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Paradoxes in Göttingen
"... In 1903 Russell’s paradox came over the mathematical world with a double stroke. Bertrand Russell himself published it under the heading “The Contradiction” in chapter 10 of his Principles of Mathematics (Russell 1903). Almost at the same time Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) referred to Russell’s ..."
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In 1903 Russell’s paradox came over the mathematical world with a double stroke. Bertrand Russell himself published it under the heading “The Contradiction” in chapter 10 of his Principles of Mathematics (Russell 1903). Almost at the same time Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) referred to Russell’s
NEW FOUNDATIONS FOR IMPERATIVE LOGIC III: A GENERAL DEFINITION OF ARGUMENT VALIDITY *
, 2013
"... Abstract. Besides pure declarative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are declaratives (“you sinned shamelessly; so you sinned”), and pure imperative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are imperatives (“repent quickly; so repent”), there are mixedpremise arguments, whose premises incl ..."
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Abstract. Besides pure declarative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are declaratives (“you sinned shamelessly; so you sinned”), and pure imperative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are imperatives (“repent quickly; so repent”), there are mixedpremise arguments, whose premises include both imperatives and declaratives (“if you sinned, repent; you sinned; so repent”), and crossspecies arguments, whose premises are declaratives and whose conclusions are imperatives (“you must repent; so repent”) or vice versa (“repent; so you can repent”). I propose a general definition of argument validity: an argument is valid exactly if, necessarily, every fact that sustains its premises also sustains its conclusion, where a fact sustains an imperative exactly if it favors the satisfaction over the violation proposition of the imperative, and a fact sustains a declarative exactly if, necessarily, the declarative is true if the fact exists. I argue that this definition yields as special cases the standard definition of validity for pure declarative arguments and my previously defended definition of validity for pure imperative arguments, and that it yields intuitively acceptable results for mixedpremise and crossspecies arguments. 1.