Policy rules that are consistent with ination targeting are examined in a small macroeconometric model of the US economy. We compare the properties and outcomes of explicit instrument rules as well as targeting rules. The latter, which imply implicit instrument rules, may be closer to actual operating procedures of inflation-targeting central banks. We find that ination forecasts are central for good policy rules under inflation targeting. Some simple instrument and targeting rules do remarkably well relative to the optimal rule; others, including some that are often used as representing inflation targeting, do less well.

The purpose of this paper is to survey and discuss inflation targeting in the context of monetary policy rules, to clarify the essential characteristics of in‡ation targeting, to compare inflation targeting to other monetary policy rules, and to draw some conclusions for the monetary policy of

In recent years, simple policy rules have received attention as a means to a more transparent and effective monetary policy. Often, however, the analysis is based on unrealistic assumptions about the timeliness of data availability. This permits rule specifications that are not operational and ignore difficulties associated with data revisions. This paper examines the magnitude of these informational problems using Taylor's rule as an example. First, I construct a database of current quarter estimates/forecasts of the quantities required by the rule based only on information available in real time. Using this data I reconstruct the policy recommendations which would have been obtained in real time. I demonstrate that the real-time policy recommendations differ considerably from those obtained with the ex post revised data. Within-year revisions in the policy recommendations are also quite large with a standard deviation exceeding that of the quarterly change of the federal funds rate. Further, I show that estimated policy reaction functions obtained using the ex post revised data can yield misleading descriptions of historical policy. Using Federal Reserve sta forecasts I show that in the 1987-1992 period simple forward-looking specifications describe policy better than comparable Taylor-type specifications, a fact that is largely obscured when the analysis is based on the ex post revised data.

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Contents 4 A Neo-Wicksellian Framework 1 1 ABasicModeloftheE#ectsofMonetaryPolicy................ 3 1.1 AnIntertemporalISRelation ...................... 4 1.2 ACompleteModel ............................ 9 2 Interest-Rate Rules and Price Stability ..................... 12 2.1 TheNaturalRateofInterest....................... 12 2.2 Conditions for Determinacy of Equilibrium ............... 18 2.3 Determinants of Inflation ......................... 32 2.4 Policy Rules for Inflation Stabilization ................. 41 3 MonetaryPolicyandInvestmentDynamics................... 45 3.1 InvestmentDemandwithStickyPrices................. 46 3.2 OptimalPrice-SettingwithEndogenousCapital............ 51 3.3 ComparisonwiththeBaselineModel .................. 56 3.4 CapitalandtheNaturalRateofInterest ................ 67 Chapter 4 A Neo-Wicksellian Framework for the Analysis of Monetary Policy We are now ready to consider the e#ects of alternative interest-ra

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The central puzzle in international business cycles is that real exchange rates are volatile and persistent. The most popular story for real exchange rate fluctuations is that they are generated by monetary shocks interacting with sticky goods prices. We quantify this story and find that it can account for some of the observed properties of real exchange rates. When prices are held fixed for at least one year, risk aversion is high and preferences are separable in leisure, the model generates real exchange rates that are as volatile as in the data. The model also generates real exchange rates that are persistent, but less so than in the data. If monetary shocks are correlated across countries, then the comovements in aggregates across countries are broadly consistent with those in the data. Making asset markets incomplete or introducing sticky wages does not measurably change the results.

The Federal Reserve and other central banks tend to change short-term interest rates in sequences of small steps in the same direction and reverse the direction of interest rate movements only infrequently. These characteristics, often referred to as interest-rate smoothing, have led to criticism that policy responds too little and too late to macroeconomic developments, suggesting to some observers that the Federal Reserve has an objective of minimizing interest- rate volatility. This paper, however, argues that interest-rate smoothing may well represent optimal behavior on the part of central banks whose only objectives are to stabilize output and inflation. We present empirical results from several recent papers that offer three explanations of interest-rate smoothing: forward-looking behavior by market participants, measurement error associated with key macroeconomic variables, and uncertainty regarding relevant structural parameters.

Recent imperfect capital market theories predict the presence of asymmetries in the variation of small and large firms' risk over the economic cycle. Small firms with little collateral should be more strongly affected by tighter credit market conditions in a recession state than large, better collateralized ones. This paper adopts a flexible econometric model to analyse these implications empirically. Consistent with theory, small firms display the highest degree of asymmetry in their risk across recession and expansion states and this translates into a higher sensitivity of these firms' expected stock returns with respect to variables that measure credit market conditions. Recent imperfect capital market theories (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)) predict that changing credit market conditions can have very different effects on small and large firms' risk. Agency costs induced by asymmetry in the information held by firms and their creditors make...

The tendency for changes in the federal funds rate to be implemented gradually has been considered evidence of an interest-rate smoothing objective for the Federal Reserve. This paper investigates whether gradual movements in the federal funds rate can be explained by the dynamic structure of the economy and the uncertainty that the Fed faces regarding this structure, without recourse to including an ad-hoc interest rate smoothing argument in the objective function of the Fed. The analysis calculates the optimal funds rate policy given the structural form of the economy estimated in a VAR. In the absence of parameter uncertainty, the calculated policy responds more aggressively to changes in the economy than the observed policy, resulting in a substantially higher volatility of the funds rate than observed. Parameter uncertainty, however, limits the willingness of the Fed to deviate from the policy rule that has been previously implemented. Because the Fed has historically smoothed interest rates, the calculated policy under parameter uncertainty can account for a considerable portion of the gradualism observed in funds rate movements.