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Online Ascending Auctions for Gradually Expiring Items
 In SODA
, 2004
"... In this paper we consider online auction mechanisms for the allocation of M items that are identical to each other except for the fact that the items have dierent expiration times, and each item must be allocated before it expires. A computational application is the allocation of time slots in a ..."
Abstract

Cited by 56 (6 self)
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In this paper we consider online auction mechanisms for the allocation of M items that are identical to each other except for the fact that the items have dierent expiration times, and each item must be allocated before it expires. A computational application is the allocation of time slots in a scheduling problem, and an economic application is the allocation of transportation tickets.
Learning and implementation on the internet
 Rutgers University, Department of Economics
, 1997
"... We address the problem of learning and implementation in the Internet. When agents play repeated games in distributed environments like the Internet, they have very limited a priori information about the other players and the payo matrix. Consequently, standard solution concepts like Nash equilibria ..."
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Cited by 21 (4 self)
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We address the problem of learning and implementation in the Internet. When agents play repeated games in distributed environments like the Internet, they have very limited a priori information about the other players and the payo matrix. Consequently, standard solution concepts like Nash equilibria, or even the serially undominated set, do not apply in such a setting. To construct more appropriate solution concepts, we rst describe the essential properties that constitute \reasonable &quot; learning behavior in distributed environments. We then study the convergence behavior of such algorithms; these results lead us to propose rather non traditional solutions concepts for this context. Finally, we discuss implementation of social choice functions with these solution concepts, and nd that only strictly coalitionally strategyproof social choice functions are implementable. 1 1
A systematic approach to the construction of nonempty choice sets
 Social Choice and Welfare
, 2007
"... Suppose a strict preference relation fails to possess maximal elements, so that a choice is not clearly defined. I propose to delete particular instances of strict preferences until the resulting relation satisfies one of a number of known regularity properties (transitivity, acyclicity, or negativ ..."
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Cited by 6 (1 self)
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Suppose a strict preference relation fails to possess maximal elements, so that a choice is not clearly defined. I propose to delete particular instances of strict preferences until the resulting relation satisfies one of a number of known regularity properties (transitivity, acyclicity, or negative transitivity), and to unify the choices generated by different orders of deletion. Removal of strict preferences until the subrelation is transitive yields a new solution with close connections to the “uncovered set ” from the political science literature and the literature on tournaments. Weakening transitivity to acyclicity yields a new solution nested between the strong and weak top cycle sets. When the original preference relation admits no indifferences, this solution coincides with the familiar top cycle set. The set of alternatives generated by the restriction of negative transitivity is equivalent to the weak top cycle set. ∗I am indebted to Mark Fey and Tasos Kalandrakis for helpful discussions during the construction of this paper. 1
Computing DominanceBased Solution Concepts
, 2012
"... Two common criticisms of Nash equilibrium are its dependence on very demanding epistemic assumptions and its computational intractability. We study the computational properties of less demanding setvalued solution concepts that are based on varying notions of dominance. These concepts are intuitive ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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Two common criticisms of Nash equilibrium are its dependence on very demanding epistemic assumptions and its computational intractability. We study the computational properties of less demanding setvalued solution concepts that are based on varying notions of dominance. These concepts are intuitively appealing, they always exist, and admit unique minimal solutions in important subclasses of games. Examples include Shapley’s saddles, Harsanyi and Selten’s primitive formations, Basu and Weibull’s CURB sets, and Dutta and Laslier’s minimal covering sets. We propose two generic algorithms for computing these concepts and investigate for which classes of games and which properties of the underlying dominance notion the algorithms are sound and efficient.
UNCOVERED SETS
, 2011
"... Abstract. This paper covers the theory of the uncovered set used in the literatures on tournaments and spatial voting. I discern three main extant definitions, and I introduce two new concepts that bound existing sets from above and below: the deep uncovered set and the shallow uncovered set. In a ..."
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Abstract. This paper covers the theory of the uncovered set used in the literatures on tournaments and spatial voting. I discern three main extant definitions, and I introduce two new concepts that bound existing sets from above and below: the deep uncovered set and the shallow uncovered set. In a general topological setting, I provide relationships to other solutions and give results on existence and external stability for all of the covering concepts, and I establish continuity properties of the two new uncovered sets. Of note, I characterize each of the uncovered sets in terms of a decomposition into choices from externally stable sets; I define the minimal generalized covering solution, a nonempty refinement of the deep uncovered set that employs both of the new relations; and I