G. H. Hardy (1941) argues that the sole criterion for excellent research is that the researcher produces “beauty. ” While seemingly ineffable and frustratingly imprecise, Hardy instead suggests that creating beauty is straightforward. First, the work must be accurate: erroneous results are useless. Second, one’s peers must recognize the work to be interesting, exciting, elegant, and “cool. ” While this second criterion might seem arbitrary, there is generally good agreement between scholars in a given community about “interesting ” work (see Cole and Cole 1973 for a discussion), so one need not survey numerous researchers to ensure research is beautiful; asking a couple is equivalent to asking them all. With certain caveats, the work in embodied conversational agents (ECA) can make claims to beauty. ECAs are phenomenologically “accurate ” to the extent that the agent’s outward appearance objectively matches the appearance, language, attitudes and behavior of humans. Thus, questions that address manifestation accuracy include “Does the agent walk like a person walk? ” and “Does the agent use language and make grammatical errors the same way a person does?”

Construal level theory proposes that temporal distance changes people’s responses to future events by changing the way people mentally represent those events. The greater the temporal distance, the more likely are events to be represented in terms of a few abstract features that convey the perceived essence of the events (high-level construals) rather than in terms of more concrete and incidental details of the events (low-level construals). The informational and evaluative implications of high-level construals, compared with those of low-level construals, should therefore have more impact on responses to distant-future events than near-future events. This article explores the implications of construal level theory for temporal changes in evaluation, prediction, and choice. The authors suggest that construal level underlies a broad range of evaluative and behavioral consequences of psychological distance from events.

Abstract: Cognitive categories in the geographic realm appear to manifest certain special features as contrasted with categories for objects at surveyable scales. We have argued that these features reflect specific ontological characteristics of geographic objects. This paper presents hypotheses as to the nature of the features mentioned, reviews previous empirical work on geographic categories, and presents the results of pilot experiments that used English-speaking subjects to test our hypotheses. Our experiments show geographic categories to be similar to their non-geographic counterparts in the ways in which they generate instances of different relative frequencies at different levels. Other tests, however, provide preliminary evidence for the existence of important differences in subjects ’ categorizations of geographic and non-geographic objects, and suggest further experimental work especially with regard to the role in cognitive categorization of different types of objectboundaries at different scales.

Five studies tested the predictions of temporal construal theory and time-discounting theories regarding evaluation of near future and distant future options (outcomes, activities, products). The options had abstract or goal-relevant features (called high-level construal features) as well as more concrete or goal-irrelevant features (called low-level construal features). The studies varied the valence (positive vs. negative) and the type of valence (affective vs. cognitive) of the low-level and high-level construal features. The results show that the weight of high-level construal features, compared to the weight of low-construal features, is greater in determining distant future preferences than near future preferences. The implications of the results for extant theories of time-dependent changes in preference are discussed.

Categories in the middle level of a taxonomic hierarchy tend to be highly differentiated in that they have both high levels of within-category similarity and low levels of between-category similarity. Research on similarity reveals a distinction between pairs of categories that are seen as dissimilar because they have few commonalities and pairs that are seen as dissimilar because they have many psychologically relevant alignable differences. The authors suggest that the low between-category similarity proposed for neighboring basic-level categories is actually a matter of having many psychologically relevant differences. In contrast, the low between-category similarity of superordinates is a result of their having few commonalities. The authors evaluate this claim in 4 experiments using a variety of natural stimuli and converging measures. The data support the importance of aliguable differences for distinguish-ing between pairs of basic-level categories. People typically categorize objects at a number of levels of generality. For example, an object on top of a coffee table that has a rectangular shape, contains pages of printed text, and describes a mysterious murder can be called a murder

is difficult. In this article we develop a cognitive framework to characterize sense-making in the implementation process that is especially relevant for recent education policy initiatives, such as standards-based reforms that press for tremendous changes in classroom instruction. From a cognitive perspective, a key dimension of the implementation process is whether, and in what ways, implementing agents come to understand their practice, potentially changing their beliefs and attitudes in the process. We draw on theoretical and empirical literature to develop a cognitive perspective on implementation. We review the contribution of cognitive science frames to implementation research and identify areas where cognitive science can make additional contributions.

This study examines whether emotion conveyed in recorded and synthesized voices affects perceptions of emotional valence of content, perceptions of suitability of content, liking of content, and credibility of content as well as whether recorded or synthesized speech influences perceptions differently. Participants heard two news stories, two movie descriptions and two health stories in a 2 (type of speech: recorded vs. synthesized) by 2 (consistency of voice emotion and content emotion: matched vs. mismatched) balanced, between subjects experiment. A happy voice, whether synthesized or recorded, made content seem happier and more suitable for extroverts, and a sad (synthesized or recorded) voice made content seem less happy and less interesting for extroverts. Participants reported liking content more when voice emotion and content emotion were matched, but rated information as more credible when voice emotion and content emotion were mismatched. Implications for design are discussed.

The study of social relationships lies at the heart of the social sciences, but our understanding of the cognitive structures that support them has received little attention. This paper develops an account of the form and content of these structures, arguing that social relationships are represented by a small number of categories, rather than by dimensions as proposed by others. Taxometric analyses demonstrated that categories proposed by Fiske (1991) are truly discrete, controverting dimensional representation and one possible form of prototype structure. The categories appear to combine in the specification of actually existing social relationships, and are more informative, or “basic”, then colloquial relationship categories. 1.

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Research has shown that the activation and application of a significant-other representation to a new person, or transference, occurs in everyday social perception (S. M. Andersen & A. Baum, 1994; S. M. Andersen & S. W. Cole, 1990). Using a combined idiographic and nomothetic experimental paradigm, two studies examined the role of chronic accessibility of significant-other representations in transference. After learning about 4 fictional people, 1 of whom resembled a significant other, participants ' recognition memory was assessed. Both studies showed greater false-positive memory in the significant-other condition, relative to control, even in the absence of priming. Study 2 showed that although the effect was greater when the significant-other representation was concretely applicable to the target information, it occurred even when no such applicability was present. Results implicate the chronic accessibility of significant-other representations in transference. Mental representations of significant others serve as storehouses of information about important individuals from one's life. Interestingly, these representations can also be triggered by a new person and applied to this person in the context of everyday interpersonal relations (Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen