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Researchers criticize the transaction cost economics (TCE) paradigm for over-generalizing the assumption of opportunism as human nature. We suggest that opportunistic propensity is affected by cultural prior conditioning of individualism–collectivism (I–C). Specifically, we propose that individualists have a higher opportunistic propensity in intra-group transactions, and collectivists in inter-group transactions. Our cultural specification of opportunism helps TCE to more effectively accommodate some criticisms and more realistically deal with problems of economic organization in today’s global economy. © 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved. “Culture serves as a check on opportunism.” — Williamson (1993b: 476) First proposed by Coase (1937) and later popularized by Williamson (1975, 1985), transaction cost economics (TCE) has become a major paradigm in social science research (Masten, 1993). One of its key building blocks is the assumption of opportunism, because individuals “will not reliably self-enforce promises but will defect from the letter and spirit of an agreement when it suits their purposes, ” and “a healthy regard for opportunism is essential

Research on boards of directors has yielded a substantial amount of knowledge. The focus of the research has generally been on the relationships between different characteristics of the boards and the performance of the firm. However, the results have so far been contradictory and difficult to synthesise. The point of departure of this paper is that earlier research has treated the work of the board as a black box. Including an intermediate variable, the work process of the board, and finding ways to describe and classify this work should generate a more comprehensive knowledge about boards. In this paper, a framework is developed which is based on the line of reasoning which the board of directors applies in its work. The paper also assimilates the results of three empirical tests of the framework in the setting of Swedish listed companies. In Test 1, the strength of the framework is tested in classifying boards of directors according to different orientations in the work of the board. We identified four categories of boards with different orientations in Swedish listed companies. The antecedents of a specific board orientation were tested in Test 2. The results revealed that board orientation is a function of several interacting variables. Major determining variables for board orientation are the directors ' attitudes towards: a) stock-market efficiency and b) the possibility of the board to govern. Ownership concentration showed minor influence on board orientation. In Test 3, the effects of different board orientations on the performance of the firm were tested. Support was given to the propositions that board orientation influences the firm's strategy regarding the level of diversification and the size of dividends. The relationship between board orientation and financial performance did not receive any significant evidence.

At what level is new value created, or, put differently, what is the locus of knowledge? While knowledge and capabilities-based researchers argue that the locus of new value and knowledge lies at the firm level, we challenge this conceptualization and theoretically build toward more individualist foundations. We explicate the underlying philosophical assumptions of extant knowledge and capabilities-based work and discuss attributional problems. Nested (individual-level, a priori) heterogeneity may provide a better explanation of collective heterogeneity. There is really no need for the firm to be the fundamental unit of organization in invention; there is plenty of reason to suppose that individual talents count for a good deal more than the firm as an organization (Arrow, 1962: 624). The knowledge and capabilities-based views (KBV) in strategy have largely extended resource-based reasoning by suggesting that knowledge is the primary resource underlying new value creation, heterogeneity, and competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992). However, despite the recent proliferation of research into knowledge-based arguments, a number of fundamental constructs and questions have yet to be clearly defined and explored (e.g., see Kaplan, Schenkel, von Krogh, & Weber, 2001, for a recent overview). A critical, implicit debate underlying much knowledge and capabilities-based work is whether the individual or the collective is the source of new

This research asked the following question: is there a correlation between types of organizational culture and factors influencing knowledge transfer? It hypothesized that organizations scoring high on the cultural factors of openness to change/innovation, and task-oriented organizational growth would tend to be fertile to knowledge transfer. Second, it hypothesized that organizations scoring high on the factors of bureaucratic and competition/confrontation would tend to be infertile to knowledge transfer.

This paper presents a critique of emergent views on the roles of the boards of directors in relation to information security. The analysis highlights several concerns about the separation and validation of proper theory and business assertions of information security at board level. New requirements articulated by industry bodies – represented by a selected group of experts and evident in literature – are compared to the underlying theory of corporate governance to identify possible discrepancies. The discussion shows in particular the importance of staying within the theoretical underpinnings of corporate governance when discussing the topic of governance in general and in relation to boards of directors ’ responsibilities. Our critique opens up more opportunities to clarify information security’s role and relationship to corporate governance. We seek to draw particular attention to the appropriate separation of governance and management. This latter point we hope will encourage academics and business practitioners to reflect on current corporate and individual biases and on the way terms such as information security governance are represented.

Net economy

theory of corporate governance

Note: The authors wish to thank the participants of the Group of Management Education Researchers seminar group at Washington University in St. Louis for their helpful comments. This paper refines and extends research on organizational control, justice, and trust by examining the actions managers take regarding three critical managerial functions: control, trustbuilding, fairness-building. Whereas past work has primarily evaluated responses to managerial actions, this paper introduces and develops a theory of the determinants of three types of managerial actions: task controls, trust-building activities, fairness-building activities. Specifically, we focus on how the presence of various forms of superior-subordinate conflicts (concerning goals, tasks, and interpersonal issues) stimulate managerial concerns around subordinate task performance and their own managerial legitimacy. We argue that managers attempt to address these concerns using particular combinations of task control, trust-building, and fairness-building initiatives. The paper concludes with a discussion about how the theory we pose here refines and extends research on organizational control, organizational trust, and organizational fairness. 2

A critical research agenda for organisational performance measurement