The concept of autopoiesis was conceived by Maturana and Varela as providing the necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing the living from the non-living (and, by extension, the cognitive from the non-cognitive). More recently however, there has been a growing consensus that their original conception of autopoiesis is necessary but insufficient for this task as it fails to meet a number of constructive, interactive, normative, and historical requirements. We argue that it also fails to satisfy crucial phenomenological requirements that are motivated by the ongoing appropriation of autopoiesis as a key concept in enactive cognitive science. The root of these problems can be traced to the abstract general systems framework in which the ideas were first formulated, as epitomized by Ashby’s cybernetics. While this abstract generality has helped the concept’s popularity in some circles, we insist that a restriction of autopoiesis to a radical embodiment in chemical self-production under far-from-equilibrium conditions is necessary if the concept is to live up to its original intentions.

An inter-enactive approach to agency holds that the behaviour of agents in a social situation unfolds not only according to their individual abilities and goals, but also according to the conditions and constraints imposed by the autonomous dynamics of the interaction process itself. We illustrate this position with examples drawn from phenomenological observations and dynamical systems models. On the basis of these examples we discuss some of the implications of this inter-enactive approach to agency for our understanding of social phenomena in a broader sense, and how the interenactive account provided here has to be taken alongside a theory of largerscale social processes. 1.

human-computer interfaces to investigate the embodied mind 'as-it-could-be ' from the first-person perspective

Varela is well known in the systems sciences for his work on second-order cybernetics, biology of cognition and especially autopoietic theory. His concern during this period was to find an appropriate epistemological foundation for the self-reference inherent in life and mind. In his later years, Varela began to develop the so-called ‘enactive ’ approach to cognitive science, which sets itself apart from other sciences by promoting a careful consideration of concrete experiential insights. His final efforts were thus dedicated to finding a pragmatic phenomenological foundation for life and mind. It is argued that Varela’s experiential turn—from epistemology to phenomenology—can be seen as a natural progression that builds on many ideas that were already implicit in second-order cybernetics and biology of cognition. It is also suggested that the rigorous study of conscious experience may enable us to refine our theories and systemic concepts of life, mind and sociality. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Abstract There is a growing realization in cognitive science that a theory of embodied intersubjectivity is needed to better account for social cognition. We highlight some challenges that must be addressed by attempts to interpret ‘simulation theory ’ in terms of embodiment, and argue for an alternative approach that integrates phenomenology and dynamical systems theory in a mutually informing manner. Instead of ‘simulation ’ we put forward the concept of the ‘extended body’, an enactive and phenomenological notion that emphasizes the socially mediated nature of embodiment. To illustrate the explanatory potential of this approach, we replicate an agent-based model of embodied social interaction. An analysis of the model demonstrates that the extended body can be explained in terms of mutual dynamical entanglement: inter-bodily resonance between individuals can give rise to self-sustaining interaction patterns that go beyond the behavioral capacities of isolated individuals by modulating their intra-bodily conditions of behavior generation.