We examined 155 information systems research articles published from 1983 to 1988 and found that although this research is not rooted in a single overarching theoretical perspective, it does exhibit a single set of philosophical assumptions regarding the nature of the phenomena studied by information systems researchers, and what constitutes valid knowledge about those phenomena. We believe that a single research perspective for studying information systems phenomena is unnecessarily restrictive, and argue that there exist other philosophical assumptions that can inform studies of the relationships between information technology, people, and organizations. In this paper, we present two additional research philosophies for consideration-the interpretive and the critical-and for each we provide empirical examples to illustrate how they are used. We conclude by suggesting that much can be gained if a plurality of research perspectives is effectively employed to investigate information systems phenomena. Philosophical assumptions—Research approaches—Positivist research—Interpretivist research—Critical research

The purpose of this paper is to propose a theoretical basis for research into the interaction of organizations and information technology. Recent work in social theory departs from prior traditions in proposing that social phenomena can be understood as comprising both subjective and objective elements. We apply this premise of duality to understanding the relationship between information technology and organizations. We construct a theoretical framework in which the development and deployment of information technology in organizations is a social phenomenon, and in which the organizational consequences of technology are products of both material and social dimensions. The framework is based on Giddens ' theory of structuration, and it allows us to progress beyond several of the false dichotomies (subjective vs objective, socially constructed vs material, macro vs micro, and qualitative vs quantitative) that persist in investigations of the interaction between organizations and information technology. The framework can be used to guide studies in two main areas of information systems research-- systems development and the organizational consequences of using information technology.

This is the manuscript that was published, with only minor copy-editing alterations, as: Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review. 108, 814-834 Copyright 2001, American Psychological Association To obtain a reprint of the final type-set article, please go through your library’s journal services, or contact the author directly Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. Four reasons are given for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post-hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it de-emphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals, emphasizing instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as anthropology and primatology. Author notes

Abstract. The role of models in the design of computer systems to support interpersonal and cooperative work is examined. It is argued that the current generation of models over-emphasise determinism at the expense of interpretation in the work process. It is further argued that there are many cases in which designs pass between many different professional groups (office workers, managers, analysts, designers, programmers). Each of these groups has its own worldview and specialised language, and hence they are termed "semantic communities". When designs pass between semantic communities, something is lost and something is gained-- but the objects on which each community works are not commensurable. The distinct objects of work (office problems, analyses, designs, programs) do not map onto each other, and cannot be mutually tested using simple truelfalse criteria. This is termed a problem of "ontological drift", and arises whenever several distinct semantic communities work on the "same " system. It is suggested that the disparity so often observed between design expectations and the ways systems are actually used is therefore quite normal. Current efforts are directed at eliminating the disparity. We suggest that a more fruitful approach might be to accept that the final determination of a system rests with the users. In the long run this might give rise to different types of design principles than those used at the moment. In the short run, even the consciousness of this perspective could make significant differences to design dialogues and attitudes to "users".

The paper discusses some of the main contributions to the theory of communities of practice (COP theory), especially as it relates to organizational learning. The paper does not attempt a full overview but concentrates on the notion of power relations. Early COP theory, was formulated as part of situated learning theory, and promised to work on issues of social context and unequal power relations. Foucault’s work and actor network theory (ANT) is introduced and forms the basis of a constructive critique of COP theory. If it appears that ANT and COP theory are in agonistic dispute, then the point of the paper is to seek a path of rapprochement through an emphasis on Foucaultian notions of practice, power and force-relations. [All comments welcome] Paper for presentation at the 3 rd International Conference on “Organizational

We have benefited from our discussions with Kristian Kreiner, Paul Hirsch and Roger Dunbar. We have also benefited from inputs that were offered by participants at the Path Dependence and Creation workshop,

Standard conceptions of how the environment influences the person are constrained by the dominant view of representation - and, therefore, perception, cognition, and language - as fundamentally consisting of encodings. I argue that this encoding view is logically incoherent. An alternative view of representation is presented, interactivism, and shown to avoid the incoherencies of encodingism. The interactivist model of representation provides accounts for standard presumed encoding phenomena, and highlights processes and forms of influence of the environment on the person that are obscure or entirely absent from the encoding account. The multiplicity and complexity of the processes of environmental influence acquire a theoretically coherent organization and development from within the interactive perspective.

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Prevailing views about what constitutes organisational knowledge need to be systematically evaluated at deep epistemological levels. We argue there is a need is to establish a new paradigm comprising of both a theoretical and an ontological foundation for thinking about knowledge epistemologies. We think, along with Bill McKelvey, (1997, 2002) that the “science of management ” as it relates to organisations seems to be greatly wanting. Our approach is based on an evolutionary theory of knowledge contained within Karl Popper’s later epistemological works beginning with his 1972 “Objective Knowledge – an evolutionary approach ” and a framework of organisational theory based on Maturana and Varela's concept of self-producing complex systems ("autopoiesis"). We have drawn upon this combined approach in order to understand how best to integrate understandings of personal and objective knowledge and the notion of “living organisations ” into a new paradigm of organisational knowledge. A model that is congruent with this new paradigmatic approach is detailed and discussed. This model is designed to provide a general overview of the different types of knowledge that give rise to organisational knowledge. Importantly, we highlight that all explicit knowledge held in organisations encoded in analogue or digital objects is in fact inert. Such knowledge cannot be regarded as “living knowledge ” unless the filter of human interpretative intelligence is applied to generate meaning from these knowledge objects or, increasingly, unless such intelligence is

ABSTRACT: In this ethnographic study of summer undergraduate research (UR) experiences at four liberal arts colleges, where faculty and students work collaboratively on a project of mutual interest in an apprenticeship of authentic science research work, analysis of the accounts of faculty and student participants yields comparative insights into the structural elements of this form of UR program and its benefits for students. Comparison of the perspectives of faculty and their students revealed considerable agreement on the nature, range, and extent of students ’ UR gains. Specific student gains relating to the process of “becoming a scientist ” were described and illustrated by both groups. Faculty framed these gains as part of professional socialization into the sciences. In contrast, students emphasized their personal and intellectual development, with little awareness of their socialization into professional practice. Viewing study findings through the lens of social constructivist learning theories demonstrates that the characteristics of these UR programs, how faculty practice UR in these colleges, and students ’ outcomes—including cognitive and personal growth and the development of a professional identity—strongly exemplify many facets of these theories, particularly, student-centered and situated learning as part of cognitive apprenticeship