Abstract This paper outlines an original interactivist-constructivist (I-C) approach to modeling intelligence and learning as a dynamical embodied form of adaptiveness and explores some applications of I-C to understanding the way cognitive learning is realised in the brain. Two key ideas for conceptualising intelligence within this framework are developed. These are: (i) intelligence is centrally concerned with the capacity for coherent, contextsensitive, self-directed management of interaction, (ii) the primary model for cognitive learning is anticipative skill construction. Self-directedness is a capacity for integrative process modulation which allows a system to ‘steer ’ itself through its world by anticipatively matching its own viability requirements to interaction with its environment. Because the adaptive interaction processes required of intelligent systems are too complex for effective action to be prespecified (e.g. genetically) learning is an important component of intelligence. A model of self-directed anticipative learning (SDAL) is formulated based on interactive skill construction, and argued to constitute a central constructivist process involved in cognitive development. SDAL illuminates the capacity of intelligent learners to start with the vague, poorly defined, problems typically posed in realistic learning situations and progressively refine them, transforming them into problems with sufficient structure to guide the construction of a solution. Finally, some of the implications of I-C for modeling of the neuronal basis of intelligence and learning are explored; in particular, Quartz and Sejnowski’s recent neural constructivism (NC) paradigm, enriched by Montague and Sejnowski’s dopaminergic model of anticipative-predictive neural learning, is assessed as a promising, but incomplete, contribution to this approach. The paper concludes with a four-fold reflection on the divergence in cognitive modeling philosophy between the I-C and the traditional computational information processing (CIP) approaches. 1.

Traditional characterizations of communication as a biological phenomenon are theoretically criticized, and an alternative understanding is presented in terms of recursive action coordination following works on cybernetics and autopoiesis. As first steps towards a study on the evolution of communication, two sets of computational experiments are presented, one dealing with nonrecursive coordination and the other with coordination of recursive actions. In the first one coordinated activity evolves even in cases in which a game-theoretic analysis predicts the contrary. This is explained by studying the spatial organization in the distribution of agents. The second one shows the inappropriateness of the metaphor of communication as an exchange of information. 1 Introduction The study of communication from an evolutionary perspective has received much attention lately. However, the view of communication traditionally advanced is far from theoretically unified and it is subject to much di...

This article briefly reviews some guidelines for building a research methodology in Artificial Life given by Miller (Miller, 1995). A formal argument is presented to point at some problems arising from the systematic application of these guidelines given the current state of affairs in Theoretical Biology, and some practical arguments are proposed against the downsizing strategy adopted by Miller. 1 Introduction. Take any recent collection of papers on simulation of adaptive behavior or Artificial Life (see Brooks & Maes, 1994) and you will find a lot of very imaginative, inspired and often methodologically messy pieces of work. Some of them address legitimate scientific questions, others seem to be more like proofs of concept, others still, just nicely implemented simulations. This problem has already been pointed out by Miller (Miller, 1995) and some of its causes (mainly from a "sociological" perspective) have been analysed by him 1 . Miller correctly points out that many of the ...

Abstract not found

There has been a conceptual revolution in the biological sciences over the past several decades. Evidence from genetics, embryology, and developmental biology has converged to offer a more epigenetic, contingent, and dynamic view of how organisms develop. Despite these advances, arguments for the heuristic value of a gene-centered, predeterministic approach to the study of human behavior and development have become increasingly evident in the psychological sciences during this time. In this article, the authors review recent advances in genetics, embryology, and developmental biology that have transformed contemporary developmental and evolutionary theory and explore how these advances challenge gene-centered explanations of human behavior that ignore the complex, highly coordinated system of regulatory dynamics involved in development and evolution. The prestige of success enjoyed by the gene theory might become a hindrance to the understanding of development by directing our attention solely to the genome....Already we have theories that refer the processes of development to genic action and regard the whole performance as no more than the realization of the potencies of the genes. Such theories are altogether too one-sided. (Harrison, 1937, p. 370) There is growing consensus in popular culture that by understanding genes and the mutual interactions of the proteins derived from them it is possible to understand all of life, including human nature. Psychology is no stranger to this perspective. As most psychologists are aware, a blend of ethology and sociobiology known as evolutionary psychology has gained increasing attention and recognition over the past several decades. Arguments for the heuristic value of a gene-centered, evolutionary approach to the study of human behavior have become increasingly evident in mainstream psychology journals (i.e., Buss, 1995; Buss & Schmitt,

In this paper we outline a theory of the nature of self-directed agents. On our account what is distinctive about self-directed agents is that they are able to anticipate interaction processes and evaluate their performance. This allows self-directed agents to modify their behaviour context sensitively so as to improve the achievement of goals, and in certain instances construct new goals. We contrast self-directedness with reactive action processes that are not modifiable by the agent, though they may be modified by supra-agent processes such as populational adaptation or external design. Self-directedness lies at the nexus of a set of issues concerning the evolution and nature of intentionality, intelligence and agency. It provides the core of a biologically grounded account of intentional agency. 1

Waddington's (1942) notion of canalization has been widely invoked in developmental psychology to conceptualize species-typical regularities in behavioral development as genetically determined. In contrast, a developmental systems view, such as the one described in the present article, sees the genes as only one component in a hierarchy of influences, all of which contribute to canalize behavioral development. A key issue is that genetic activity does not by itself produce finished traits; differentiation occurs as a consequence of events above as well as below the cellular level, necessarily involving factors in addition to genetic influences to canalize behavioral development. In exploring the possible experiential canalization of development, it was found that the mallard duck embryo's contact call plays a canalizing role in species-specific perceptual development (Gottlieb, 1991). Thus, normally occurring experience, in concert with genetic and other activities, can canalize behavioral development. The concept of canalization has been utilized in several different ways in the psychological literature. Canalization was originally put forward by Holt (1931) to call attention to prenatal conditioning as a factor in narrowing down the initially

Abstract not found

Organisms inherit a set of environmental regularities as well as genes, and these two inheritances repeatedly encounter each other across generations. This repetition drives natural selection to coordinate the interplay of stably replicated genes with stably persisting environmental regularities, so that this web of interactions produces the reliable development of a functionally organized design. Selection is the only known counterweight to the tendency of physical systems to lose rather than grow functional organization. This means that the individually unique and unpredictable factors in the web of developmental interactions are a disordering threat to normal development. Selection built anti-entropic mechanisms into organisms to orchestrate transactions with environments so that they have some chance of being organization-building and reproduction-enhancing rather than disordering. Evolutionary psychology was founded on a new theory of development that encompasses, reformulates, and (we believe) logically reconciles other views such as nativism, environmentalism, interactionism, developmental systems theory, and others. Readers who want to understand what evolutionary psychologists actually think about development need to consult the original sources (see, e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, 1990, 1992) rather than relying on critics ’ misconceptions. Below, we address several confusions. Deficiencies in Basic Biology Because developmental systems theorists are psychologists rather than a more interdisciplinarily inclusive team, it is not surprising that they also provide questionable characterizations of fields outside of psychology, such as genetics, developmental biology, and evolutionary biology (e.g., Lickliter & Honeycutt,

It seems to be a common feeling that animals learn to see, and this feeling, together with the reemergence of computer learning paradigms that mimic many forms of human learning, has raised hopes that learning is the key to the computer vision problem. Indeed, it seems clear that Nature does not "program" all our visual capabilities into the genome, and we certainly know that programming a computer with a closed-form solution to the vision problem is a daunting task. This aim of this informal and elementary report (basically a term paper) is to cast doubt on the idea that biological systems learn to see. The complex process of development, beginning at fertilization and ending with a mature individual, could be considered to have genetic ("nature") and learning ("nurture") processes as logical endpoints or opposite poles. This report mostly considers what goes on between those endpoints, and is meant to raise the possibility that some of the least understood processes in biology are re...