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This article presents a theory that inte~ates space-based and object-based approaches to visual attention. The theory puts together M. P. van Oeffelen and P. G. Vos's ( 1982, 1983) COntour DEtector (CODE) theory of perceptual grouping by proximity with C. Bundesen's (1990) theory of visual attention (TVA). CODE provides input to TVA, accounting for spatially based between-object selection, and TVA converts the input to output, accounting for feature- and category-based withinobject selection. CODE clusters nearby items into perceptual groups that are both perceptual objects and regions of space, thereby integrating object-based and space-based approaches to attention. The combined theory provides a quantitative account of the effects of grouping by proximity and dis~nce between items on reaction time and accuracy data in 7 empirical situations that shaped the current literature on visual spatial attention. For the last decade the attention literature has been embroiled in a debate over the nature of visual spatial attention that focuses on the "thing " that attention selects (e.g., Baylis &

this article should be addressed to Evan Heir, Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, 2029 Sheridan Road, Evanston, Illinois 60208. Electronic mail may be sent to heit@nwu.edu

ositive side, though, the second person might have some advantage over the first person in learning how to shift gears, because the second person would not have to overcome negative transfer from experience with automatic transmissions. As another example, imagine that you are an explorer visiting a remote island, with the purpose of writing a book about the people that you see there. You bring to this island many forms of prior knowledge that will guide you in learning about these new people. For example, based on your experiences in other places, you would expect to see males and females, younger and older people, shy people and arrogant people. You would also have certain hypotheses at a more abstract level, for example, that the clothes that someone wears may be related to the person's age and gender. (Goodman, 1955, referred to such abstract hypotheses as overhypotheses.) In a way, these biases due to previous knowledge might seem to be undesirable. After all, wouldn't be it be be

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Probabilistic models have recently received much attention as accounts of human cognition. However, previous work has focused on formulating the abstract problems behind cognitive tasks and their probabilistic solutions, rather than considering mechanisms that could implement these solutions. Exemplar models are a successful class of psychological process models that use an inventory of stored examples to solve problems such as identification, categorization and function learning. We show that exemplar models can be interpreted as a sophisticated form of Monte Carlo approximation known as importance sampling, and thus provide a way to perform approximate Bayesian inference. Simulations of Bayesian inference in speech perception and concept learning show that exemplar models can account for human performance with only a few exemplars, for both simple and relatively complex prior distributions. Thus, we show that exemplar models provide a possible mechanism for implementing Bayesian inference.

Major biases and stereotypes in group judgments are reviewed and modeled from a recurrent connectionist perspective. These biases are in the areas of group impression formation (illusory correlation), group differentiation (accentuation), stereotype change (dispersed vs. concentrated distribution of inconsistent information), and group homogeneity. All these phenomena are illustrated with well-known experiments, and simulated with an autoassociative network architecture with linear activation update and delta learning algorithm for adjusting the connection weights. All the biases were successfully reproduced in the simulations. The discussion centers on how the particular simulation specifications compare with other models of group biases and how they may be used to develop novel hypotheses for testing the connectionist modeling approach and, more generally, for improving theorizing in the field of social biases and stereotype change. Petite, attractive, intelligent, WSF, 30, fond of music, theatre, books, travel, seeks warm, affectionate, fun-loving man to share life’s pleasures with view to lasting relationship. Send photograph. Please no

Over the last several years, researchers have begun to appreciate the ways in which questions of interest to personality and social psychologists can be addressed with neuropyschological case material (e.g., Klein & Kihlstrom, 1998; Klein, Loftus, &

According to the instantiation principle, the representation of a category includes detailed information about its diverse range of instances. Many accounts of categorization, including classical and standard prototype theories, do not follow the instantiation principle, because they assume that detailed, exemplar-level information is filtered out of category representations. Nevertheless, the instantiation principle can be implemented in a wide class of models, including both exemplar and abstraction models. To assess the instantiation principle empirically, a parameter-free exemplarbased model of instantiation was applied to typicality judgments for 16 simple categories (e.g., mammal, beverage) and 14 complex categories (e.g., dangerous mammal) in four superordinates (animal, food, small animal, dangerous animal). Across three studies, the model did an excellent job of predicting mean typicality judgments (correlations generally above .9) and a good job of predicting standard deviati...

Research has shown that the activation and application of a significant-other representation to a new person, or transference, occurs in everyday social perception (S. M. Andersen & A. Baum, 1994; S. M. Andersen & S. W. Cole, 1990). Using a combined idiographic and nomothetic experimental paradigm, two studies examined the role of chronic accessibility of significant-other representations in transference. After learning about 4 fictional people, 1 of whom resembled a significant other, participants ' recognition memory was assessed. Both studies showed greater false-positive memory in the significant-other condition, relative to control, even in the absence of priming. Study 2 showed that although the effect was greater when the significant-other representation was concretely applicable to the target information, it occurred even when no such applicability was present. Results implicate the chronic accessibility of significant-other representations in transference. Mental representations of significant others serve as storehouses of information about important individuals from one's life. Interestingly, these representations can also be triggered by a new person and applied to this person in the context of everyday interpersonal relations (Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen