This paper presents a skill learning model CLARION. Different from existing models of mostly high-level skill learning that use a top-down approach (that is, turning declarative knowledge into procedural knowledge through practice), we adopt a bottom-up approach toward low-level skill learning, where procedural knowledge develops first and declarative knowledge develops later. Our model is formed by integrating connectionist, reinforcement, and symbolic learning methods to perform on-line reactive learning. It adopts a two-level dual-representation framework (Sun, 1995), with a combination of localist and distributed representation. We compare the model with human data in a minefield navigation task, demonstrating some match between the model and human data in several respects.

We are capable of drawing a variety of inferences effortlessly, spontaneously, and with remarkable efficiency — as though these inferences are a reflex response of our cognitive apparatus. This remarkable human ability poses a challenge for cognitive science and computational neuroscience: How can a network of slow neuron-like elements represent a large body of systematic knowledge and perform a wide range of inferences with such speed? The connectionist model Shruti attempts to address this challenge by demonstrating how a neurally plausible network can encode a large body of semantic and episodic facts, systematic rules, and knowledge about entities and types, and yet perform a wide range of explanatory and predictive inferences within a few hundred milliseconds. Relational structures (frames, schemas) are represented in Shruti by clusters of cells, and inference in Shruti corresponds to a transient propagation of rhythmic activity over such cell-clusters wherein dynamic bindings are represented by the synchronous firing of appropriate cells. Shruti encodes mappings across relational structures using high-efficacy links that enable the propagation of rhythmic activity, and it encodes items in long-term memory as coincidence and conincidence-error detector circuits that become active in response to the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of appropriate coincidences in the on going flux of rhythmic activity.

This article explicates the interaction between implicit and explicit processes in skill learning, in contrast to the tendency of researchers to study each type in isolation. It highlights various effects of the interaction on learning (including synergy effects). The authors argue for an integrated model of skill learning that takes into account both implicit and explicit processes. Moreover, they argue for a bottom-up approach (first learning implicit knowledge and then explicit knowledge) in the integrated model. A variety of qualitative data can be accounted for by the approach. A computational model, CLARION, is then used to simulate a range of quantitative data. The results demonstrate the plausibility of the model, which provides a new perspective on skill learning. The role of implicit learning in skill acquisition and the distinction between implicit and explicit learning have been widely recognized in recent years (see, e.g., Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, &

Humans routinely generalize universal relationships to unfamiliar instances. If we are told ‘‘if glork then frum,’ ’ and ‘‘glork,’ ’ we can infer ‘‘frum’’; any name that serves as the subject of a sentence can appear as the object of a sentence. These universals are pervasive in language and reasoning. One account of how they are generalized holds that humans possess mechanisms that manipulate symbols and variables; an alternative account holds that symbol-manipulation can be eliminated from scientific theories in favor of descriptions couched in terms of networks of interconnected nodes. Can these ‘‘eliminative’ ’ connectionist models offer a genuine alternative? This article shows that eliminative connectionist models cannot account for how we extend universals to arbitrary items. The argument runs as follows. First, if these models, as currently conceived, were to extend universals to arbitrary instances, they would have to generalize outside the space of training examples. Next, it is shown that the class of eliminative connectionist models that is currently popular cannot learn to extend universals outside the training space. This limitation might be avoided through the use of an architecture that implements symbol manipulation.

This chapter provides an introduction to the field of hybrid neural systems. Hybrid neural systems are computational systems which are based mainly on artificial neural networks but also allow a symbolic interpretation, or interaction with symbolic components. In this overview, we will describe recent results of hybrid neural systems. We will give a brief overview of the main methods used, outline the work that is presented here, and provide additional references. We will also highlight some important general issues and trends.

This paper will give an overview of the various approaches to neurosymbolic integration. Roughly, these can be divided into two strategies: unified strategies aim at attaining neural and symbolic capabilities using neural networks alone, while hybrid strategies combine neural networks with symbolic models such as expert systems, case-based reasoning systems, 2 Chapter 2 and decision trees. These two approaches form the main subtrees of the classification hierarchy depicted in Figure 1. Symbol Proc. Neuronal Unified approach Symbol Proc. hybrids Connectionist Localist Hybrid approach Combined L/D Neurosymbolic integration Functional Chainprocessing Translational Subprocessing hybrids Metaprocessing Distributed Coprocessing Figure 1 Classification of integrated neurosymbolic systems.

This paper, however, is concerned more with general approaches, ideas and possibilities than with precise technical details (which can be found elsewhere, as will be pointed out along the way)

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Constructivism is the Piagetian notion that learning leads the child to develop new types of representations. For example, on the Piagetian view, a child is born without knowing that objects persist in time even when they are occluded; through a process of learning, the child comes to know that objects persist in time. The trouble with this view has always been the lack of a concrete, computational account of how a learning mechanism could lead to such a change. Recently, however, in a book entitled Rethinking Innateness, Elman et al. (Elman,

The performance of symbolic inference tasks has long been a challenge to connectionists. In this paper, we present an extended survey of this area. Existing connectionist inference systems are reviewed, with particular reference to how they perform variable binding and rulebased reasoning and whether they involve distributed or localist representations. The benefits and disadvantages of different representations and systems are outlined, and conclusions drawn regarding the capabilities of connectionist inference systems when compared with symbolic inference systems or when used for cognitive modelling.