Results 1  10
of
48
A Logic for Reasoning about Probabilities
 Information and Computation
, 1990
"... We consider a language for reasoning about probability which allows us to make statements such as “the probability of E, is less than f ” and “the probability of E, is at least twice the probability of E,, ” where E, and EZ are arbitrary events. We consider the case where all events are measurable ( ..."
Abstract

Cited by 214 (19 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We consider a language for reasoning about probability which allows us to make statements such as “the probability of E, is less than f ” and “the probability of E, is at least twice the probability of E,, ” where E, and EZ are arbitrary events. We consider the case where all events are measurable (i.e., represent measurable sets) and the more general case, which is also of interest in practice, where they may not be measurable. The measurable case is essentially a formalization of (the propositional fragment of) Nilsson’s probabilistic logic. As we show elsewhere, the general (nonmeasurable) case corresponds precisely to replacing probability measures by DempsterShafer belief functions. In both cases, we provide a complete axiomatization and show that the problem of deciding satistiability is NPcomplete, no worse than that of propositional logic. As a tool for proving our complete axiomatizations, we give a complete axiomatization for reasoning about Boolean combinations of linear inequalities, which is of independent interest. This proof and others make crucial use of results from the theory of linear programming. We then extend the language to allow reasoning about conditional probability and show that the resulting logic is decidable and completely axiomatizable, by making use of the theory of real closed fields. ( 1990 Academic Press. Inc 1.
Reasoning about Knowledge and Probability
 Journal of the ACM
, 1994
"... : We provide a model for reasoning about knowledge and probability together. We allow explicit mention of probabilities in formulas, so that our language has formulas that essentially say "according to agent i, formula ' holds with probability at least b." The language is powerful enough to allow r ..."
Abstract

Cited by 156 (15 self)
 Add to MetaCart
: We provide a model for reasoning about knowledge and probability together. We allow explicit mention of probabilities in formulas, so that our language has formulas that essentially say "according to agent i, formula ' holds with probability at least b." The language is powerful enough to allow reasoning about higherorder probabilities, as well as allowing explicit comparisons of the probabilities an agent places on distinct events. We present a general framework for interpreting such formulas, and consider various properties that might hold of the interrelationship between agents' probability assignments at different states. We provide a complete axiomatization for reasoning about knowledge and probability, prove a small model property, and obtain decision procedures. We then consider the effects of adding common knowledge and a probabilistic variant of common knowledge to the language. A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the Second Conference on T...
The Independent Choice Logic for modelling multiple agents under uncertainty
 Artificial Intelligence
, 1997
"... Inspired by game theory representations, Bayesian networks, influence diagrams, structured Markov decision process models, logic programming, and work in dynamical systems, the independent choice logic (ICL) is a semantic framework that allows for independent choices (made by various agents, includi ..."
Abstract

Cited by 150 (9 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Inspired by game theory representations, Bayesian networks, influence diagrams, structured Markov decision process models, logic programming, and work in dynamical systems, the independent choice logic (ICL) is a semantic framework that allows for independent choices (made by various agents, including nature) and a logic program that gives the consequence of choices. This representation can be used as a specification for agents that act in a world, make observations of that world and have memory, as well as a modelling tool for dynamic environments with uncertainty. The rules specify the consequences of an action, what can be sensed and the utility of outcomes. This paper presents a possibleworlds semantics for ICL, and shows how to embed influence diagrams, structured Markov decision processes, and both the strategic (normal) form and extensive (gametree) form of games within the Thanks to Craig Boutilier and Holger Hoos for detailed comments on this paper. This work was supporte...
Two views of belief: Belief as generalized probability and belief as evidence
, 1992
"... : Belief functions are mathematical objects defined to satisfy three axioms that look somewhat similar to the Kolmogorov axioms defining probability functions. We argue that there are (at least) two useful and quite different ways of understanding belief functions. The first is as a generalized prob ..."
Abstract

Cited by 72 (12 self)
 Add to MetaCart
: Belief functions are mathematical objects defined to satisfy three axioms that look somewhat similar to the Kolmogorov axioms defining probability functions. We argue that there are (at least) two useful and quite different ways of understanding belief functions. The first is as a generalized probability function (which technically corresponds to the inner measure induced by a probability function). The second is as a way of representing evidence. Evidence, in turn, can be understood as a mapping from probability functions to probability functions. It makes sense to think of updating a belief if we think of it as a generalized probability. On the other hand, it makes sense to combine two beliefs (using, say, Dempster's rule of combination) only if we think of the belief functions as representing evidence. Many previous papers have pointed out problems with the belief function approach; the claim of this paper is that these problems can be explained as a consequence of confounding the...
Anonymity and Information Hiding in Multiagent Systems
, 2003
"... We provide a framework for reasoning about informationhiding requirements in multiagent systems and for reasoning about anonymity in particular. Our framework employs the modal logic of knowledge within the context of the runs and systems framework, much in the spirit of our earlier work on secrecy ..."
Abstract

Cited by 66 (2 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We provide a framework for reasoning about informationhiding requirements in multiagent systems and for reasoning about anonymity in particular. Our framework employs the modal logic of knowledge within the context of the runs and systems framework, much in the spirit of our earlier work on secrecy [9]. We give several definitions of anonymity with respect to agents, actions, and observers in multiagent systems, and we relate our definitions of anonymity to other definitions of information hiding, such as secrecy. We also give probabilistic definitions of anonymity that are able to quantify an observer's uncertainty about the state of the system. Finally, we relate our definitions of anonymity to other formalizations of anonymity and information hiding, including definitions of anonymity in the process algebra CSP and definitions of information hiding using function views.
Reasoning about Noisy Sensors and Effectors in the Situation Calculus
 Artificial Intelligence
, 1998
"... Agents interacting with an incompletely known world need to be able to reason about the effects of their actions, and to gain further information about that world they need to use sensors of some sort. Unfortunately, both the effects of actions and the information returned from sensors are subject t ..."
Abstract

Cited by 63 (4 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Agents interacting with an incompletely known world need to be able to reason about the effects of their actions, and to gain further information about that world they need to use sensors of some sort. Unfortunately, both the effects of actions and the information returned from sensors are subject to error. To cope with such uncertainties, the agent can maintain probabilistic beliefs about the state of the world. With probabilistic beliefs the agent will be able to quantify the likelihood of the various outcomes of its actions and is better able to utilize the information gathered from its errorprone actions and sensors. In this paper, we present a model in which we can reason about an agent's probabilistic degrees of belief and the manner in which these beliefs change as various actions are executed. We build on a general logical theory of action developed by Reiter and others, formalized in the situation calculus. We propose a simple axiomatization that captures an agent's state of ...
Symbolic Model Checking the Knowledge of the Dining Cryptographers
, 2002
"... This paper describes how symbolic techniques (in particular, OBDD's) may be used to to implement an algorithm for model checking specifications in the logic of knowledge for a single agent operating with synchronous perfect recall in an environment of which it has incomplete knowledge. As an illustr ..."
Abstract

Cited by 54 (9 self)
 Add to MetaCart
This paper describes how symbolic techniques (in particular, OBDD's) may be used to to implement an algorithm for model checking specifications in the logic of knowledge for a single agent operating with synchronous perfect recall in an environment of which it has incomplete knowledge. As an illustration of the utility...
Belief in information flow
 In Proc. 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop
, 2005
"... Information leakage traditionally has been defined to occur when uncertainty about secret data is reduced. This uncertaintybased approach is inadequate for measuring information flow when an attacker is making assumptions about secret inputs and these assumptions might be incorrect; such attacker b ..."
Abstract

Cited by 53 (10 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Information leakage traditionally has been defined to occur when uncertainty about secret data is reduced. This uncertaintybased approach is inadequate for measuring information flow when an attacker is making assumptions about secret inputs and these assumptions might be incorrect; such attacker beliefs are an unavoidable aspect of any satisfactory definition of leakage. To reason about information flow based on beliefs, a model is developed that describes how attacker beliefs change due to the attacker’s observation of the execution of a probabilistic (or deterministic) program. The model leads to a new metric for quantitative information flow that measures accuracy rather than uncertainty of beliefs. 1.
Updating Probabilities
, 2002
"... As examples such as the Monty Hall puzzle show, applying conditioning to update a probability distribution on a "naive space", which does not take into account the protocol used, can often lead to counterintuitive results. Here we examine why. A criterion known as CAR ("coarsening at random") in t ..."
Abstract

Cited by 53 (6 self)
 Add to MetaCart
As examples such as the Monty Hall puzzle show, applying conditioning to update a probability distribution on a "naive space", which does not take into account the protocol used, can often lead to counterintuitive results. Here we examine why. A criterion known as CAR ("coarsening at random") in the statistical literature characterizes when "naive" conditioning in a naive space works. We show that the CAR condition holds rather infrequently, and we provide a procedural characterization of it, by giving a randomized algorithm that generates all and only distributions for which CAR holds. This substantially extends previous characterizations of CAR. We also consider more generalized notions of update such as Jeffrey conditioning and minimizing relative entropy (MRE). We give a generalization of the CAR condition that characterizes when Jeffrey conditioning leads to appropriate answers, and show that there exist some very simple settings in which MRE essentially never gives the right results. This generalizes and interconnects previous results obtained in the literature on CAR and MRE.
Reasoning about Noisy Sensors in the Situation Calculus
 Artificial Intelligence
, 1995
"... : Agents interacting with an incompletely known dynamic world need to be able to reason about the effects of their actions, and to gain further information about that world using sensors of some sort. Unfortunately, sensor information is inherently noisy, and in general serves only to increase the a ..."
Abstract

Cited by 52 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
: Agents interacting with an incompletely known dynamic world need to be able to reason about the effects of their actions, and to gain further information about that world using sensors of some sort. Unfortunately, sensor information is inherently noisy, and in general serves only to increase the agent's degree of confidence in various propositions. Building on a general logical theory of action formalized in the situation calculus, developed by Reiter and others, we propose a simple axiomatization of the effect on an agent's state of belief of taking a reading from a noisy sensor. By exploiting Reiter's solution to the frame problem, we automatically obtain that these sensor actions leave the rest of the world unaffected, and further, that nonsensor actions change the state of belief of the agent in appropriate ways. Keywords: situation calculus, theories of action, knowledge, degree of belief. Declaration: This paper has not already been accepted by and is not currently under rev...