A renewed interest in the hunting hypothesis has focused on the control and distribution of meat. A frequent observation among foragers is that large game prey resources are often widely distributed in a manner that suggests to some researchers that hunters do not own their prey and thus cannot direct meat distribution to their families. The `show-off' model has been evoked to argue that hunters hunt in order to signal status rather than to provision their families. In contrast, detailed prey distribution data from the whale hunters of Lamalera, Indonesia, show that hunters do in fact own specific shares of prey. Whales are indeed very large game, but rather than a public good, a harvested whale carcass at Lamalera consists of privately owned shares, delineated by a complex and mutually agreedupon set of norms. Results show that hunting in Lamalera is mutualistic, involving multifaceted coordination between many individuals. Rights to shares of the harvest are contingent primarily upon hunt participation either directly as a hunter, as a craftsman, or as a corporate member. If big game hunting does not preclude hunters from owning the meat they harvest, then hunting may be less about simply `show' and more about family provisioning than suggested by the show-off model.

The cooperative acquisition, defense and distribution of meat are common problems that must be solved by social hunters. These were also problems faced by any of our hominid ancestors that may have hunted large game in our evolutionary past. Much of the last 40 years of research in evolutionary ecology has tried to understand such cooperative behavior. The classic Prisoner's Dilemma game theory model captures much of the essence of cooperation and its study has dominated inquiry into cooperation. While a good model of reciprocity, the Prisoner's Dilemma may not be the best paradigm for understanding other types of cooperation. Both byproduct and synergistic mutualism differ from the Prisoner's Dilemma with respect to the relative payoffs for cooperators and defectors. I argue that synergistic mutualism more closely models the payoffs common to cooperative big game hunting. Selection favors by-product mutualism in circumstances where not cooperating inflicts a cost on the cheater. The difference between synergistic hunting and by-product hunting lies with the returns obtained from solitary large game hunting (lower return) relative to the returns obtained from solitary small game hunting (higher return). For many types of large game, return rates increase significantly when hunting occurs in a group. However, these same prey are extremely difficult to kill alone. I present whale hunting in the village of Lamalara, Indonesia as an example of synergistic big game hunting.

The “original resources ” available to humans has puzzled the founder of modern neuroscience, Santiago Ramon y Cajal. In his autobiography he writes: “At that time, the generally accepted idea that the differences between the brain of [non-human) mammals (cat, dog, monkey, etc.) and that of man are

Work was conducted among traditional, subsistence whale hunters in Lamalera, Indonesia, in order to test if strict biological kinship or lineage membership is more important for explaining the organization of cooperative hunting parties ranging in size from 8 to 14 men. Crew identifications were collected for all 853 hunts that occurred between May 3 and August 5, 1999. Lineage identity and genetic relatedness were determined for a sample of 189 hunters. Results of matrix regression show that genetic kinship explains little of the hunters ’ affiliations independent of lineage identity. Crew members are much more closely related to each other than expected by chance, but this is due to the correlation between lineage membership and genetic kinship. Lineage members are much more likely to affiliate in crews, but kin with r < 0.5 are just as likely not to affiliate. The results are discussed vis-à-vis the evolution of cooperation and group identity.

Work was conducted among traditional, subsistence whale hunters in Lamalera, Indonesia in order to test if kinship or lineage membership is more important for explaining the organization of cooperative hunting parties ranging in size from 8-14 men. Crew identifications were collected for all 853 hunts that occurred between May 3 and August 5, 1999. Lineage identity and genetic relatedness were determined for a sample of 189 hunters. Results of matrix regression show that kinship explains little of the hunters' affiliations independent of lineage identity. Crews are much more related amongst themselves than expected by chance. This is due, however, to the correlation between lineage membership and kinship. Lineage members are much more likely to affiliate in crews, but beyond r = 0.5 kin are just as likely not to affiliate. The results are discussed vis--vis the evolution of cooperation and group identity.

Abstract not found

The recent blossoming of evolutionary linguistics resulted in a variety of theories that attempt to provide a selective scenario for the evolution of early language. There are scenarios focusing on almost all of the possible uses of human language one can think of: mate choice, mating contract, pair bonding, parent-offspring communication, gossip, rituals, grooming, tool making, and hunting. This is definitely a positive change after the infamous ban of the French Academy of Sciences; however, the overabundance of these theories makes many researchers sceptical towards such theorising. We think, agreeing with the sceptics, that a more rigorous approach is needed towards the construction of such theories. Despite the well-founded scepticism there is no agreement as to what criteria should be used to evaluate the validity of the various competing theories. Here we would like to fill the gap and provide a guideline upon which the various historical narratives can be judged. Some of these criteria follow from our evolutionary stance, some follow from biological and historical constraints, and others follow from common sense and the latest results of game theory. None of these criteria is highly constraining in itself, but we think that taken together these criteria can provide a powerful evolutionary framework to think about the evolution of human language.