to stimulate the next wave of research on organization learning. It provides a conceptual framework for research on the differences and similarities of learning by individuals, groups, and organizations.

Case-based reasoning is a recent approach to problem solving and learning that has got a lot of attention over the last few years. Originating in the US, the basic idea and underlying theories have spread to other continents, and we are now within a period of highly active research in case-based reasoning in Europe, as well. This paper gives an overview of the foundational issues related to case- based reasoning, describes some of the leading methodo- logical approaches within the field, and exemplifies the current state through pointers to some systems. Initially, a general framework is defined, to which the subsequent descriptions and discussions will refer. The framework is influenced by recent methodologies for knowledge level descriptions of intelligent systems. The methods for case retrieval, reuse, solution testing, and learning are summa-rized, and their actual realization is discussed in the light of a few example systems that represent different CBR approaches. We also discuss the role of case-based methods as one type of reasoning and learning method within an integrated system architecture.

There has been a proliferation of proposed mental modules in an attempt to account for different cognitive functions but so far there has been no successful account of their integration. ACT-R (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998) has evolved into a theory that consists of multiple modules but also explains how they are integrated to produce coherent cognition. The perceptual-motor modules, the goal module, and the declarative memory module are presented as examples of specialized systems in ACT-R. These modules are associated with distinct cortical regions. These modules place chunks in buffers where they can be detected by a production system that responds to patterns of information in the buffers. At any point in time a single production rule is selected to respond to the current pattern. Subsymbolic processes serve to guide the selection of rules to fire as well as the internal operations of some modules. Much of learning involves tuning of these subsymbolic processes. Empirical examples are presented that illustrate the predictions of ACT-R’s modules. In addition, two models of complex tasks are described to illustrate how these modules result in strong predictions when they are brought together. One of these models is concerned with complex patterns of behavioral data in a dynamic task and the other is concerned with fMRI data obtained in a study of symbol manipulation.

We consider the general problem of learning from labeled and unlabeled data, which is often called semi-supervised learning or transductive inference. A principled approach to semi-supervised learning is to design a classifying function which is sufficiently smooth with respect to the intrinsic structure collectively revealed by known labeled and unlabeled points. We present a simple algorithm to obtain such a smooth solution. Our method yields encouraging experimental results on a number of classification problems and demonstrates effective use of unlabeled data. 1

Does knowledge of language consist of mentally-represented rules? Rumelhart and McClelland have described a connectionist (parallel distributed processing) model of the acquisition of the past tense in English which successfully maps many stems onto their past tense forms, both regular (walk/walked) and irregular (go/went), and which mimics some of the errors and sequences of development of children. Yet the model contains no explicit rules, only a set of neuron-style units which stand for trigrams of phonetic features of the stem, a set of units which stand for trigrams of phonetic features of the past form, and an array of connections between the two sets of units whose strengths are modified during learning. Rumelhart and McClelland conclude that linguistic rules may be merely convenient approximate fictions and that the real causal processes in language use and acquisition must be characterized as the transfer of activation levels among units and the modification of the weights of their connections. We analyze both the linguistic and the developmental assumptions of the model in detail and discover that (1) it cannot represent certain words, (2) it cannot learn many rules, (3) it can learn rules found in no human language, (4) it cannot explain morphological and phonological regularities, (5) it cannot explain the differences between irregular and regular forms, (6) it fails at its assigned task of mastering the past tense of English, (7) it gives an incorrect explanation for two developmental phenomena: stages of overregularization of irregular forms such as bringed, and the appearance of doubly-marked forms such as ated, and (8) it gives accounts of two others (infrequent overregularization of verbs ending in t/d, and the order of acquisition of different irregula...

Abstract not found

Abstract: Human agents draw a variety of inferences effortlessly, spontaneously, and with remarkable efficiency — as though these inferences are a reflex response of their cognitive apparatus. Furthermore, these inferences are drawn with reference to a large body of background knowledge. This remarkable human ability seems paradoxical given the results about the complexity of reasoning reported by researchers in artificial intelligence. It also poses a challenge for cognitive science and computational neuroscience: How can a system of simple and slow neuron-like elements represent a large body of systematic knowledge and perform a range of inferences with such speed? We describe a computational model that is a step toward addressing the cognitive science challenge and resolving the artificial intelligence paradox. We show how a connectionist network can encode millions of facts and rules involving n-ary predicates and variables, and perform a class of inferences in a few hundred msec. Efficient reasoning requires the rapid representation and propagation of dynamic bindings. Our model achieves this by i) representing dynamic bindings as the synchronous firing of appropriate nodes, ii) rules as interconnection patterns

This article describes an integrated theory of analogical access and mapping, instantiated in a

Traditional views of automaticity are in need of revision. For example, automaticity otten has been treated as an all-or-none phenomenon, and traditional ~es have held that automatic processes are independent of attention. Yet recent empirical data suggest that automatic processes are continu-ous, and furthermore are subject to attentional control. A model of attention is presented to address these issues. Within a parallel distributed processing framework, it is proposed that the attributes of automaticity depend on the strength of a processing pathway and that strength increases with train-ing. With the Stroop effect as an example, automatic processes are shown to be continuous and to emerge gradually with practice. Specifically, a computational model of the Stroop task simulates the time course of processing as well as the effects of learning. This was accomplished by combining the cascade mechanism described by McCleUand (1979) with the backpropagation learning algorithm (Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986). The model can simulate performance in the standard Stroop task, as well as aspects of performance in variants of this task that manipulate stimulus-onset asynchrony, response set, and degree of practice. The model presented is contrasted against other models, and its relation to many of the central issues in the literature on attention, automaticity, and interference is discussed.

We present data and argument to show that in Tetris-a real-time, interactive video game-certain cognitive and perceptual problems ore more quicktv, easily, and reliably solved by performing actions in the world than by performing com-putational actions in the head atone. We have found that some of the translations and rotations made by players of this video game are best understood as actions that use the world to improve cognition. These actions are not used to implement a plan, or to implement a reaction; they are used to change the world in order to simplify the problem-solving task. Thus, we distinguish pragmatic octions--actions performed to bring one physically closer to a goal-from epistemic actions-actions performed to uncover informatioan that is hidden or hard to compute mentally. To illustrate the need for epistemic actions, we first develop a standard information-processing model of Tetris cognition and show that it cannot explain performance data from human players of the game-even when we relax the assumption of fully sequential processing. Standard models disregard many actions taken by players because they appear unmotivated or superfluous. How-ever, we show that such actions are actually far from superfluous; they play a valuable role in improving human performance. We argue that traditional accounts are limited because they regard action as having o single function: to change the world. By recognizing a second function of action-an epistemic func-tion-we can explain many of the actions that a traditional model cannot. Al-though our argument is supported by numerous examples specifically from Tetris, we outline how the new category of epistemic action can be incorporated into theories of action more generally. In this article, we introduce the general idea of an epistemic action and discuss its role in Tetris, a real-time, interactive video game. Epistemic actions-physical actions that make mental computation easier, faster, or more We thank Steve Haehnichen for his work on the initial implementations of Tetris and