According to the approach/inhibition theory of power (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), having power should be associated with the approach system, and lacking power with the avoidance system. However, to this point research has focused solely on whether power leads to more action, particularly approach–related action, or not. In three experiments, we extend this research by exploring the direct, unintentional relation between power and both approach and avoidance tendencies. Priming high power led to greater relative BAS strength than priming low power, but did not affect the BIS (Exp. 1). High–power priming also facilitated both simple and complex approach behavior, but did not affect avoidance behavior (Exp. 2–3). These effects of power occurred even in power–irrelevant situations. They also cannot be explained by priming of general positive versus negative constructs, nor by changes in positive, negative, approach–related, or avoidance–related affect. Behavior is driven by two fundamental action tendencies: approach and avoidance

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Conceptualizing probability as psychological distance, the authors draw on construal level theory (Y. Trope & N. Liberman, 2003) to propose that decreasing an event’s probability leads individuals to represent the event by its central, abstract, general features (high-level construal) rather than by its peripheral, concrete, specific features (low-level construal). Results indicated that when reported probabilities of events were low rather than high, participants were more broad (Study 1) and inclusive (Study 2) in their categorization of objects, increased their preference for general rather than specific activity descriptions (Study 3), segmented ongoing behavior into fewer units (Study 4), were more successful at abstracting visual information (Study 5), and were less successful at identifying details missing within a coherent visual whole (Study 6). Further, after exposure to low-probability as opposed to high-probability phrases, participants increasingly preferred to identify actions in ends-related rather than means-related terms (Study 7). Implications for probability assessment and choice under uncertainty are discussed.

Having power means that one makes decisions that determine the outcomes of less powerful others (e.g., Deprét & Fiske, 1993). In fact, powerful people sometimes face multiple impactful, complicated decisions a day, with little room for error. How do they accomplish this? Recent research indicates that power changes not only a person’s responsibilities, but also the way a person thinks. The powerful process information more abstractly—integrating information to extract the gist, detecting patterns and relationships—than the powerless (Smith & Trope, 2006). Work on unconscious-thought theory (UTT; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006) suggests that such abstract thinking leads to better decisions when the situation is complex. Individuals who think consciously are unable to consider all relevant attributes, due to consciousness ’ limited capacity. The piecemeal nature of conscious thought also leads them to weight these attributes suboptimally. In contrast, unconscious thought (i.e., thought when conscious attention is directed elsewhere) is more abstract, integrating information to form a summary judgment. Indeed, unconscious thought leads to better decisions than does conscious thought in complex situations (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006). Conscious thought impairs performance in part because it is piecemeal. If the powerful think more abstractly than the powerless by default, they should tend to think more abstractly even when thinking consciously. The powerful would then be spared the performance deficits accompanying conscious thought. This hypothesis moves beyond the debate of whether the powerful (Fiske, 1993) or the powerless (Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky, & van Dijk, 2008) are normally under greater attentional demands: High-power participants should perform equally well regardless

the experience of power increases interpersonal forgiveness

ABSTRACT—Four experiments explored whether lacking power impairs executive functioning, testing the hypothesis that the cognitive presses of powerlessness increase vulnerability to performance decrements during complex executive tasks. In the first three experiments, low power impaired performance on executive-function tasks: The powerless were less effective than the powerful at updating (Experiment 1), inhibiting (Experiment 2), and planning (Experiment 3). Existing research suggests that the powerless have difficulty distinguishing between what is goal relevant and what is goal irrelevant in the environment. A fourth experiment established that the executive-function impairment associated with low power is driven by goal neglect. The current research implies that the cognitive alterations arising from powerlessness may help foster stable social hierarchies and that empowering employees may reduce costly organizational errors. Societies are structured around social hierarchies, with some individuals and groups achieving positions of power and dominance over others (cf. Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006). These social orders are often rooted in immutable characteristics such as race and sex, a situation that is unfair and ineffective because talented members of disadvantaged groups are often prevented from moving into positions of power. Many contemporary societies, in response to this injustice, have shifted from hierarchies based on aristocracy to hierarchies based on meritocracy, with high achievers filling more powerful positions than low achievers. An implication of meritocracies is that individuals who lack power are low achievers because they are less capable or less motivated than those who acquire power. In this article, we challenge this assumption. We propose that powerless people often achieve less than powerful people because lacking power

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Power—asymmetric control over valued resources—is a fundamental dimension of social relations. Classical conceptualizations of power emphasize its conscious nature. In the present review, we reveal how power often operates nonconsciously and identify the different methods and paradigms used to activate or create a psychological sense of power outside of conscious awareness. First, we establish that cues of power are often attended to nonconsciously, which explains why people can be so accurate at determining their own and others ‘ level of power yet so inaccurate at identifying the specific cues diagnostic of possessing power. Second, we discuss how people are often unaware of how the possession of power fundamentally alters basic psychological and behavioral tendencies and describe the range of methodologies—roles, cues, episodic recall, conceptual priming—used to identify the nonconscious effects of power. Power produces two broad types of effects: It increases abstraction in thought and approach in behavior, both of which make individuals more focused on their own goals and internal states. Like other psychological constructs and processes, even ones that are inherently social and relational, power‘s cues and consequences

When leaders perform solitary tasks, do they self-regulate to maximize their effort, or do they reduce effort and conserve their resources? Our model suggests that power motivates selfregulation toward effective performance — unless the task is perceived as unworthy of leaders. Our first studies showed that power improves self-regulation and performance, even when resources for self-regulation are low (ego depletion). Additional studies showed that leaders sometimes disdain tasks they deem unworthy, by withholding effort (and therefore performing poorly). Ironically, during ego depletion leaders skip the appraisal and therefore work hard regardless of task suitability, so that depleted leaders sometimes outperform non-depleted ones. Our final studies replicated these patterns with different tasks and even simply manipulating framing and perception of the same task (Experiment 5). Experiment 4 also showed that the continued high exertion of leaders when depleted takes a heavy toll, resulting in larger impairments later. The judicious expenditure of self-control resources among powerful people may help them prioritize their efforts to pursue their goals effectively.

What is the difference between far and further? Investigations into such psychological distancing – removal from an egocentric reference point – have suggested similarities between geographical space, time, probability, and social distance. We draw on these similarities to propose that experiencing any kind of distance will reduce sensitivity to any other distance. Ten studies varied the initial distance of an event and assessed sensitivity to a second distance. Consistently, people were less responsive to a given span of distance when it was distal versus proximal. This effect held using each of the four distances as the initial instantiation of distance; it also held using each dimension to assess sensitivity to distance (i.e., as the secondary distance dimension). These findings suggest that the dimensions of psychological distance share a common, interchangeable meaning and that the cross-dimension difference between far and further is less than that between near and far.