In this paper, we characterize, interpret, and test the over-identifying restrictions imposed in affine models of the term-structure. "We begin by showing, using the classification scheme proposed by Dai, Liu, and Singleton [10] for general affine diffusions, that the family of N-factor models can be classified into N + 1 non-nested sub-families of models. For each subfamily, we derive a canonical model with the property that every admissible member of this family is equivalent to or a nested special case of our canonical model. Second, using our classification scheme and canonical models, we show that many of the three-factor models in the literature impose potentially strong over-identifying restrictions, and we completely characterize these restrictions. Finally, we compute simulated-method-of-moments estimates for several members of the sub-family of three-factor models that nest the "benchmark" model of Chen [8], and test the over-identifying restrictions on the joint distribution...

Using dealer’s quotes and transactions prices on straight industrial bonds, we investigate the determinants of credit spread changes. Variables that should in theory determine credit spread changes have rather limited explanatory power. Further, the residuals from this regression are highly cross-correlated, and principal components analysis implies they are mostly driven by a single common factor. Although we consider several macroeconomic and financial variables as candidate proxies, we cannot explain this common systematic component. Our results suggest that monthly credit spread changes are principally driven by local supply0 demand shocks that are independent of both credit-risk factors and standard proxies for liquidity.

The purpose of this article is to explain the spread between spot rates on corporate and government bonds. We find that the spread can be explained in terms of three elements: (1) compensation for expected default of corporate bonds (2) compensation for state taxes since holders of corporate bonds pay state taxes while holders of government bonds do not, and (3) compensation for the additional systematic risk in corporate bond returns relative to government bond returns. The systematic nature of corporate bond return is shown by relating that part of the spread which is not due to expected default or taxes to a set of variables which have been shown to effect risk premiums in stock markets Empirical estimates of the size of each of these three components are provided in the paper. We stress the tax effects because it has been ignored in all previous studies of corporate bonds. 1

Abstract not found

I find that the standard class of a#ne models produces poor forecasts of future changes in Treasury yields. Better forecasts are generated by assuming that yields follow random walks. The failure of these models is driven by one of their key features: The compensation that investors receive for facing risk is a multiple of the variance of the risk. This means that risk compensation cannot vary independently of interest rate volatility. I also describe and empirically estimate a class of models that is broader than the standard a#ne class. These "essentially a#ne" models retain the tractability of the usual models, but allow the compensation for interest rate risk to vary independently of interest rate volatility. This additional flexibility proves useful in forming accurate forecasts of future yields. Address correspondence to the University of California, Haas School of Business, 545 Student Services Building #1900, Berkeley, CA 94720. Phone: 510-642-1435. Email address: du#ee@haas.b...

Because the option to call a corporate bond should rise in value when bond yields fall, the relation between noncallable Treasury yields and spreads of corporate bond yields over Treasury yields should depend on the callability of the corporate bond. I confirm this hypothesis for investment-grade corporate bonds. Although yield spreads on both callable and noncallable corporate bonds fall when Treasury yields rise, this relation is much stronger for callable bonds. This result has important implications for interpreting the behavior of yields on commonly used corporate bond indexes, which are composed primarily of callable bonds. COMMONLY USED INDEXES OF CORPORATE bond yields, such as those produced by Moody’s or Lehman Brothers, are constructed using both callable and noncallable bonds. Because the objective of those producing the indexes is to track the universe of corporate bonds, this methodology is sensible. Until the mid-1980s, few corporations issued noncallable bonds, hence an index designed to measure the yield on a typical corporate bond would have to be

Despite powerful advances in yield curve modeling in the last twenty years, comparatively little attention has been paid to the key practical problem of forecasting the yield curve. In this paper we do so. We use neither the no-arbitrage approach, which focuses on accurately fitting the cross section of interest rates at any given time but neglects time-series dynamics, nor the equilibrium approach, which focuses on time-series dynamics (primarily those of the instantaneous rate) but pays comparatively little attention to fitting the entire cross section at any given time and has been shown to forecast poorly. Instead, we use variations on the Nelson-Siegel exponential components framework to model the entire yield curve, period-by-period, as a three-dimensional parameter evolving dynamically. We show that the three time-varying parameters may be interpreted as factors corresponding to level, slope and curvature, and that they may be estimated with high efficiency. We propose and estimate autoregressive models for the factors, and we show that our models are consistent with a variety of stylized facts regarding the yield curve. We use our models to produce term-structure forecasts at both short and long horizons, with encouraging results. In particular, our forecasts appear much more accurate at long horizons than various standard benchmark forecasts. Finally, we discuss a number of extensions, including generalized duration measures, applications to active bond portfolio management, and arbitrage-free specifications. Acknowledgments: The National Science Foundation and the Wharton Financial Institutions Center provided research support. For helpful comments we are grateful to Dave Backus, Rob Bliss, Michael Brandt, Todd Clark, Qiang Dai, Ron Gallant, Mike Gibbons, Da...

Abstract not found

This paper explores the nature of default arrival and recovery implicit in the term structures of sovereign CDS spreads. We argue that term structures of spreads reveal not only the arrival rates of credit events (λ Q), but also the loss rates given credit events. Applying our framework to Mexico, Turkey, and Korea, we show that a single-factor model with λ Q following a lognormal process captures most of the variation in the term structures of spreads. The risk premiums associated with unpredictable variation in λ Q are found to be economically significant and co-vary importantly with several economic measures of global event risk, financial market volatility, and macroeconomic policy. THE BURGEONING MARKET FOR SOVEREIGN CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS (CDS) contracts offers a nearly unique window for viewing investors ’ risk-neutral probabilities of major credit events impinging on sovereign issuers, and their risk-neutral losses of principal in the event of a restructuring or repudiation of external debts. In contrast to many “emerging market ” sovereign bonds, sovereign CDS

Richardson were especially helpful on this manuscript. Thanks to Deepak Agrawal for computational assistance and thoughtful comments. I would also like to thank Yakov Amihud, Anthony Lynch, Jennifer Carpenter, Paul Wachtel and Cliff Green for their comments and help. As always, none of the aforementioned are responsible for any opinions expressed or any errors. 1 One of the fundamental issues in finance is what are the factors that affect expected return on assets, the sensitivity of expected return to these factors, and the reward for bearing this sensitivity. There is a long history of testing in this area, and it is clearly one of the most investigated areas in finance. Almost all of the testing I am aware of involves using realized returns as a proxy for expected returns. The use of average realized returns as a proxy for expected returns relies on a belief that information surprises tend to cancel out over the period of the study and realized returns are therefore an unbiased estimate of expected returns. However, I believe that there is ample evidence that this belief is misplaced. There are periods longer than ten years where stock market realized returns are on average less than the risk-free rate (1973 to 1984). There are periods longer than fifty years in which risky long-term bonds on average underperformed the risk free