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The roles of retribution and utility in determining punishment
, 2006
"... Three studies examined the motives underlying people’s desire to punish. In previous research, participants have read hypothetical criminal scenarios and assigned “fair” sentences to the perpetrators. Systematic manipulations within these scenarios revealed high sensitivity to factors associated wit ..."
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Three studies examined the motives underlying people’s desire to punish. In previous research, participants have read hypothetical criminal scenarios and assigned “fair” sentences to the perpetrators. Systematic manipulations within these scenarios revealed high sensitivity to factors associated with motives of retribution, but low sensitivity to utilitarian motives. This research identifies the types of information that people seek when punishing criminals, and explores how different types of information aVect punishments and confidence ratings. Study 1 demonstrated that retribution information is more relevant to punishment than either deterrence or incapacitation information. Study 2 traced the information that people actually seek when punishing others and found a consistent preference for retribution information. Finally, Study 3 confirmed that retribution information increases participant confidence in assigned punishments. The results thus provide converging evidence that people punish primarily on the basis of retribution.
Kant's Deconstruction of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* By Be'atrice Longuenesse
"... they lacked the transcendental method of the Critique oj'Pure Reason. According to this method, one proves the truth of a synthetic a priori principle (for instance, the causal principle) by proving two things: (1) that the conditions of possibility of our experience of an object are also the c ..."
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they lacked the transcendental method of the Critique oj'Pure Reason. According to this method, one proves the truth of a synthetic a priori principle (for instance, the causal principle) by proving two things: (1) that the conditions of possibility of our experience of an object are also the conditions of possibility ($this object itself'(this is the argument Kant makes in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, in the Critique of Pure Reason); ( 2) that presupposing the truth of the synthetic principle under consideration (for instance, the causal principle, but also all the other 'principles of pure understanding ' in the Critique ($Pure Reason) is a condition of possibility of our experience of any object, and therefore (by virtue of ( l) ) , of this object itself. What Kant describes as his "proof of the principle of sufficient reason" is none other than his proof, according to this n~cthod, of the causal principle in the Second Analogy of Experience, in the Critique oj'Pure Reason.' Now this claim is somewhat surprising. 111 Leibniz, and in Christian WolKthe main representative of the postLcibnizian school of Gcrnman philosophy discussed by Kantthe causal principle is only one of the specifications of the princi
MSc in Logic
, 2012
"... Friedman [1, 2] claims that Kant’s constructive approach to geometry was developed as a means to circumvent the limitations of his logic, which has been widely regarded by various commentators as nothing more than a glossa to Aristotelian subjectpredicate logic. Contra Friedman, and building on the ..."
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Friedman [1, 2] claims that Kant’s constructive approach to geometry was developed as a means to circumvent the limitations of his logic, which has been widely regarded by various commentators as nothing more than a glossa to Aristotelian subjectpredicate logic. Contra Friedman, and building on the work of Achourioti and van Lambalgen [3], we purport to show that Kant’s constructivism draws its independent motivation from his general theory of cognition. We thus propose an exegesis of the Transcendental Deduction according to which the consciousness of space as a formal intuition of outer sense (with its properties of, e.g., infinity and continuity) is produced by means of the activity of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination in the construction of geometrical concepts, which synthesis must be in thoroughgoing agreement with the categories. In order to substantiate these claims, we provide an analysis of Kant’s characterization of geometrical inferences and of geometrical continuity, along with a formal argument illustrating how the representation of space as a continuum can be constructed from Kantian principles. Contents
A FORMALISATION OF KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC
"... ABSTRACT. Although Kant envisaged a prominent role for logic in the argumentative structure of his Critique of pure reason [12], logicians and philosophers have generally judged Kant’s logic negatively. What Kant called ‘general ’ or ‘formal ’ logic has been dismissed as a fairly arbitrary subsystem ..."
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ABSTRACT. Although Kant envisaged a prominent role for logic in the argumentative structure of his Critique of pure reason [12], logicians and philosophers have generally judged Kant’s logic negatively. What Kant called ‘general ’ or ‘formal ’ logic has been dismissed as a fairly arbitrary subsystem of first order logic, and what he called ‘transcendental logic ’ is considered to be not a logic at all: no syntax, no semantics, no definition of validity. Against this, we argue that Kant’s ‘transcendental logic ’ is a logic in the strict formal sense, albeit with a semantics and a definition of validity that are vastly more complex than that of first order logic. The main technical application of the formalism developed here is a formal proof that Kant’s Table of Judgements in §9 of the Critique of pure reason, is indeed, as Kant claimed, complete for the kind of semantics he had in mind. This result implies that Kant’s ’general ’ logic is after all a distinguished subsystem of first order logic, namely what is known as geometric logic. 1.
Construction and Schemata in Mathematics
"... scandal in philosophy is the problem of free will ” [17, p. 205]. I very much agree with Suppes that the problem of the free will is a major puzzle, which we should try to get a better understanding of by examining the deeper issues connected with the free will. This essay, however, does not treat t ..."
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scandal in philosophy is the problem of free will ” [17, p. 205]. I very much agree with Suppes that the problem of the free will is a major puzzle, which we should try to get a better understanding of by examining the deeper issues connected with the free will. This essay, however, does not treat the problem of the free will. It concerns the problems of the ontology and epistemology of mathematics. In genereal, the problems of the philosophy of mathematics are just as old and—if it makes sense to talk about solvability of such problems— perhaps just as unsolved as the problem of the free will. Mathematics is a very important ingredient of knowledge. In its most simple form mathematics plays a necessary role in our understanding of the surrounding world and is necessary for solving simple problems of ordinary life. At the other end of the simplicityscale we find the mathematics as used in science. Also here mathematics has a necessary role in our descriptions of nature and the way in which we are involved with it and each other. It truly amazes me that there seems to be very little consensus with respect to the ontology and epistemology
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"... Both Carnap and Quine made significant contributions to the philosophy of mathematics despite their diversed views. Carnap endorsed the dichotomy between analytic and synthetic knowledge and classified certain mathematical questions as internal questions appealing to logic and convention. On the con ..."
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Both Carnap and Quine made significant contributions to the philosophy of mathematics despite their diversed views. Carnap endorsed the dichotomy between analytic and synthetic knowledge and classified certain mathematical questions as internal questions appealing to logic and convention. On the contrary, Quine was opposed to the analyticsynthetic distinction and promoted a holistic view of scientific inquiry. The purpose of this paper is to argue that in light of the recent advancement of experimental mathematics such as Monte Carlo simulations, limiting mathematical inquiry to the domain of logic is unjustified. Robustness studies implemented in Monte Carlo Studies demonstrate that mathematics is on par with other experimentalbased sciences.
Carnap and Quine: TwentiethCentury Echoes of Kant and Hume
"... As a student at the University of Jena—where, in particular, he learned modern mathematical logic from Gottlob Frege—Rudolf Carnap was exposed early on to the Kantian view that the geometry of space is grounded in the pure form of our spatial intuition; and, as Carnap explains in his autobiography, ..."
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As a student at the University of Jena—where, in particular, he learned modern mathematical logic from Gottlob Frege—Rudolf Carnap was exposed early on to the Kantian view that the geometry of space is grounded in the pure form of our spatial intuition; and, as Carnap explains in his autobiography, he was initially strongly attracted by this view: I studied Kant’s philosophy with Bruno Bauch in Jena. In his seminar, the Critique of Pure Reason was discussed in detail for an entire year. I was strongly impressed by Kant’s conception that the geometrical structure of space is determined by the form of our intuition. The aftereffects of this influence were still noticeable in the chapter on the space of intuition in my dissertation, Der Raum. (1963a, 4) In particular, Carnap’s dissertation, completed—under Bauch—in 1921 and published in KantStudien in 1922, defends the view that the form of our pure intuition has only the infinitesimally Euclidean structure presupposed in Riemann’s theory of ndimensional manifolds (rather than a global threedimensional Euclidean
iv Promotor: prof.dr. W.R. de Jong
"... Proofs, intuitions and diagrams Kant and the mathematical method of proof ..."
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Proofs, intuitions and diagrams Kant and the mathematical method of proof
Preface
, 2012
"... geometry [180] when I was preparing my dissertation on Euclid’s Elements and was focused on studying Greek mathematics and classical Greek philosophy. Then I convinced myself that the mathematical category theory is philosophically relevant not only because of its name but also because of its conten ..."
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geometry [180] when I was preparing my dissertation on Euclid’s Elements and was focused on studying Greek mathematics and classical Greek philosophy. Then I convinced myself that the mathematical category theory is philosophically relevant not only because of its name but also because of its content and because of its special role in the contemporary mathematics, which I privately compared to the role of the notion of figure in Euclid’s geometry. Today I have more to say about these matters. The broad historical and philosophical context, in which I studied category theory, is made explicit throughout the present book. My interest to the Axiomatic Method stems from my work on Euclid and extends through Hilbert and axiomatic set theories to Lawvere’s axiomatic topos theory to the Univalent Foundations of mathematics recently proposed by Vladimir Voevodsky. This explains what the two subjects appearing in the title of this book share in common. The next crucial biographical episode took place in 1999 when I was a young scholar visiting Columbia University on the Fulbright grant working on ontology of events under the supervision of Achille Varzi. As a part of my Fulbright program I had to make a presentation in a different American university, and I decided to use this opportunity for talking about the philosophical