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Partial realizations of Hilbert’s program
 Journal of Symbolic Logic
, 1988
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JSTOR is a notforprofit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Association for Symbolic Logic is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Hilbert’s Program Then and Now
, 2005
"... Hilbert’s program is, in the first instance, a proposal and a research program in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. It was formulated in the early 1920s by German mathematician David Hilbert (1862–1943), and was pursued by him and his collaborators at the University of Göttingen and els ..."
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Hilbert’s program is, in the first instance, a proposal and a research program in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. It was formulated in the early 1920s by German mathematician David Hilbert (1862–1943), and was pursued by him and his collaborators at the University of Göttingen and elsewhere in the 1920s
Hilbert’s “Verunglückter Beweis,” the first epsilon theorem and consistency proofs. History and Philosophy of Logic
"... Abstract. On the face of it, Hilbert’s Program was concerned with proving consistency of mathematical systems in a finitary way. This was to be accomplished by showing that that these systems are conservative over finitistically interpretable and obviously sound quantifierfree subsystems. One propo ..."
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Abstract. On the face of it, Hilbert’s Program was concerned with proving consistency of mathematical systems in a finitary way. This was to be accomplished by showing that that these systems are conservative over finitistically interpretable and obviously sound quantifierfree subsystems. One proposed method of giving such proofs is Hilbert’s epsilonsubstitution method. There was, however, a second approach which was not refelected in the publications of the Hilbert school in the 1920s, and which is a direct precursor of Hilbert’s first epsilon theorem and a certain “general consistency result. ” An analysis of this socalled “failed proof ” lends further support to an interpretation of Hilbert according to which he was expressly concerned with conservatitvity proofs, even though his publications only mention consistency as the main question. §1. Introduction. The aim of Hilbert’s program for consistency proofs in the 1920s is well known: to formalize mathematics, and to give finitistic consistency proofs of these systems and thus to put mathematics on a “secure foundation.” What is perhaps less well known is exactly how Hilbert thought this should be carried out. Over ten years before Gentzen developed sequent calculus formalizations
What does it mean to say that logic is formal?
, 2000
"... Much philosophy of logic is shaped, explicitly or implicitly, by the thought that logic is distinctively formal and abstracts from material content. The distinction between formal and material does not appear to coincide with the more familiar contrasts between a priori and empirical, necessary and ..."
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Much philosophy of logic is shaped, explicitly or implicitly, by the thought that logic is distinctively formal and abstracts from material content. The distinction between formal and material does not appear to coincide with the more familiar contrasts between a priori and empirical, necessary and contingent, analytic and synthetic—indeed, it is often invoked to explain these. Nor, it turns out, can it be explained by appeal to schematic inference patterns, syntactic rules, or grammar. What does it mean, then, to say that logic is distinctively formal? Three things: logic is said to be formal (or “topicneutral”) (1) in the sense that it provides constitutive norms for thought as such, (2) in the sense that it is indifferent to the particular identities of objects, and (3) in the sense that it abstracts entirely from the semantic content of thought. Though these three notions of formality are by no means equivalent, they are frequently run together. The reason, I argue, is that modern talk of the formality of logic has its source in Kant, and these three notions come together in the context of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Outside of this context (e.g., in Frege), they can come apart. Attending to this
MATHEMATICAL IDEA ANALYSIS: WHAT EMBODIED COGNITIVE SCIENCE CAN SAY ABOUT THE HUMAN NATURE OF MATHEMATICS
"... This article gives a brief introduction to a new discipline called the cognitive science of mathematics (Lakoff & Núñez, 2000), that is, the empirical and multidisciplinary study of mathematics (itself) as a scientific subject matter. The theoretical background of the arguments is based on embodied ..."
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This article gives a brief introduction to a new discipline called the cognitive science of mathematics (Lakoff & Núñez, 2000), that is, the empirical and multidisciplinary study of mathematics (itself) as a scientific subject matter. The theoretical background of the arguments is based on embodied cognition, and on relatively recent findings in cognitive linguistics. The article discusses Mathematical Idea Analysis—the set of techniques for studying implicit (largely unconscious) conceptual structures in mathematics. Particular attention is paid to everyday cognitive mechanisms such as image schemas and conceptual metaphors, showing how they play a fundamental role in constituting the very fabric of mathematics. The analyses, illustrated with a discussion of some issues of set and hyperset theory, show that it is (human) meaning what makes mathematics what it is: Mathematics is not transcendentally objective, but it is not arbitrary either (not the result of pure social conventions). Some implications for mathematics education are suggested. Have you ever thought why (I mean, really why) the multiplication of two negative numbers yields a positive one? Or why the empty class is a subclass of all