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The enactive approach -- Theoretical sketches from cell to society
, 2011
"... There is a small but growing community of researchers spanning a spectrum of disciplines which are united in rejecting the still dominant computationalist paradigm in favor of the enactive approach. The framework of this approach is centered on a core set of ideas, such as autonomy, sense-making, em ..."
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There is a small but growing community of researchers spanning a spectrum of disciplines which are united in rejecting the still dominant computationalist paradigm in favor of the enactive approach. The framework of this approach is centered on a core set of ideas, such as autonomy, sense-making, emergence, embodiment, and experience. These concepts are finding novel applications in a diverse range of areas. One hot topic has been the establishment of an enactive approach to social interaction. The main purpose of this paper is to serve as an advanced entry point into these recent developments. It accomplishes this task in a twofold manner: (i) it provides a succinct synthesis of the most important core ideas and arguments in the theoretical framework of the enactive approach, and (ii) it uses this synthesis to refine the current enactive approach to social interaction. A new operational definition of social interaction is proposed which not only emphasizes the cognitive agency of the individuals and the irreducibility of the interaction process itself, but also the need for jointly co-regulated action. It is suggested that this revised conception of ‘socio-cognitive interaction ’ may provide the necessary middle ground from which to understand the confluence of biological and cultural values in personal action.
Seeing mind in action
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
, 2012
"... There is a fundamental, if generally unexpressed, presupposition behind much current social cognition research. Call this the “unobservability principle ” (UP): the idea that minds are composed of exclusively intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible and thus unobservable to everyone but the ..."
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There is a fundamental, if generally unexpressed, presupposition behind much current social cognition research. Call this the “unobservability principle ” (UP): the idea that minds are composed of exclusively intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible and thus unobservable to everyone but their owner.1 UP isn’t just a contemporary idea. It motivates the classical philosophical problem of other
The brain: A mediating organ
- Journal of Consciousness Studies
, 2011
"... Cognitive neuroscience has been driven by the idea that by reductionist analysis of mechanisms within a solitary brain one can best understand how the human mind is constituted and what its nature is. The brain thus came to appear as the creator of the mind and the experienced world. In contrast, th ..."
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Cited by 5 (0 self)
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Cognitive neuroscience has been driven by the idea that by reductionist analysis of mechanisms within a solitary brain one can best understand how the human mind is constituted and what its nature is. The brain thus came to appear as the creator of the mind and the experienced world. In contrast, the paper argues for an ecological view of mind and brain as both being embedded in the relation of the living organism and its environment. This approach is crucially dependent on a developmental perspective: The brain is conceived as a plastic system of open loops that are formed in the process of life and closed to full functional cycles in every interaction with the environment. Each time a new disposition of coherent neural activity is formed through repeated experience, structures of the mind are imprinted onto the brain. The brain becomes a mediating organ or a window to the mind, for it is structured by the mind itself.
The Direct-Perception Model of Empathy: A Critique.” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2
- Vicarious Pain: Imagination, Mirroring or Perception?” In Perception and Its Modalities
, 2011
"... Abstract This paper assesses the so-called “direct-perception ” model of empathy. This model draws much of its inspiration from the Phenomenological tradition: it is offered as an account free from the assumption that most, if not all, of another’s psychological states and experiences are unobservab ..."
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Abstract This paper assesses the so-called “direct-perception ” model of empathy. This model draws much of its inspiration from the Phenomenological tradition: it is offered as an account free from the assumption that most, if not all, of another’s psychological states and experiences are unobservable and that one’s understanding of another’s psychological states and experiences are based on inferential processes. Advocates of this model also reject the simulation-based approach to empathy. I first argue that most of their criticisms miss their target because they are directed against the simulation-based approach to mindreading. Advocates of this model further subscribe to an expressivist conception of human behavior and assume that some of an individual’s psychological states (e.g. her goals and emotions, not her beliefs) can be directly perceived in the individual’s expressive behavior. I argue that advocates of the direct-perception model face the following dilemma: either they embrace behaviorism or else they must recognize that one could not understand another’s goal or emotion from her behavior alone without making contextual assumptions. Finally, advocates of the direct-perception model endorse the narrative competency hypothesis, according to which the ability to ascribe beliefs to another is grounded in the ability to understand narratives. I argue that this hypothesis is hard to reconcile with recent results in developmental psychology showing that preverbal human infants seem able to ascribe false beliefs to others.
An Inter-Enactive Approach to Agency: Participatory Sense-Making, Dynamics, and Sociality *
"... An inter-enactive approach to agency holds that the behaviour of agents in a social situation unfolds not only according to their individual abilities and goals, but also according to the conditions and constraints imposed by the autonomous dynamics of the interaction process itself. We illustrate t ..."
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An inter-enactive approach to agency holds that the behaviour of agents in a social situation unfolds not only according to their individual abilities and goals, but also according to the conditions and constraints imposed by the autonomous dynamics of the interaction process itself. We illustrate this position with examples drawn from phenomenological observations and dynamical systems models. On the basis of these examples we discuss some of the implications of this inter-enactive approach to agency for our understanding of social phenomena in a broader sense, and how the interenactive account provided here has to be taken alongside a theory of largerscale social processes. 1.
Supporting human-robot teams in social dynamicism: An overview of the metaphoric inference framework
- Proceedings of 56th Annual Meeting of the HFES
, 2012
"... Metaphoric classification of social interaction in human-robot teams can provide a useful frame for directing robot-human engagement while assisting the robot in sense-making of dynamic world behaviors. This paper describe a framework built from principles of embodiment to show how members of teams ..."
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Metaphoric classification of social interaction in human-robot teams can provide a useful frame for directing robot-human engagement while assisting the robot in sense-making of dynamic world behaviors. This paper describe a framework built from principles of embodiment to show how members of teams are not separated from their world, but make sense and interact in a world via a continuous (rather than causal) flow of engagement facilitated by two forms of perception. In this context, we distinguish between direct and reflective perception, arguing that agents socially engage via these modalities of perception through body, language, and context. We then argue that these forms of perception can direct the use of metaphors. The metaphors, in turn, act as classification frames for robot social intelligence using established human schemas.
Bodily affectivity: Prenoetic elements in enactive perception. Phenomenology and Mind
, 2013
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, 2012
"... Imitation by social interaction? Analysis of a minimal ..."
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Imitation by social interaction? Analysis of a minimal
Editorial: Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives
"... Human beings, even very young infants, and members of several other species, exhibit remarkable capacities for attending to and engaging with others. These basic capacities have been the subject of intense research in developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, comparative psychology, neuroscie ..."
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Human beings, even very young infants, and members of several other species, exhibit remarkable capacities for attending to and engaging with others. These basic capacities have been the subject of intense research in developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, comparative psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind over the last several decades. Appropriately characterizing the exact level and nature of these abilities and what lies at their basis continues to prove a tricky business. The contributions to this special issue investigate whether and to what extent the exercise of such capacities count as, or are best explained by, a genuine understanding of minds, where such understanding depends on the creatures in question possessing capacities for attributing a range of mental states and their contents in systematic ways. The question that takes center stage is: Do the capacities for attending to and engaging with others in question involve mindreading or is this achieved by other means? In this editorial we will review the state of the debate between mindreading and alternative accounts of social cognition. The issue is organized as follows: the first two papers
Understanding Others The Person Model Theory
"... Theory (ST) give an adequate account of how we understand others. Their shared defect, it is claimed, is that both focus on third-person observation of the other, and neglect the role of social interaction. While interaction theory is made to ac-count for the latter, it has problems doing justice to ..."
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Theory (ST) give an adequate account of how we understand others. Their shared defect, it is claimed, is that both focus on third-person observation of the other, and neglect the role of social interaction. While interaction theory is made to ac-count for the latter, it has problems doing justice to explicit attributions of propos-itional attitudes, especially from an observational stance. The latter received a new explanation by the Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH) which focuses on story-based explanations and tends to underestimate the relevance of nonlin-guistic intuitive understanding. In this paper, I first try to do justice to what is plausible about each of the four approaches by accepting that each account intro-duces one plausible epistemic strategy for understanding others, which leads us to a multiplicity view about the epistemic strategies for understanding others. But it will then be argued that an adequate theory of understanding others needs fur-ther adjustment and correction because we need to account for the fact that we usually understand others on the basis of specific background knowledge that be-comes more enriched during our life; I thus propose Person Model Theory (PMT)
