This article describes an integrated theory of analogical access and mapping, instantiated in a

This is the manuscript that was published, with only minor copy-editing alterations, as: Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review. 108, 814-834 Copyright 2001, American Psychological Association To obtain a reprint of the final type-set article, please go through your library’s journal services, or contact the author directly Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. Four reasons are given for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post-hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it de-emphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals, emphasizing instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as anthropology and primatology. Author notes

This paper begins with a brief review of SME and MAC/FAC, our simulations of matching and retrieval. Next I lay out several arguments for exploring analogy in the large, including why it is now very feasible and what we can learn by such explorations. A new constraint on cognitive simulations, the Integration Constraint, is proposed: A cognitive simulation of some aspect of analogical processing should be usable as a component in larger-scale cognitive simulations. I believe that the implications of this new constraint for cognitive simulation of analogy are far-reaching. After that, two explorations of larger-scale phenomena are described. First, I describe a theoretical framework in which we model common sense reasoning as an interplay of analogical and first-principles reasoning. Second, I describe how SME and MAC/FAC have been used in a case-based coach that is accessible to engineering thermodynamics students worldwide via electronic mail. These examples show that exploring analogy in the large can provide new insights and new challenges to our simulations. Finally, the broader implications of this approach are discussed.

Recent constraint-satisfaction models of explanation, analogy, and decision making claim that these processes are influenced by bidirectional constraints that promote coherence. College students were asked to reach a verdict in a complex legal case involving multiple conflicting arguments, including alternative analogies to the target case. Participants rated agreement with the individual arguments both in isolation before seeing the case, and again after reaching a verdict. Assessments of the individual arguments (including the competing analogies) shifted so as to cohere with their emerging verdict. Information about the character of the defendant in the initial case triggered a cascade of "spreading coherence", influencing decisions made about a subsequent case involving very different legal issues. Participants ' memory for their initial positions also shifted so as to cohere with their final positions. The coherence shifts were simulated by a constraint satisfaction model. The results demonstrate that an alogical process of constraint satisfaction can transform highly ambiguous inputs into coherent decisions. Bidirectional Reasoning 3 One of the most deep-rooted assumptions about human reasoning is that the flow of

Although commentators periodically declare that Freud is dead, his repeated burials lie on shaky grounds. Critics typically attack an archaic version of psychodynamic theory that most clinicians similarly consider obsolete. Central to contemporary psychodynamic theory is a series of propositions about (a) unconscious cognitive, affective, and motivational processes; (b) ambivalence and the tendency for affective and motivational dynamics to operate in parallel and produce compromise solutions; (c) the origins of many personality and social dispositions in childhood; (d) mental representations of the self, others, and relationships; and (e) developmental dynamics. An enormous body of research in cognitive, social, developmental, and personality psychology now supports many of these propositions. Freud's scientific legacy has implications for a wide range of domains in psychology, such as integration of affective and motivational constraints into connectionist models in cognitive science. Freud, like Elvis, has been dead for a number of years but continues to be cited with some regularity. Although the majority of clinicians report that they rely to some degree upon psychodynamic 1 principles

This article presents a computational framework for understanding how media information about environmental problems influences cognition, emotion, and behaviour. The theoretical assumptions are formally specified and implemented in the computer model ITERA (Intuitive Thinking in Environmental Risk Appraisal) using a constraint satisfaction network. The model

When people use analogies to solve problems they form an analogical mapping between two domains of knowledge. This mapping may support inferences by analogy that suggest a novel solution to a problem. Several factors have been proposed to be important in selecting this mapping, from among several alternative mappings: structural factors (systematicity and structural consistency) and pragmatic factors (the exploitation of higher-order planning categories). We suggest another set of factors play a role in selecting mappings: adaptability factors. Specifically, if a mapped solution can be adapted easily to a problem, then it will be preferred over an alternative mapping that is less adaptable. Two experiments are reported which test the effects of pragmatic and adaptation factors; using a novel technique in which the story analogue used has two alternative plans either of which can be used to solve an insight problem. In Experiment 1, these plans were varied in terms of their pragmatic-im...

How is information transmitted in a group? A multi-agent connectionist model is proposed that combines features of standard recurrent models to simulate the process of information uptake, integration and memorization within individual agents, with novel aspects that simulate the communication of beliefs and opinions between agents. A crucial aspect in belief updating based on information from other agents is the trust in the information provided, implemented as the consistency with the receiving agents’ existing beliefs. Trust leads to a selective propagation and thus filtering out of less reliable information, and implements Grice’s (1975) maxims of quality and quantity in communication. By studying these communicative aspects within the framework of standard models of information processing, the unique contribution of communicative mechanisms beyond intra-personal factors was explored in simulations of key phenomena involving persuasive communication and polarization, lexical acquisition, spreading of stereotypes and rumors, and a lack of sharing unique information in group decisions.

this article should be addressed to Robert L. Goldstone, Psychology Department, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47405. Electronic mail may be sent via Internet to rgoldsto@indiana.edu. Further information can be found at http://cognitrn.psych.indiana.edu

ith different meaning, dependingon their content andthe context in which they are used. People may then have nearly asmany selvesas they have significant interpersonal relationships(Sullivan, 1953; see also Kelly, 1955), providing for both contextual variability andthe longstandingrepresentationsasa chronic influence. We assess idiosyncratic knowledge representations in memory and track their influence on affect and mot ivat ion . We also examine how self-regulato ry p rocesses furt her modulat e t hese responses. Our conceptualization focuseson the ways the self is linked to other people who are (or hadbeen) significant, who have hadan impact on one s life, and in whom one is (or once was) emotionally invested. Because mental representat ions of significant others and t heir relat ional linkages to the self are central in t he model, t he emotional investmentsone has in significant othersplay a role in determiningone sresponses, includingone s self-regulato ry effo r ts. One has a rel