is difficult. In this article we develop a cognitive framework to characterize sense-making in the implementation process that is especially relevant for recent education policy initiatives, such as standards-based reforms that press for tremendous changes in classroom instruction. From a cognitive perspective, a key dimension of the implementation process is whether, and in what ways, implementing agents come to understand their practice, potentially changing their beliefs and attitudes in the process. We draw on theoretical and empirical literature to develop a cognitive perspective on implementation. We review the contribution of cognitive science frames to implementation research and identify areas where cognitive science can make additional contributions.

The term incident command system (ICS) denotes a particular approach to assembly and control of the highly reliable, temporary organizations employed by many firefighters, police, and other public safety professionals to manage diverse resources at a wide variety of emergency scenes. Our inductive study of a fire department’s use of the ICS identified three main factors enabling this distinctively bureaucratic system to produce remarkably flexible and reliable organizations for complex and volatile task environments. In general, this research suggests the possibility of new organizational forms able to capitalize on the control and efficiency benefits of bureaucracy, while at the same time avoiding or overcoming the considerable tendencies toward inertia that are thought to accompany bureaucratic systems. Recent organization science research indicates that an expanding number of organizations are facing increasingly unforgiving socio-political-economic contexts (cf. D’Aveni, 1994). Operational failures resulting in inappropriate, incomplete, laggardly or otherwise mindless organizational responses to unexpected and demanding environmental contingencies (such as major and unforeseen competitive threats, product malfunctions and recalls, supplier collapses, technology breakdowns, etc.) are ever more likely to be immediately

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Organizations sometimes face critical situations or crises that can induce severe consequences or even disasters if wrong decisions are made. The bulk of crisis management research has relied heavily on case study methods yet often with rhetorical or even inconsistent suggestions. With an exclusive focus on crisis prevention, the issue of how organizations can maintain good performance when faced with critical situations has largely remained unexplored. There is also an apparent lack of consideration regarding how aspects of organizational design and task environment interact and affect organizational performance under critical situations. In this paper, we attempt to address this issue from an open system’s perspective and integrate techniques of computational modeling with the analyses of two crisis cases, the Vincennes incident and the Hinsdale incident. The use of a computational model with strong organization theory foundation has provided a systematic mechanism for abstracting empirical information and generating theoretical results, thus complementing conventional case analyses, which thrive on in-depth information but are often limited by the lack of analytical ability to provide theoretical insight that goes beyond empirical descriptions. For the two crisis cases, the study shows, through detailed quantitative illustrations, that the computer model can be very effective in predicting organizational performance and suggesting designs that organizations can employ to mitigate the impact of crises. This study has demonstrated that our approach of computational case analysis can be very successful in providing systematic and explicit guidance for effective crisis mitigation both theoretically and empirically.

Relying only on explanations based on impersonal social forces and cultural imperatives that are viewed as inevitably leading to particular human behaviors is, at best, incomplete social analysis. Any adequate theory of modern society must include people as active, purposeful, and innovative beings whose futureoriented behavior helps create not only their own future but also the social order itself. Social research directed at the investigation of such human agency contributes to our knowledge of futures thinking and accountability. Although people produce consequences for which they ought to be held accountable, they often do so only more or less competently. Their competence can be improved by teaching them the principles of futures thinking. They can become more responsible actors by learning to search more fully for possible futures, to forecast probable futures more accurately, and to make judgments of preferable futures more objectively. In today's world of rapid social change, no college education is adequate if it fails to include some systematic study of the principles of the futures field.

In this chapter, I compare organizational rituals of risk and error in two U.S. government agencies: The Federal Aviation Administration's National Air Traffic System (NATS) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). I take the position that all organizations, even those categorized as High Reliability Organizations, are subject to routine nonconformity: they regularly produce mistakes and errors. For both agencies, I describe their technologies of control, which are the rules and procedures, work practices, and surveillance technologies for regulating risk. Then I examine definitional processes: how anomalies are identified, tracked, and converted into formal organizational categories. Because of differences in the certainty of space shuttles and airplanes, the technologies of control employed as these two agencies identify, define, and control risk and error vary. This variation has important consequences. I show that the variation in these agencies' technologies of control produces different cultural understandings about risk and error. These cultural understandings have social psychological consequences, affecting how technical workers interpret signals of potential danger. Finally, I consider the implications for this comparison for organizational encounters with risk. Organizational encounters with risk and error are not restricted to the sensational cases that draw media coverage when mistakes, near-misses, and accidents become public. They are, instead, a routine and systematic

There is general agreement that engineering students should receive ethics instruction as a part of their undergraduate education. However, there are diverse opinions on how engineering ethics instruction should be carried out. Philosophy of ethics, the original approach, emphasizes normative ideals and abstract principles. The new case studies approach focuses on a number of real and hypothetical cases. This article shows that teaching one approach or the other does not help students become ethical professionals. It suggests bridging the gap between ethical theory and cases by teaching ethical dilemmas and issues that are likely to be encountered in daily professional life. I.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—as the global leader in all areas of spaceflight and space science— is a unique organization in terms of size, mission, constraints, complexity and motivations. NASA’s flagship endeavor—human spaceflight—is extremely risky and one of the most complicated tasks undertaken by man. It is well accepted that the tragic destruction of the Space Shuttle Challenger on 28 January 1986 was the result of organizational failure. The surprising disintegration of the Space Shuttle Columbia in February 2003—nearly 17 years to the day after Challenger—was a shocking reminder of how seemingly innocuous details play important roles in risky systems and organizations. NASA as an organization has changed considerably over the 42 years of its existence. If it is serious about minimizing failure and promoting its mission, perhaps the most intense period of organizational change lies in its immediate future. This paper outlines some of the critical features of NASA’s organization and organizational change, namely path dependence and ‘‘normalization of deviance’’. Subsequently, it reviews the rationale behind calling the Challenger tragedy an organizational failure. Finally, it argues that the recent Columbia accident displays characteristics of organizational failure and proposes recommendations for the future. r 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 1.

11 April 2008

Risk assessment is a means to characterize and reduce uncertainty to support our ability to deal with catastrophe through risk management. This paper addresses the application of risk assessment to both the built and natural environments, to improve our understanding and management of human health, safety, and security within those environments, especially in the