We examine the frequency of price changes for 350 categories of goods and services covering about 70 % of consumer spending, based on unpublished data from the BLS for 1995 to 1997. Compared with previous studies we find much more frequent price changes, with half of goods' prices lasting less than 4.3 months. Even excluding the role of temporary price cuts (sales), we find that half of goods' prices last 5.5 months or less. The frequency of price changes differs dramatically across categories. We exploit this variation to ask how inflation for "flexible-price goods" (goods with frequent changes in individual prices) differs from inflation for "sticky-price goods" (those displaying infrequent price changes). Compared to the predictions of popular sticky price models, actual inflation rates are far more volatile and transient, particularly for sticky-price goods.

I develop a general equilibrium model with sticky prices, credit constraints, nominal loans and asset prices. Changes in asset prices modify agents ’ borrowing capacity through collateral value; changes in nominal prices affect real repayments through debt deflation. Monetary policy shocks move asset and nominal prices in the same direction, and are amplified and propagated over time. The “financial accelerator ” is not constant across shocks: nominal debt stabilises supply shocks, making the economy less volatile when the central bank controls the interest rate. I discuss the role of equity, debt indexation and household and firm leverage in the propagation mechanism. Finally, I find that monetary policy should not target asset prices as a means of reducing output and inflation volatility. “The population is not distributed between debtors and creditors randomly. Debtors have borrowed for good reasons, most of which indicate a high marginal propensity to spend from wealth or from current income or from any other liquid resources they can command. Typically their indebtedness is rationed by lenders [...] Business borrowers typically have a strong propensity to hold physical capital, producers ’ durable goods. Their desired portfolios contain more capital than their net worth — they like to take risks with other people’s money. Household debtors are frequently young families acquiring homes and furnishings before they earn incomes to pay for them outright; given the difficulty of borrowing against future wages, they are liquidity-constrained and have a high marginal propensity to consume ” (James Tobin, “Asset Accumulation and Economic Activity”, 1980)

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From 1960-1983, the standard deviation of annual growth rates in real GDP in the United States was 2.7%. From 1984-2001, the corresponding standard deviation was 1.6%. This paper investigates this large drop in the cyclical volatility OF real economic.activity. The paper has two objectives. The first is to provide a comprehensive characterization of the decline in volatility using a large number of U.S. economic time series and a variety of methods designed to describe time-varying time series processes. In so doing, the paper reviews the literature on the moderation and attempts to resolve some of its disagreements and discrepancies. The second objective is to provide new evidence on the quantitative importance of various explanations for this "great moderation". Taken together, we estimate that the moderation in volatility is attributable to a combination of improved policy (20-30%), identifiable good luck in the form of productivity and commodity price shocks (20-30%), and other unknown forms of good luck that manifest themselves as smaller reduced-form forecast errors (40-60%).

The present paper provides an overview of recent developments in the analysis of monetary policy in the presence of nominal rigidities. The paper emphasizes the existence of several dimensions in which the recent literature provides a new perspective on the linkages among monetary policy, inflation, and the business cycle. It is argued that the adoption of an explicitly optimizing, general equilibrium framework has not been superfluous; on the contrary, it has yielded many insights which, by their nature, could hardly have been obtained with earlier non-optimizing models.

We explore the role of real wage dynamics in a New Keynesian business cycle model with search and matching frictions in the labor market. Both job creation and destruction are endogenous. We show that the model generates counterfactual inflation and labor market dynamics. In particular, it fails to generate a Beveridge curve: vacancies and unemployment are positively correlated. Introducing real wage rigidity leads to a negative correlation, and increases the magnitude of labor market flows to more realistic values. However, inflation dynamics are only weakly affected by real wage rigidity. This is because of the presence of labor market frictions, which generate long-run employment relationships. The measure of real marginal cost that is relevant for inflation dynamics via the Phillips curve contains a dynamic component that does not necessarily move with real wages. JEL CLASSIFICATION: KEYWORDS:

: Yes. We construct a measure of aggregate technology change, controlling for imperfect competition, varying utilization of capital and labor, and aggregation effects. On impact, when technology improves, input use falls sharply, and output may fall slightly. With a lag of several years, inputs return to normal and output rises strongly. These results are inconsistent with frictionless dynamic general equilibrium models, which generally predict that technology improvements are expansionary, with inputs and (especially) output rising immediately. However, the results are consistent with plausible sticky-price models, which predict the results we find: When technology improves, input use generally falls in the short run, and output itself may also fall. * Fernald is an economist in the International Finance Division of the Federal Reserve Board, and can be reached at Stop 20, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DC 20551. Basu and Kimball are associate professors of economics at the Univer...

The volatility of economic activity in most G7 economies has moderated over the past forty years. Also, despite large increases in trade and openness, G7 business cycles have not become more synchronized. After documenting these twin facts, we interpret G7 output data using a structural VAR that separately identifies common international shocks, the domestic effects of spillovers from foreign idiosyncratic shocks, and the effects of domestic idiosyncratic shocks. This analysis suggests that, with the exception of Japan, the widespread reduction in volatility is in large part associated with a reduction in the magnitude of the common international shocks. Had the common international shocks in the 1980s and 1990s been as large as they were in the 1960s and 1970s, G7 business cycles would have been substantially more volatile and more highly synchronized than they actually were.