Learning from experience, the cyclical interplay of thinking and doing, is increasingly important as organizations struggle to cope with rapidly changing environments and more complex and interdependent sets of knowledge. This paper confronts two central issues for organizational learning: (1) how is local learning (by individuals or small groups) integrated into collective learning by organizations? and (2) what are the differences between learning practices that focus on control, elimination of surprises, and single-loop incremental “fixing ” of problems with those that focus on deep or radical learning, double-loop challenging of assumptions, and discovery of new opportunities? We articulate these relationships through an analysis of learning practices in high-hazard organizations, specifically, problem investigation teams that examine the most serious and troubling events and trends in nuclear power plants and chemical plants. Our analysis suggests a four-stage model of organizational learning reflecting different approaches to control and learning. LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE IN HIGH-HAZARD ORGANIZATIONS 1

This paper explores the challenges of adopting a MOO-based technology to support a virtual working environment spanning several geographically dispersed units of a global organization. We use community-based interpretive schemes as an analytic lens for identifying assumptions and expectations about technology use and genres of communication, and for examining how these shaped participants ’ distributed interaction over time. We found differences in interpretive schemes across sites, nationalities, languages, and roles, as well as over time. These interpretive differences help to explain the difficulties in appropriation of the technology and the limited development of shared genre norms. In addition, they offer some reasons for why the use of the virtual work environment was halted after two years.

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During our two-and-a-half-year research path of EMPOST-NET, there have been multiple parties that contributed to the project. This research project was conducted under the auspices of The European Union Commission, and would not have been possible without the support of the Environment and Climate Research Programme. We would especially like to thank our programme officer Michael Cornaert, who provided us with warm administrative assistance as well as insightful comments in the end stages of the project. All the participating institutions deserve our gratitude: The International Institute at

Profile analysis is proposed as a means for advancing empirical change process research. In the context of organizational studies, a profile can be viewed as a set of sequentially arranged factors that expresses the relative strength of individual factors and holistic patterns inside or between organizational entities. To demonstrate the utility of the approach in change process research, profile analysis was employed in a cross-sectional study. Hypotheses related to Lewin’s three-step model of change were tested using data obtained from managers involved in change implementation. Results confirmed a progression through Lewin’s unfreezing-movement-refreezing sequence during implementation. Profiles that reflected higher systematic use of change process factors were also found related to implementation success. Many future research opportunities are apparent, such as investigating interorganizational change profile types and using profile analysis to enhance longitudinal research designs.

This paper presents a field study of decision-making processes in management teams in two organizations. It reviews existing literature on managerial knowledge structures and decision-making, and identifies methodological and conceptual limitations with these approaches. The authors then develop interpretive case studies of two management teams, which focus on the articulated and social methods used to make decisions. They found that both organizations used rules of thumb or heuristic reasoning in their decision-making, that these rules of thumb functioned as headlines of deeper organizational narratives, and that these narratives were grounded in emotional as well as purely rational considerations. We suggest that the term “guiding principle ” usefully integrates our three findings into a descriptive concept that may be further explored in future research of both a descriptive and prescriptive nature.

Generally perceived as a negative phenomenon to overcome, resistance to change (RTC) has been discussed widely in the organization literature. However, opting for a manichean view of RTC seems to be simplistic. In this paper we focus on exploring professors ' reactions to change induced by the Bologna reform at the university. Based on 38 in-depth interviews and using Pettigrew's framework (context – content – process), we observe that reactions to change are mostly ambivalent, containing both positive and negative representations. This leads us to introduce the concept of reluctance to change as a result of the ambivalent reactions. Going further in our exploration, we emphasize some main elements that explain the negative representations: a lack of shared vision, an uncertain political context and a perceived lack of resources. We also emphasize incompatibilities that nurture ambivalence: a university culture characterized by stability, slowness, academic freedom, incremental and consensus-based change, is not adapted to the Bologna reform, which occurs with an overall sense of urgency, a rapid rhythm of adaptation, an imposed and complex process. This paper shows that university is not a simple and homogenous organization since it is composed of different subcultures. Based on these results, we suggest university managers develop a common sense-making and take reluctance to change into account as an indicator of future potential brakes in the Bologna process.

Emerging (or "inchoate") industries differ significantly from mature industries. Inchoate industries are characterized by few producers, underdeveloped markets, unclear technologies, and uncertain regulatory forces. Traditional, linear-adaptive approaches to business strategy derived from the study of mature industries, such as Miles and Snow (1978) and Porter (1980), are not applicable to inchoate industries. In this paper, we argue that an interpretive approach to studying organizing and strategy-making -- specifically Daft and Weick's model of organizations as interpretive systems (1984) -- is better suited to the context of industry emergence. Daft and Weick's typology of interpretive stances distinguishes the manner in which managers attempt to make sense of equivocal and uncertain environments, and hence is independent of an industry's maturity level. This study is the first attempt to operationalize the Daft and Weick typology. Propositions and preliminary evidence pres...

Barriers to producing multidisciplinary knowledge in communities of scholarship