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The institution-based view as a third leg for a strategy tripod
, 2009
"... This article identifies the emergence of the institution-based view as a third leading perspective in strategic management (the first two being the industry-based and resource-based views). We (a) review the roots of the institution-based view, (b) articulate its two core propositions, and (c) outli ..."
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This article identifies the emergence of the institution-based view as a third leading perspective in strategic management (the first two being the industry-based and resource-based views). We (a) review the roots of the institution-based view, (b) articulate its two core propositions, and (c) outline how this view contributes to the four fundamental questions in strategy. Overall, we suggest that the institution-based view represents the third leg of a strategy tripod, overcomes the long-standing criticisms of the industrybased and resource-based views ’ lack of attention to contexts, and contributes significant new insights as part of the broader intellectual movement centered on new institutionalism.
EDITORIAL Corporate governance and Asian companies
, 2010
"... Abstract While prominent differences in corporate governance exist across the Asia Pacific region, there are common concerns about controlling shareholders expropriating wealth from minority shareholders at the expense of overall wealth creation, as well as about the roles and qualifications of mana ..."
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Abstract While prominent differences in corporate governance exist across the Asia Pacific region, there are common concerns about controlling shareholders expropriating wealth from minority shareholders at the expense of overall wealth creation, as well as about the roles and qualifications of managers in Asian companies. The contributors to this Special Issue of the Asia Pacific Journal of Management address these concerns and provide new evidence on their empirical relevance, as well as the factors conditioning that relevance. They also provide cautionary insight into the merits of specific proposals to reform Asian corporate governance. An important theme emerging from this Special Issue is that one needs to understand the institutional framework in which organizations operate in order to understand the We thank Saturna Capital Corporation and Nick Kaiser (Director and Chairman) for financial support that made possible our Special Issue Conference held in Vancouver in October 2009. We also thank all the authors and reviewers, whose work turned this Special Issue from editors ’ vision into reality. We are grateful to Rosalie Tung for delivering a keynote speech at the conference, as well as to Mick Carney, Tom Roehl, and Jongwook Kim for invigorating the discussions of papers presented at the conference. Phil
Multiple agency perspective, family control, and private information abuse in an emerging economy
- Asia Pacific Journal of Management
"... Abstract Using a comprehensive sample of listed companies in Hong Kong this paper investigates how family control affects private information abuses and firm performance in emerging economies. We combine research on stock market microstructure with more recent studies of multiple agency perspectives ..."
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Abstract Using a comprehensive sample of listed companies in Hong Kong this paper investigates how family control affects private information abuses and firm performance in emerging economies. We combine research on stock market microstructure with more recent studies of multiple agency perspectives and argue that family ownership and control over the board increases the risk of private information abuse. This, in turn, has a negative impact on stock market performance. Family control is associated with an incentive to distort information disclosure to minority shareholders and obtain private benefits of control. However, the multiple agency roles of controlling families may have different governance properties in terms of investors ’ perceptions of private information abuse. These findings contribute to our understanding of the conflicting evidence on the governance role of family control within a multiple agency perspective.
REVIEWS Informal institutions, shareholder coalitions, and principal–principal conflicts
"... Abstract How do informal institutions affect conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders, also known as principal–principal (PP) conflicts? The dominant formal institution-based view of corporate governance suggests that legal rules and regulations are crucial for the protection of share ..."
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Abstract How do informal institutions affect conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders, also known as principal–principal (PP) conflicts? The dominant formal institution-based view of corporate governance suggests that legal rules and regulations are crucial for the protection of shareholder rights. While this perspective has significantly advances our understanding of international corporate governance, we suggest that more attention to informal institutions may complement the formal approach. First, we utilize social identity theory to shed light on the formation of shareholder coalitions. Second, we draw on research involving informal institutions such as culture and trust to better understand PP conflicts. Overall, we extend the growing literature on PP conflicts by an explicit focus on informal institutions. Keywords Informal institutions. Culture. Principal–principal conflicts. Shareholder coalitions. Social identity theory An institution-based view of corporate governance has recently emerged in the literature (Jiang & Peng, 2011a, b; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997, 1998, 2000; Peng & Jiang, 2010). The basic proposition is that “institutions matter, ” which is consistent with a long line of corporate governance research that has emphasized the importance of the formal institutional environment for the protection of investor rights (La Porta et al., 1998, 2000). A common element in these studies is the focus on the We thank Dane Blevins, Elizabeth Lim, and Weichieh Su for helpful comments and discussions. We acknowledge funding from the Jindal Chair of Global Strategy at the Jindal School of Management,
Declaration
, 2013
"... This is to certify that: (i) The thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD except where indicated (ii) Due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used, (iii) Due acknowledgement has been made in the text to my co-authors with whom I have worked on research manus ..."
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This is to certify that: (i) The thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD except where indicated (ii) Due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used, (iii) Due acknowledgement has been made in the text to my co-authors with whom I have worked on research manuscripts, (iii) The thesis is less than 100,000 words in length, inclusive of table, figures, bibliographies, appendices and footnotes. I authorize the Dean of the Business School to make or have made a copy of this thesis to any person judged to have an acceptable reason for access to the information, i.e., for research, study or instruction. ‘The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives licence. Researchers are free to copy, distribute or transmit the thesis on the condition that they attribute it, that they do not use it for commercial purposes and that they do not alter, transform or build upon it. For any reuse or redistribution, researchers must make clear to others the licence terms of this work’.
Good Corporate Governance Structures: A Must for Family Businesses
, 2015
"... Corporate governance refers to the structures and processes for the direction and control of busi-nesses and the relationships among the management, board of directors, controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and other stakeholders. Since good corporate governance contributes to sustainable ..."
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Corporate governance refers to the structures and processes for the direction and control of busi-nesses and the relationships among the management, board of directors, controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and other stakeholders. Since good corporate governance contributes to sustainable economic development by enhancing the performance of companies, it is imperative that companies adopts good corporate governance structures to enable them grow. Family busi-nesses are an often overlooked form of business ownership in today’s world, yet they constitute a majority of the businesses. This means that families own a significant share of businesses and can influence important decisions in today’s business world. However, according to Neubauer and Lank, until recently, the study of corporate governance in family business has been a largely neg-lected area of research [1]. As family businesses are an important component of every economy and play a critical role in promoting growth of a country’s economy, as they grow, they face same challenges and pressures as any major corporation. To succeed, they must remain ahead of the competition, adopt good corporate governance practices and skillfully navigate through market changes. This paper is an empirical study from the current authors ’ previous work on the topic
The Influences of Formal and Informal Institutions on Taiwanese Family-owned Firms ’ Entry Mode Choice
"... Copyright © 2015 by authors, all rights reserved. Authors agree that this article remains permanently open access under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 International License Abstract This study is designed to shed further light on the foreign direct investment (FDI) decisio ..."
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Copyright © 2015 by authors, all rights reserved. Authors agree that this article remains permanently open access under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 International License Abstract This study is designed to shed further light on the foreign direct investment (FDI) decision by the family business, and address the question: Under what situation family-owned firms make the entry mode with high risk commitment. The data source for this study was obtained from Taiwan Economic Journal Database. The database is a comprehensive source for Taiwanese firms ’ foreign direct
Corporate ownership, governance and tax avoidance: An interactive effects
"... Abstract Although tax avoidance practices are as old as taxes themselves, the ways they are being perpetrated among corporate taxpayers have transmuted so sophisticated in recent times. This study thus proposes models for empirical investigations into the relationship between corporate ownership st ..."
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Abstract Although tax avoidance practices are as old as taxes themselves, the ways they are being perpetrated among corporate taxpayers have transmuted so sophisticated in recent times. This study thus proposes models for empirical investigations into the relationship between corporate ownership structure and corporate tax avoidance in Malaysia. It was argued, based on cost/benefits consideration of tax avoidance, that family; foreign and government ownerships could be associated with corporate tax avoidance among Malaysian listed companies. The study further proposes that strong governance mechanism could mitigate such association. Two econometrics dynamic panel data models are proposed for the investigation. Generalized Method Moment (GMM) estimator is recommended as the estimation method.
Corporate Governance Provisions, Family Involvement, and Firm Performance in Publicly Traded Family Firms
"... Abstract: This study examines the moderation effects of corporate governance provisions on the link between family involvement (i.e., family ownership and family management) in publicly-traded firms and firm performance by drawing upon agency theory, with a focus on principal-principal agency issue ..."
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Abstract: This study examines the moderation effects of corporate governance provisions on the link between family involvement (i.e., family ownership and family management) in publicly-traded firms and firm performance by drawing upon agency theory, with a focus on principal-principal agency issues, and the extant family governance literature. We develop and test the hypotheses on 386 of the S&P 500 firms longitudinally. Findings support the hypotheses suggesting the moderation effects of the use of provisions (a) protecting controlling owners in terms of their sustainability of controlling status, and (b) protecting management legally on the inverted Ushaped relationship between family ownership and firm performance. We also found support for the moderation effects of provisions (c) protecting controlling owners in terms of their voting rights, (d) protecting noncontrolling owners, and (e) protecting management monetarily on the inverted U-shaped relationship between family management and firm performance. By this, our study provides empirical support for the principal-principal agency perspective on the corporate governance in publicly-traded family firms. As such, it suggests new avenues of research for both the corporate governance literature, as well as for the theory of the family firm. Our study also offers insights to policy directed toward monitoring the actions of large shareholders such as family and enhancing the overall shareholder value in publicly-traded family firms. Financial Stud. 2015, 3, 194-229; doi:10. Abstract: This study examines the moderation effects of corporate governance provisions on the link between family involvement (i.e., family ownership and family management) in publicly-traded firms and firm performance by drawing upon agency theory, with a focus on principal-principal agency issues, and the extant family governance literature. We develop and test the hypotheses on 386 of the S&P 500 firms longitudinally. Findings support the hypotheses suggesting the moderation effects of the use of provisions (a) protecting controlling owners in terms of their sustainability of controlling status, and (b) protecting management legally on the inverted U-shaped relationship between family ownership and firm performance. We also found support for the moderation effects of provisions (c) protecting controlling owners in terms of their voting rights, (d) protecting noncontrolling owners, and (e) protecting management monetarily on the inverted U-shaped relationship between family management and firm performance. By this, our study provides empirical support for the principal-principal agency perspective on the corporate governance in publicly-traded family firms. As such, it suggests new avenues of research for both the corporate governance literature, as well as for the theory of the family firm. Our study also offers insights to policy directed toward monitoring the actions of large shareholders such as family and enhancing the overall shareholder value in publicly-traded family firms. . J. Financial Stud. 2015, 3 195 OPEN ACCESS Int
