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46
UMAC: Fast and Secure Message Authentication
, 1999
"... Abstract. We describe a message authentication algorithm, UMAC, which can authenticate messages (in software, on contemporary machines) roughly an order of magnitude faster than current practice (e.g., HMACSHA1), and about twice as fast as times previously reported for the universal hashfunction f ..."
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Cited by 114 (14 self)
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Abstract. We describe a message authentication algorithm, UMAC, which can authenticate messages (in software, on contemporary machines) roughly an order of magnitude faster than current practice (e.g., HMACSHA1), and about twice as fast as times previously reported for the universal hashfunction family MMH. To achieve such speeds, UMAC uses a new universal hashfunction family, NH, and a design which allows effective exploitation of SIMD parallelism. The “cryptographic ” work of UMAC is done using standard primitives of the user’s choice, such as a block cipher or cryptographic hash function; no new heuristic primitives are developed here. Instead, the security of UMAC is rigorously proven, in the sense of giving exact and quantitatively strong results which demonstrate an inability to forge UMACauthenticated messages assuming an inability to break the underlying cryptographic primitive. Unlike conventional, inherently serial MACs, UMAC is parallelizable, and will have everfaster implementation speeds as machines offer up increasing amounts of parallelism. We envision UMAC as a practical algorithm for nextgeneration message authentication. 1
CBC MACs for arbitrarylength messages: The threekey constructions
 Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO ’00, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
, 2000
"... Abstract. We suggest some simple variants of the CBC MAC that let you efficiently MAC messages of arbitrary lengths. Our constructions use three keys, K1, K2, K3, to avoid unnecessary padding and MAC any message M ∈ {0, 1} ∗ using max{1, ⌈M/n⌉} applications of the underlying nbit block cipher. O ..."
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Cited by 67 (16 self)
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Abstract. We suggest some simple variants of the CBC MAC that let you efficiently MAC messages of arbitrary lengths. Our constructions use three keys, K1, K2, K3, to avoid unnecessary padding and MAC any message M ∈ {0, 1} ∗ using max{1, ⌈M/n⌉} applications of the underlying nbit block cipher. Our favorite construction, XCBC, works like this: if M  is a positive multiple of n then XOR the nbit key K2 with the last block of M and compute the CBC MAC keyed with K1; otherwise, extend M’s length to the next multiple of n by appending minimal 10 i padding (i ≥ 0), XOR the nbit key K3 with the last block of the padded message, and compute the CBC MAC keyed with K1. We prove the security of this and other constructions, giving concrete bounds on an adversary’s inability to forge in terms of her inability to distinguish the block cipher from a random permutation. Our analysis exploits new ideas which simplify proofs compared to prior work. 1
On the Security of Randomized CBCMAC Beyond the Birthday Paradox Limit  A New Construction
 Fast Software Encryption ’02, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
, 2001
"... . In this paper, we study the security of randomized CBC{MACs and propose a new construction that resists birthday paradox attacks and provably reaches full security. The proof is done in a new security model that may be of independent interest to study the security of randomized functions. The size ..."
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Cited by 27 (1 self)
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. In this paper, we study the security of randomized CBC{MACs and propose a new construction that resists birthday paradox attacks and provably reaches full security. The proof is done in a new security model that may be of independent interest to study the security of randomized functions. The size of the MAC tags in this construction is optimal, i.e., exactly twice the size of the block cipher. Up to a constant, the security of the proposed randomized CBC{MAC using an n{bit block cipher is the same as the security of the usual encrypted CBC{MAC using a 2n{bit block cipher. Moreover, this construction adds a negligible computational overhead compared to the cost of a plain, nonrandomized CBC{MAC. 1
FormatPreserving Encryption
"... Abstract. Formatpreserving encryption (FPE) encrypts a plaintext of some specified format into a ciphertext of identical format—for example, encrypting a valid creditcard number into a valid creditcard number. The problem has been known for some time, but it has lacked a fully general and rigorous ..."
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Cited by 18 (6 self)
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Abstract. Formatpreserving encryption (FPE) encrypts a plaintext of some specified format into a ciphertext of identical format—for example, encrypting a valid creditcard number into a valid creditcard number. The problem has been known for some time, but it has lacked a fully general and rigorous treatment. We provide one, starting off by formally defining FPE and security goals for it. We investigate the natural approach for achieving FPE on complex domains, the “rankthenencipher ” approach, and explore what it can and cannot do. We describe two flavors of unbalanced Feistel networks that can be used for achieving FPE, and we prove new security results for each. We revisit the cyclewalking approach for enciphering on a nonsparse subset of an encipherable domain, showing that the timing information that may be divulged by cycle walking is not a damaging thing to leak. 1
Improved security analyses for CBC MACs
 In Advances in Cryptology Crypto 2005, LNCS 3621
, 2005
"... Abstract We present an improved bound on the advantage of any qquery adversary at distinguishingbetween the CBC MAC over a random nbit permutation and a random function outputting nbits. The result assumes that no message queried is a prefix of any other, as is the case when all messages to be MAC ..."
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Cited by 17 (5 self)
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Abstract We present an improved bound on the advantage of any qquery adversary at distinguishingbetween the CBC MAC over a random nbit permutation and a random function outputting nbits. The result assumes that no message queried is a prefix of any other, as is the case when all messages to be MACed have the same length. We go on to give an improved analysis ofthe encrypted CBC MAC, where there is no restriction on queried messages. Letting
SENSS: Security Enhancement to Symmetric Shared Memory Multiprocessors
 In Intl. Symp. on HighPerformance Computer Architecture
, 2005
"... With the increasing concern of the security on high performance multiprocessor enterprise servers, more and more effort is being invested into defending against various kinds of attacks. This paper proposes a security enhancement model called SENSS, that allows programs to run securely on a symmetri ..."
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Cited by 14 (0 self)
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With the increasing concern of the security on high performance multiprocessor enterprise servers, more and more effort is being invested into defending against various kinds of attacks. This paper proposes a security enhancement model called SENSS, that allows programs to run securely on a symmetric shared memory multiprocessor (SMP) environment. In SENSS, a program, including both code and data, is stored in the shared memory in encrypted form but is decrypted once it is fetched into any of the processors. In contrast to the traditional uniprocessor XOM model [10], the main challenge in developing SENSS lies in the necessity for guarding the clear text communication between processors in a multiprocessor environment. In this paper we propose an inexpensive solution that can effectively protect the shared bus communication. The proposed schemes include both encryption and authentication for bus transactions. We develop a scheme that utilizes the Cipher Block Chaining mode of the advanced encryption standard (CBCAES) to achieve ultra low latency for the shared bus encryption and decryption. In addition, CBCAES can generate integrity checking code for the bus communication over time, achieving bus authentication. Further, we develop techniques to ensure the cryptographic computation throughput meets the high bandwidth of gigabyte buses. We performed full system simulation using Simics to measure the overhead of the security features on a SMP system with a snooping write invalidate cache coherence protocol. Overall, only a slight performance degradation of 2.03 % on average was observed when the security is provided at the highest level. 1.
A Suggestion for Handling ArbitraryLength Messages with the CBC MAC
, 2000
"... Introduction The CBC MAC is the customary way to make a message authentication code (MAC) from a block cipher. It is the subject of several standards, including [1, 5, 6]. It is wellknown and wellunderstood. Given all this, it seems likely that the CBC MAC will be standardized as an AES mode of o ..."
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Cited by 9 (0 self)
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Introduction The CBC MAC is the customary way to make a message authentication code (MAC) from a block cipher. It is the subject of several standards, including [1, 5, 6]. It is wellknown and wellunderstood. Given all this, it seems likely that the CBC MAC will be standardized as an AES mode of operation. In this note we suggest a nice version of the CBC MAC that one might select for this purpose. We recall that the CBC MAC actually comes in a number of different versions. These versions differ in details involving padding (what to do when a message is not a nonzero multiple of the block length), lengthvariability (how to properly authenticate messages that come in a variety of lengths), and keysearch strengthening (making the mode more secure against keysearch attacks). Our CBC MAC variant is described in [4], where it is called XCBC. Let us now review this MAC's definition, as well as the definition for
Security Flaws Induced by CBC Padding  Applications to SSL, IPSEC, WTLS
 Proceedings of In Advances in Cryptology  EUROCRYPT'02
, 2002
"... are first preformatted, then encrypted in CBC mode with a block cipher. Decryption needs to check if the format is valid. Validity of the format is easily leaked from communication protocols in a chosen ciphertext attack since the receiver usually sends an acknowledgment or an error message. This i ..."
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Cited by 7 (1 self)
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are first preformatted, then encrypted in CBC mode with a block cipher. Decryption needs to check if the format is valid. Validity of the format is easily leaked from communication protocols in a chosen ciphertext attack since the receiver usually sends an acknowledgment or an error message. This is a side channel. In this paper we show various ways to perform an efficient side channel attack. We discuss potential applications, extensions to other padding schemes and various ways to fix the problem. 1
Minding Your MAC Algorithms
, 2004
"... In spite of the advantages of digital signatures, MAC algorithms are still widely used to authenticate data; common uses include authorization of financial transactions, mobile communications (GSM and 3GPP), and authentication of Internet communications with SSL/TLS and IPsec. While some MAC a ..."
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Cited by 7 (0 self)
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In spite of the advantages of digital signatures, MAC algorithms are still widely used to authenticate data; common uses include authorization of financial transactions, mobile communications (GSM and 3GPP), and authentication of Internet communications with SSL/TLS and IPsec. While some MAC algorithms are part of `legacy' implementations, the success of MAC algorithms is mainly due to their much lower computational and storage costs (compared to digital signatures). This article describes a list of common pitfalls that the authors have encountered when evaluating MAC algorithms deployed in commercial applications and provides some recommendations for practitioners.
Decorrelation over Infinite Domains: the Encrypted CBCMAC Case
, 2000
"... Decorrelation theory has recently been proposed in order to address the security of block ciphers and other cryptographic primitives over a nite domain. We show here how to extend it to innite domains, which can be used in the Message Authentication Code (MAC) case. In 1994, Bellare, Kilian and Roga ..."
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Cited by 6 (1 self)
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Decorrelation theory has recently been proposed in order to address the security of block ciphers and other cryptographic primitives over a nite domain. We show here how to extend it to innite domains, which can be used in the Message Authentication Code (MAC) case. In 1994, Bellare, Kilian and Rogaway proved that CBCMAC is secure when the input length is xed. This has been extended by Petrank and Racko in 1997 with a variable length. In this paper, we prove a result similar to Petrank and Racko's one by using decorrelation theory. This leads to a slightly improved result and a more compact proof. This result is meant to be a general proving technique for security, which can be compared to the approach which was announced by Maurer at CRYPTO'99. Decorrelation theory has recently been introduced. (See references [17] to [22].) Its rst aim was to address provable security in the area of block ciphers in order to prove their security against dierential [7] and linear cryptanalysis...