We consider the problem of routing traffic to optimize the performance of a congested network. We are given a network, a rate of traffic between each pair of nodes, and a latency function for each edge specifying the time needed to traverse the edge given its congestion; the objective is to route traffic such that the sum of all travel times—the total latency—is minimized. In many settings, it may be expensive or impossible to regulate network traffic so as to implement an optimal assignment of routes. In the absence of regulation by some central authority, we assume that each network user routes its traffic on the minimum-latency path available to it, given the network congestion caused by the other users. In general such a “selfishly motivated ” assignment of traffic to paths will not minimize the total latency; hence, this lack of regulation carries the cost of decreased network performance. In this article, we quantify the degradation in network performance due to unregulated traffic. We prove that if the latency of each edge is a linear function of its congestion, then the total latency of the routes chosen by selfish network users is at most 4/3 times the minimum possible total latency (subject to the condition that all traffic must be routed). We also consider the more general setting in which edge latency functions are assumed only to be continuous and nondecreasing in the edge congestion. Here, the total

We study the degradation in network performance caused by the selfish behavior of noncooperative network users. We consider a model of selfish routing in which the latency experienced by network traffic on an edge of the network is a function of the edge congestion, and network users are assumed to selfishly route traffic on minimumlatency paths. The quality of a routing of traffic is measured by the sum of travel times, also called the total latency. The outcome of selfish routing—a Nash equilibrium—does not in general minimize the total latency; hence, selfish behavior carries the cost of decreased network performance. We quantify this degradation in network performance via the price of anarchy, the worst-possible ratio between the total latency of a Nash equilibrium and of an optimal routing of the traffic. We show the price of anarchy is determined only by the simplest of networks. Specifically, we prove that under weak hypotheses on the class of allowable edge latency functions, the worst-case ratio between the total latency of a Nash equilibrium and of a minimum-latency routing for any multicommodity flow network is achieved by a singlecommodity

This paper uses the method of kinematic waves, developed in part I, but may be read independently. A functional relationship between flow and concentration for traffic on crowded arterial roads has been postulated for some time, and has experimental backing (? 2). From this a theory of the propagation of changes in traffic distribution along these roads may be deduced (??2, 3). The theory is applied (?4) to the problem of estimating how a 'hump', or region of increased concentration, will move along a crowded main road. It is suggested that it will move slightly slower than the mean vehicle speed, and that vehicles passing through it will have to reduce speed rather suddenly (at a 'shock wave') on entering it, but can increase speed again only very gradually as they leave it. The hump gradually spreads out along the road, and the time scale of this process is estimated. The behaviour of such a hump on entering a bottleneck, which is too narrow to admit the increased flow, is studied (?5), and methods are obtained for estimating the extent and duration of the resulting hold-up. The theory is applicable principally to traffic behaviour over a long stretch of road, but the paper concludes (? 6) with a discussion of its relevance to problems of flow near junctions, including a discussion of the starting flow at a controlled junction. In the introductory sections 1 and 2, we have included some elementary material on the quantitative study of traffic flow for the benefit of scientific readers unfamiliar with the subject. 1.

Abstract. This paper gives an extensive documentation of applications of finite-dimensional nonlinear complementarity problems in engineering and equilibrium modeling. For most applications, we describe the problem briefly, state the defining equations of the model, and give functional expressions for the complementarity formulations. The goal of this documentation is threefold: (i) to summarize the essential applications of the nonlinear complementarity problem known to date, (ii) to provide a basis for the continued research on the nonlinear complementarity problem, and (iii) to supply a broad collection of realistic complementarity problems for use in algorithmic experimentation and other studies.

We study the negative consequences of selfish behavior in a congested network and economic means of influencing such behavior. We consider the model of selfish routing defined by Wardrop [30] and studied in a computer science context by Roughgarden and Tardos [26]. In this model, the latency experienced by network traffic on an edge of the network is a function of the edge congestion, and network users are assumed to selfishly route traffic on minimum-latency paths. The quality of a routing of traffic is measured by the sum of travel times (the total latency).

We study the price of selfish routing in non-cooperative networks like the Internet. In particular, we investigate the price...

Dynamic multi-path routing has the potential to improve the reliability and performance of a communication network, but carries a risk. Routing needs to respond quickly to achieve the potential benefits, but not so quickly that the network is destabilized. This paper studies how rapidly routing can respond, without compromising stability. We present a sufficient condition for the local stability of end-to-end algorithms for joint routing and rate control. The network model considered allows an arbitrary interconnection of sources and resources, and heterogeneous propagation delays. The sufficient condition we present is decentralized: the responsiveness of each route is restricted by the round-trip time of that route alone, and not by the roundtrip times of other routes. Our results suggest that stable, scalable load-sharing across paths, based on end-to-end measurements, can be achieved on the same rapid time-scale as rate control, namely the time-scale of round-trip times.

According to Wardrop's first principle, agents in a congested network choose their routes selfishly, a behavior that is captured by the Nash equilibrium of the underlying noncooperative game. A Nash equilibrium does not optimize any global criterion per se, and so there is no apparent reason why it should be close to a solution of minimal total travel time, i.e. the system optimum. In this paper, we offer extensions of recent positive results on the efficiency of Nash equilibria in traffic networks. In contrast to prior work, we present results for networks with capacities and for latency functions that are nonconvex, nondifferentiable and even discontinuous. The inclusion of upper bounds on arc flows has early been recognized as an important means to provide a more accurate description of traffic flows. In this more general model, multiple Nash equilibria may exist and an arbitrary equilibrium does not need to be nearly efficient. Nonetheless, our main result shows that the best equilibrium is as efficient as in the model without capacities. Moreover, this holds true for broader classes of travel cost functions than considered hitherto.

Abstract We consider a directed network in which every edge possesses a latency function specifying the time needed to traverse the edge given its congestion. Selfish, noncooperative agents constitute the network traffic and wish to travel from a source s to a sink t as quickly as possible. Since the route chosen by one network user affects the congestion (and hence the latency) experienced by others, we model the problem as a noncooperative game. Assuming each agent controls only a negligible portion of the overall traffic, Nash equilibria in this noncooperative game correspond to s-t flows in which all flow paths have equal latency. A natural measure for the performance of a network used by selfish agents is the common latency experienced by each user in a Nash equilibrium. It is a counterintuitive but well-known fact that removing edges from a network may improve its performance; the most famous example of this phenomenon is the so-called Braess's Paradox. This fact motivates the following network design problem: given such a network, which edges should be removed to obtain the best possible flow at Nash equilibrium? Equivalently, given a large network of candidate edges to be built, which subnetwork will exhibit the best performance when used selfishly? We give optimal inapproximability results and approximation algorithms for several network design problems of this type. For example, we prove that for networks with n vertices and continuous, nondecreasing latency functions, there is no approximation algorithm for this problem with approximation ratio less than n/2 (unless P = N P). We also prove this hardness result to be best possible by exhibiting an n/2-approximation algorithm. For networks in which the latency of each edge is a linear function of the congestion, we prove that there is no ( 43- ffl)-approximation algorithm for the problem (for any ffl> 0, unless P = N P); the existence of a 43-approximation algorithm follows easily from existing work, proving this hardness result sharp. Moreover, we prove that an optimal approximation algorithm for these problems is what we call the trivial algorithm: given a network of candidate edges, build the entire network. A consequence of this result is that Braess's Paradox (even in its worst-possible manifestation) is impossible to detect efficiently.

We study a priority service where users are free to choose the priority of their traffic, but are charged accordingly by the network. We assume that each user chooses priorities to maximize its own net benefit, and model the resulting interaction among users as a noncooperative game. We show that there exists an unique equilibrium for this game and that in equilibrium the bandwidth allocation is weighted max-min fair.