This paper focuses on designing incentive mechanisms for overlay multicast systems. Existing proposals on the problem are no longer able to provide proper incentives when rational users collude or launch sybil attacks. To overcome this key limitation, we propose a novel decentralized DCast multicast protocol and prove that it offers a novel concept of safety-net guarantee: A user running the protocol will always obtain at least a reasonably good utility despite the deviation of any number of rational users that potentially collude or launch sybil attacks.

We introduce iOwe, a deferred compensation scheme that can be used in a broad range of decentralized systems. iOwe is reminiscent of a currency scheme backed by a precious commodity: network resources. iOwe does not require a central authority, proofs of work, continuous connectivity to currency issuers, or trusted storage. Instead, in iOwe, any principal may issue their own currency, in any amount, at any time. ”Currency ” in iOwe, called iotas, is a promise of future work, bootstrapped by peers ’ trust of one another. We present several applications of iOwe, and an evaluation in the context of bootstrapping video streaming systems. 1

A key challenge in large-scale collaborative distributed systems is to properly incentivize the rational/selfish users so that they will properly collaborate. Within such a context, this paper focuses on designing incentive mechanisms for overlay multicast systems. A key limitation shared by existing proposals on the problem is that they are no longer able to provide proper incentives and thus will collapse when rational users collude or launch sybil attacks. This work explicitly aims to properly sustain collaboration despite collusion and sybil attacks by rational users. To this end, we propose a new decentralized DCast multicast protocol that uses a novel mechanism with debt-links and circulating debts. We formally prove that the protocol offers a novel concept of safety-net guarantee: A user running the protocol will always obtain a reasonably good utility despite the deviation of any number of rational users that potentially collude or launch sybil attacks. Our prototyping as well as simulation demonstrates the feasibility and safety-net guarantee of our design in practice.