows the processes of ascription to be analysed more directly than in the standard version. Keywords: naive psychology, the Turing test, the `other minds' problem, false belief tests, folk psychology, theory of mind. I. Introduction 1. In 1950 Alan Turing considered the question `Can machines think?' but almost immediately threw it away as "too meaningless to deserve discussion" and proposed to replace it with a more empirical test ---...

The social brain hypothesis is a well-accepted and well-supported evolutionary theory of enlarged brain size in the non-human primates. Nevertheless, it tends to emphasize an anthropocentric view of social life and cognition. This often leads to confusion between ultimate and proximate mechanisms, and an over-reliance on a Cartesian, narratively structured view of the mind and social life, which in turn lead to views of social complexity that are congenial to our views of ourselves, rather than necessarily representative of primate social worlds. In this paper, we argue for greater attention to embodied and distributed theories of cognition, which get us away from current fixations on ‘theory of mind ’ and other high-level anthropocentric constructions, and allow for the generation of testable hypotheses that combine neurobiology, psychology and behaviour in a mutually reinforcing manner.

Individuals interact with conspecifics in a number of behavioural contexts or dimensions. Here, we formalise this by considering a social network between n individuals interacting in b behavioural dimensions as a nxnxb multidimensional object. In addition, we propose that the topology of this object is driven by individual needs to reduce uncertainty about the outcomes of interactions in one or more dimension. The proposal grounds social network dynamics and evolution in individual selection processes and allows us to define the uncertainty of the social network as the joint entropy of its constituent interaction networks. In support of these propositions we use simulations and natural ‗knock-outs ‘ in a free-ranging baboon troop to show (i) that such an object can display a small-world state and (ii) that, as predicted, changes in interactions after social perturbations lead to a more certain social network, in which the outcomes of interactions are easier for members to predict. This new formalisation of social networks provides a framework within which to predict network dynamics and evolution under the assumption that it is driven by individuals seeking to reduce the uncertainty of their social environment.

doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00105 The pervasive nature of unconscious social information processing in executive control