A fundamental question in causal inference is whether it is possible to reliably infer the manipulation effects from observational data. There are a variety of senses of asymptotic reliability in the statistical literature, among which the most commonly discussed frequentist notions are pointwise consistency and uniform consistency (see, e.g. Bickel, Doksum [2001]). Uniform consistency is in general preferred to pointwise consistency because the former allows us to control the worst case error bounds with a finite sample size. In the sense of pointwise consistency, several reliable causal inference algorithms have been established under the Markov and Faithfulness assumptions [Pearl 2000, Spirtes et al. 2001]. In the sense of uniform consistency, however, reliable causal inference is impossible under the two assumptions when time order is unknown and/or latent confounders are present [Robins et al. 2000]. In this paper we present two natural generalizations of the Faithfulness assumption in the context of structural equation models, under which we show that the typical algorithms in the literature are uniformly consistent with or without modifications even when the time order is unknown. We also discuss the situation where latent confounders may be present and the sense in which the Faithfulness assumption is a limiting case of the stronger assumptions.

Bengson, 2009). This research has focused primarily on puzzling asymmetries in ordinary people‘s judgments about intentional action. For example, researchers have been concerned with ordinary judgments about the intentional status of side effects, as in the case described in Knobe (2003a), where a negative foreseen side effect of a CEO‘s action—harming the environment—is judged to be intentional while a positive foreseen side effect—helping the environment—is judged to be unintentional. Call any puzzling asymmetry in ordinary judgments about intentional action (whether or not they involve side effects) an intentionality judgment asymmetry. Debate has turned on whether intentionality judgment asymmetries are best explained in terms of the influence of some type of prescriptive judgment (Alicke, 2008; Knobe,

009-9474-7 The main focus of this paper is the question as to what it is for an individual to think of her environment in terms of a concept of causation, or causal concepts, in contrast to some more primitive ways in which an individual might pick out or register what are in fact causal phenomena. I show how versions of this question arise in the context of two strands of work on causation, represented by Elizabeth Anscombe and Christopher Hitchcock, respectively. I then describe a central type of reasoning that, I suggest, a subject has to be able to engage in, if we are to credit her with causal concepts. I also point out that this type of reasoning turns on the idea of a physical connection between cause and effect, as articulated in recent singularist approaches of causation.