This paper, an expanded version of a talk on love given to a literary society, attempts to analyse some of the architectural requirements for an agent which is capable of having primary, secondary and tertiary emotions, including being infatuated or in love. It elaborates on work done previously in the Birmingham Cognition and Affect group, describing our proposed three level architecture (with reactive, deliberative and metamanagement layers), showing how different sorts of emotions relate to those layers. Some of the relationships between emotional states involving partial loss of control of attention (e.g. emotional states involved in being in love) and other states which involve dispositions (e.g. attitudes such as loving) are discussed and related to the architecture. The work of poets and playwrights can be shown to involve an implicit commitment to the hypothesis that minds are (at least) information processing engines. Besides loving, many other familiar states and process...

Introduction This chapter presents the agent-based perspective on imitation. In this perspective, imitation is best considered as the behavior of an autonomous agent in relation to its environment, including other autonomous agents. We argue that such a perspective helps unfold the full potential of research on imitation and helps in identifying challenging and important research issues. We first explain the agent-based perspective and then discuss it in the context of particular research issues in studies with animals and artifacts, with reference to chapters presented in this book. At the end of the chapter we briefly introduce the individual contributions to this book and provide a roadmap that helps the reader in navigating through the exciting and highly interwoven themes that are presented in this book. In order to focus discussions, we explain the agent-based perspective with particular consideration of the correspondence

This article puts research on socially intelligent agents (SIA) in the broader context of how humans (and other primates) perceive and interact with the social world. Phylogenetic (evolutionary) and ontogenetic (developmental) issues are discussed with respect to the social origin of primate and human intelligence and human culture. Implications for designing artifacts and for the evolvability of human societies are outlined. A theory of empathy is presented that is based on current research on the primate social brain. Research projects that investigate some of these issues are reviewed. I argue that Socially Intelligent Agents (SIA) research, although strongly linked to software and robotic engineering, goes beyond a software engineering paradigm: it can potentially serve as a paradigm for a science of social minds. A systematic and experimental investigation of human social minds and the way humans perceive the social world can result in truly social artifacts,...

One of the defining features of intelligent behaviour is the ordering of individual expressed actions into coherent, apparently rational patterns. Psychology has long assumed that hierarchical and sequential structures internal to the intelligent agent underlie this expression. Recently these assumptions have been challenged by claims that behaviour controlled by such structures is necessarily rigid, brittle, and incapable of reacting quickly and opportunistically to changes in the environment (Hendriks-Jansen 1996, Goldfield 1995, Brooks 1991a). This dissertation is intended to support the hypothesis that sequential and hierarchical structures are necessary to intelligent behaviour, and to refute the above claims of their impracticality. Three forms of supporting evidence are provided: • a demonstration in the form of experimental results in two domains that structured intelligence can lead to robust and reactive behaviour, • a review of recent research results and paradigmatic trends within artificial intelligence, and • a similar examination of related research in natural intelligence.

Finding a useful abstract representation is fundamental to solving many difficult problems in software engineering. In order to better understand how representations are actually used in key collaborative software engineering tasks, this empirical study examined all of the spoken representations of soflware behavior in 9 domain analysis sessions. It found that about 70 % of them were metaphorical, representing system behavior as physical movement of objects, as perceptual processes, or in anthropomorphic terms ascribing beliefs and desires to the system. The pattern of use of these representations indicates 1) that they were not merely temporary placeholders, but rather their use persisted even when a specialized and more formal vocabulary had been developed, and 2) the metaphoric descriptions appear to reflect actual use of metaphor, rather than just a choice of vocabulary. The use of metaphor is explained in terms d how well they serve human cognitive abilities and collaborative needs. The predominance of metaphorical representations in synchronous collaborative sessions raises important issues about the possible misleading effects of metaphorical thinking. It also raises questions about the compatibility of the spoken representations with other representations (e.g., diagrams, specification languages) that trigger, and capture the results of, the verbal collaborative work.

This article, derived from the 1996 American Association for Artificial Intelligence Presidential Address, explores the notion of intelligence from a variety of perspectives and finds that it "are" many things. It has, for example, been interpreted in a variety of ways even within our own field, ranging from the logical view (intelligence as part of mathematical logic) to the psychological view (intelligence as an empirical phenomenon of the natural world) to a variety of others. One goal of this article is to go back to basics, reviewing the things that we, individually and collectively, have taken as given, in part because we have taken multiple different and sometimes inconsistent things for granted. I believe it will prove useful to expose the tacit assumptions, models, and metaphors that we carry around as a way of understanding both what we're about and why we sometimes seem to be at odds with one another

Introduction Within DAI and the game theoretical literature a fundamental question is often posed: Given bounded rationality and knowledge, what conditions produce cooperative and/or altruistic interagent behaviour? One line of enquiry involves the application of simple learning rules within game theoretic environments (Liebrand & Messick 1996). This approach assumes that agents are individual satisficing learners. Another approach applies selective mimicry from a spatial "neighbourhood" based on maximum payoff (Nowak & May 1992). Although elegant, and able to produce cooperation, neither can produce sustained altruism - where individual needs are driven by the needs of a group to the individuals detriment. Here, a fresh perspective on cooperation is applied which is a synthesis of these two approaches yet moves beyond them. A "memetic" (Bura 1994, Dennett 1995, Hales 1997) approach is developed which takes it's inspiration from theories concerning the cultural evolut

When Tom Givón asked me a while ago what my chapter would be about, I said, “Roughly, about the relation between language and theory of mind. ” His laconic response was, “Well, they are inseparable. ” So, I thought, there goes my chapter. But not really. There is reason to believe that language and theory of mind have coevolved, given their close relation in development and their tight connection in social behavior. However, they are clearly not inseparable—physiologically, cognitively, or functionally. So the question becomes, “What is the exact relation between language and theory of mind, in evolution, development, and social behavior? ” To answer this question is a daunting task; I will try merely to clear a path toward an answer. I will consider several possible relations between the two faculties, bring conceptual arguments and empirical evidence to bear on them, and end up arguing for an escalation process in which language and theory of mind have fueled each other’s evolution. Language Some Stipulations About Language and Theory of Mind What constitutes genuine language? Modern language is typically described on several

this paper benefited from support provided by NIH Grant R01-HD23922 to Frank Keil

The emergence and evolution of human language has been the focus of increasing amounts of research activity in recent years. This increasing interest has been coincident with the increased use of computer simulation, particularly using one or more of the methods and techniques of ‘Artificial Life’, to investigate a wide range of evolutionary problems and questions. There is now a significant body of work that uses such computer simulations to investigate the evolution of language. In this thesis a broad review of work on the evolution of language is presented, showing that language evolution occurs as two distinct evolutionary processes. The ability to use language is clearly the result of biological evolution. But the changes that occur over time to all spoken languages can also be viewed as being part of a process of cultural evolution. In this thesis, work using artificial life models to investigate each of these processes is reviewed. A review of the methods and techniques used in artificial life is also presented early in the work. A novel model is developed which is used to explore the conditions necessary for the