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Symmetric and asymmetric encryption
 ACM Computing Surveys
, 1979
"... All cryptosystems currently m use are symmetrm m the sense that they require the transmitter and receiver to share, m secret, either the same pmce of reformation (key) or one of a paLr of related keys easdy computed from each other, the key is used m the encryption process to introduce uncertainty t ..."
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All cryptosystems currently m use are symmetrm m the sense that they require the transmitter and receiver to share, m secret, either the same pmce of reformation (key) or one of a paLr of related keys easdy computed from each other, the key is used m the encryption process to introduce uncertainty to an unauthorized receiver. Not only is an
BIT 19 (1979k 27~275 CRITICAL REMARKS ON "CRITICAL REMARKS ON SOME PUBLICKEY
"... Cryptosystems", [5] suggests a method for attacking the RSA publickey cryptosystem. In this note we show that Herlestam's proposed attack is highly impractical, and that his analysis is erroneous. The RSA cryptosystem [1] encodes a message M using the key (e,n) via the equation: (1) C = E~(M) M e ..."
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Cryptosystems", [5] suggests a method for attacking the RSA publickey cryptosystem. In this note we show that Herlestam's proposed attack is highly impractical, and that his analysis is erroneous. The RSA cryptosystem [1] encodes a message M using the key (e,n) via the equation: (1) C = E~(M) M e (modn). Here the original message M and the ciphertext C are considered as integers in the range 0 to n 1. The integer n is the product of two large prime numbers p and q. The integer e is relatively prime to (p1)(q1). To decrypt a received ciphertext C the recipient computes (2) M Dd,(M) C d (modn) where d is chosen to satisfy the equation de 1 (modlcm(pl,q1)). The attack proposed by Herlestam runs as follows: Let P(x) be a polynomial in x such that
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"... The literature of cryptography has a curious history. Secrecy, of course, has always played a central role, but until the First World War, important developments appeared in print in a more or less timely fashion and the field moved forward in much the same way as other specialized disciplines. As l ..."
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The literature of cryptography has a curious history. Secrecy, of course, has always played a central role, but until the First World War, important developments appeared in print in a more or less timely fashion and the field moved forward in much the same way as other specialized disciplines. As late as 1918, one of the most influential cryptanalytic papers of the twentieth century, William F. Friedman’s monograph The Index of Coincidence and Its Applications in Cryptography, appeared as a research report of the private Riverbank Laboratories [577]. And this, despite the fact that the work had been done as part of the war effort. In the same year Edward H. Hebern of Oakland, California filed the first patent for a rotor machine [710], the device destined to be a mainstay of military cryptography for nearly 50 years. After the First World War, however, things began to change. U.S. Army and Navy organizations, working entirely in secret, began to make fundamental advances in cryptography. During the thirties and forties a few basic papers did appear in the open literature and several treatises on the subject were published, but the latter were farther and farther behind the state of the art. By the end of the war the transition was complete. With one notable exception, the public literature had died. That exception was Claude Shannon’s paper “The Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems, ” which