currency transactions has the unique distinction of having attracted the ire of a power no less than the U.S. Congress. Introduced by Bob Dole and three other politicians, the "Prohibition on United Nations Taxation Act of 1996 " aimed at preventing UN officials and agencies from developing or promoting the Tobin tax or any other international taxation scheme under a different name. 2 Leaving aside the irony of a country with the greatest arrears in its dues to the UN, telling the international body what it should and should not do, what made the Tobin tax such an unwelcome proposal to the U.S. Congress was, as Raffer (1998) argues, its potential to bolster national autonomy and distribute the tax burden more equally around the globe. Both ran "counter to current tide of liberalization, globalization, and tax reductions for the well-off " (p. 530). Tobin's main reason for proposing his tax was of course more technical in nature. His main concern was to curb currency speculation, which he thought was responsible for the much greater frequency of exchange rate crises around the world since the trend of capital liberalization took hold. In much of the academic criticism on the Tobin tax, the debate concentrated on its feasibility and the "distorting " effects it would have as any tax does on private decisions. 3 Some also cautioned against its potential to detract attention from discussions of more far reaching solutions to the problem of international financial volatility (Taylor and Eatwell 2000, p. 93). But, few if any other than Davidson (1997, 1998) have questioned- on Keynesian grounds- that in theory such a transaction tax would dampen financial volatility and curb