We use an extensive data set of bilateral credit default swap (CDS) positions to estimate the impact on collateral demand of new clearing and margin regula-tions. The estimated collateral demands includes both initial margin as well as frictional requirements associated with the movement of variation margin through the network of market participants. We estimate the impact on total collateral de-mand of more widespread initial margin requirements, increased novation of CDS to central clearing parties (CCPs), an increase in the number of clearing members, the proliferation of CCPs of both specialized and non-specialized types, collateral rehypothecation practices, and client clearing. System-wide collateral demand is increased significantly by the application of initial margin requirements for dealers, whether or not the CDS are cleared. Given these dealer-to-dealer initial margin requirements, mandatory central clearing is shown to lower, not raise, system-wide collateral demand, provided there is no significant proliferation of CCPs. Central clearing does, however, have significant distributional consequences for collateral requirements across various types of market participants.

Credit default swaps (CDS) have been growing in importance in the global finan-cial markets. However, their role has been hotly debated, in industry and academia, particularly after the credit crisis of 2008-2009 and the European sovereign crisis of 2010-2012. We review the extant literature on CDS that has accumulated over the past two decades. We divide our survey into seven topics after providing a broad overview in the introduction. The second section traces the historical development of CDS markets and provides an introduction to CDS contract definitions and con-ventions. The third section discusses the pricing of CDS, from the perspective of no-arbitrage principles as well as from that of structural and reduced-form credit risk models. It also summarizes the literature on the determinants of CDS spreads, with a focus on the role of fundamental credit risk factors, liquidity and counterparty risk. The fourth section discusses how the development of the CDS market has af-fected the characteristics of the related bond and equity markets, with an emphasis

The introduction of CCPs in most derivative transactions will dramatically change the landscape of derivatives pricing, hedging and risk management, and, according to the TABB group, will lead to an overall liquidity impact about 2 USD trillions. In this article we develop for the first time a comprehensive approach for pricing under CCP clearing, including variation and initial margins, gap credit risk and collateralization, showing concrete examples for interest rate swaps. Mathematically, the inclusion of asymmetric borrowing and lending rates in the hedge of a claim lead to nonlinearities showing up in claim dependent pricing measures, aggregation dependent prices, nonlinear PDEs and BSDEs. This still holds in presence of CCPs and CSA. We introduce a modeling approach that allows us to enforce rigorous separation of the interconnected nonlinear risks into different valuation adjustments where the key pricing nonlinearities are confined to a funding costs component that is analyzed through numerical schemes for BSDEs. We present a numerical case study for Interest Rate Swaps that highlights the relative size of the different valuation adjustments and the quantitative role of initial and variation margins, of liquidity bases, of credit risk, of the margin period of risk and of wrong way risk correlations.

We present a dialogue on Funding Costs and Counterparty Credit Risk modeling, inclusive of collateral, wrong way risk, gap risk and possible Central Clearing implementation through CCPs. This frame-work is important following the fact that derivatives valuation and risk analysis has moved from exotic derivatives managed on simple single asset classes to simple derivatives embedding the new or previously ne-glected types of complex and interconnected nonlinear risks we address here. This dialogue is the continuation of the “Counterparty Risk, Collateral and Funding FAQ ” by Brigo (2011). In this dialogue we focus more on funding costs for the hedging strategy of a portfolio of trades, on the non-linearities emerging from assuming borrowing and lending rates to be different, on the resulting aggregation-dependent valuation process and its operational challenges, on the implications of the onset of central clearing, on the macro and micro effects on valuation and risk of the onset of CCPs, on initial and variation mar-gins impact on valuation, and on multiple discount curves. Through questions and answers (Q&A) between a senior expert and a junior colleague, and by referring to the growing body of literature on the subject, we present a unified view of valuation (and risk) that takes all such aspects into account. ∗This dialogue, available at damianobrigo.it, SSRN.com and arXiv.org, is sec-ond in a series started with “Counterparty Risk, Collateral and Funding FAQ”, see

The recent financial crisis and subsequent regulatory changes on over-the-counter (OTC) markets have given rise to the new valuation and trading frameworks for defaultable claims to investors and dealer banks. More OTC market participants have adopted the new market conventions that incorpo-rate counterparty risk into the valuation of OTC derivatives. In addition, the use of collateral has become common for most bilateral trades to reduce counterparty default risk. On the other hand, to increase transparency and market stability, the U.S and European regulators have required mandatory clearing of defaultable derivatives through central counterparties. This disser-tation tackles these changes and analyze their impacts on the pricing, trading and clearing of defaultable claims. In the first part of the thesis, we study a valuation framework for finan-cial contracts subject to reference and counterparty default risks with col-lateralization requirement. We propose a fixed point approach to analyze the mark-to-market contract value with counterparty risk provision, and show that

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Abstract In this paper we study how the use of collateral is evolving under the influence of regulatory reform and changing market structure. We start with a critical review of the recent empirical literature on the supply and demand of collateral which has focussed on the issue of 'collateral scarcity'. We argue that while limited data availability does not allow a comprehensive view of the market for collateral, it is unlikely that there is an overall shortage of collateral. However, it is quite possible that there may be bottlenecks within the system which mean that available collateral is immobilized in one part of the system and unattainable by credit-worthy borrowers. We then describe how these problems sometimes can be overcome by improved information systems and collateral transformation. We discuss how collateral management techniques differ between banks and derivatives markets infrastructures including, in particular, CCPs. In order to assess the impact of alternative institutional arrangements on collateral demand, we introduce a theoretical model of an OTC derivatives market consisting of investors and banks arrayed in several regions or market segments. We simulate this model under alternative forms meant to capture the implications of moving to mandatory CCP clearing and mandatory initial margin requirements for non-cleared OTC derivatives. This paper is published as part of the Systemic Risk Centre's Discussion Paper Series. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the editor at the above address. Abstract In this paper we study how the use of collateral is evolving under the influence of regulatory reform and changing market structure. We start with a critical review of the recent empirical literature on the supply and demand of collateral which has focussed on the issue of 'collateral scarcity'. We argue that while limited data availability does not allow a comprehensive view of the market for collateral, it is unlikely that there is an overall shortage of collateral. However, it is quite possible that there may be bottlenecks within the system which mean that available collateral is immobilized in one part of the system and unattainable by credit-worthy borrowers. We then describe how these problems sometimes can be overcome by improved information systems and collateral transformation. We discuss how collateral management techniques differ between banks and derivatives markets infrastructures including, in particular, CCPs. In order to assess the impact of alternative institutional arrangements on collateral demand, we introduce a theoretical model of an OTC derivatives market consisting of investors and banks arrayed in several regions or market segments. We simulate this model under alternative forms meant to capture the implications of moving to mandatory CCP clearing and mandatory initial margin requirements for non-cleared OTC derivatives.

Abstract We study a financial network where forced liquidations of an illiquid asset have a negative impact on its price, thus reinforcing network contagion. We prove uniqueness of the clearing asset price and liability payments under no, partial, and full multilateral netting of interbank liabilities. We show that partial versus full multilateral netting increases bank shortfall, and reduces clearing asset price and aggregate bank surplus. We also show that partial multilateral netting can be worse than no netting at all.

This paper attempts to assess the economic significance and implications of collateralization in different financial markets, which is essentially a matter of theoretical justification and empirical verification. We present a comprehensive theoretical framework that allows for collateralization adhering to bankruptcy laws. As such, the model can back out differences in asset prices due to collateralized counterparty risk. This framework is very useful for pricing outstanding defaultable financial contracts. By using a unique data set, we are able to achieve a clean decomposition of prices into their credit risk factors. We find empirical evidence that counterparty risk is not overly important in credit-related spreads. Only the joint effects of collateralization and credit risk can sufficiently explain unsecured credit costs. This finding suggests that failure to properly account for collateralization may result in significant mispricing of financial contracts. We also analyze the difference between cleared and OTC markets.

This paper presents preliminary findings and is being distributed to economists and other interested readers solely to stimulate discussion and elicit comments. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.