This paper is a commentary on the foundational significance of the Clifton-Bub-Halvorson theorem characterizing quantum theory in terms of three information-theoretic constraints. I argue that: (1) a quantum theory is best understood as a theory about the possibilities and impossibilities of information transfer, as opposed to a theory about the mechanics of nonclassical waves or particles, (2) given the information-theoretic constraints, any mechanical theory of quantum phenomena that includes an account of the measuring instruments that reveal these phenomena must be empirically equivalent to a quantum theory, and (3) assuming the information-theoretic constraints are in fact satisfied in our world, no mechanical theory of quantum phenomena that includes an account of measurement interactions can be acceptable, and the appropriate aim of physics at the fundamental level then becomes the representation and manipulation of information.

This Chapter deals with theoretical developments in the subject of quantum information and quantum computation, and includes an overview of classical information and some relevant quantum mechanics. The discussion covers topics in quantum communication, quantum cryptography, and quantum computation, and concludes by considering whether a perspective in terms of quantum information

We argue that the intractable part of the measurement problem—the ‘big ’ measurement problem—is a pseudo-problem that depends for its legitimacy on the acceptance of two dogmas. The first dogma is John Bell’s assertion that measurement should never be introduced as a primitive process in a fundamental mechanical theory like classical or quantum mechanics, but should always be open to a complete analysis, in principle, of how the individual outcomes come about dynamically. The second dogma is the view that the quantum state has an ontological significance analogous to the significance of the classical state as the ‘truthmaker ’ for propositions about the occurrence and non-occurrence of events, i.e., that the quantum state is a representation of physical reality. We show how both dogmas can be rejected in a realist information-theoretic interpretation of quantum mechanics as an alternative to the Everett interpretation. The Everettian, too, regards the ∗E-mail address:

Abstract. Pure interpretations of quantum theory, which reject the classical part of the Copenhagen interpretation without adding new structure to it’s quantum part, are not viable. This is a consequence of a non-uniqueness result for the canonical operators. 1. Introduction: The

Abstract. A non-uniqueness result for the canonical structure in quantum theory shows that the classical part of the Copenhagen interpretation contains physically important information not contained in it’s quantum part. As a consequence, we cannot compute the symmetry group of a quantum theory considering only the quantum part. The unavoidable vagueness of the classical part therefore leads to a similar vagueness in the definition of the symmetry group. This makes it at least problematic, if not impossible, to establish the true symmetry group of a quantum theory in the Copenhagen interpretation. Different from the old measurement problem, the symmetry group is to important physically to be rejected as a metaphysical pseudoproblem. 1.