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Risk protection, service use, and health outcomes under colombia’s health insurance program for the poor
- American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
, 2013
"... Unexpected medical care spending imposes considerable financial risk on developing country households. Based on managed care models of health insurance in wealthy countries, Colombia’s Régimen Subsidiado is a publicly financed insurance program targeted to the poor, aiming both to provide risk prote ..."
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Unexpected medical care spending imposes considerable financial risk on developing country households. Based on managed care models of health insurance in wealthy countries, Colombia’s Régimen Subsidiado is a publicly financed insurance program targeted to the poor, aiming both to provide risk protection and to promote allocative efficiency in the use of medical care. Using a “fuzzy ” regression discontinuity design, we find that the program has shielded the poor from some financial risk while increasing the use of traditionally under-utilized preventive services – with measurable health gains.
Moral hazard in a mutual health-insurance system:
, 2009
"... Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen ..."
is given to the source. Incentives in Obesity and Health Insurance
, 2007
"... Economists meetings. The authors alone are responsible for errors. The views expressed herein are ..."
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Economists meetings. The authors alone are responsible for errors. The views expressed herein are
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES INCENTIVES IN OBESITY AND HEALTH INSURANCE
, 2008
"... All in-text references underlined in blue are linked to publications on ResearchGate, letting you access and read them immediately. ..."
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All in-text references underlined in blue are linked to publications on ResearchGate, letting you access and read them immediately.
New University of Lisboa From the SelectedWorks of Pedro P Barros
, 2008
"... What determines the individual decision to take preventive actions? ..."
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How Health Insurance Affects Health Care Demand - A Structural Analysis of Behavioral Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection *
"... Abstract Individuals with health insurance use more health care. One reason is that health care is cheaper for the insured. Additionally, having insurance can encourage unhealthy behavior via moral hazard. Previous work studying the effect of health insurance on medical utilization has mostly ignor ..."
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Abstract Individuals with health insurance use more health care. One reason is that health care is cheaper for the insured. Additionally, having insurance can encourage unhealthy behavior via moral hazard. Previous work studying the effect of health insurance on medical utilization has mostly ignored behavioral changes due to having health insurance, and how that in turn affects medical utilization. This paper investigates the structural causal relationships among health insurance status, health behavior, and medical utilization theoretically and empirically, and separates price effects from behavioral moral hazard effects. Also distinguished are the extensive vs. intensive margins of insurance effects on behavior JEL Codes: C51, I12, D12
Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 987 Did the Cooperative Start Life as a Joint-Stock Company? Business Law and Cooperatives in Spain, 1869-1931
, 2010
"... Studies of Spanish cooperatives date their spread from the Law on Agrarian Syndicates of 1906. But the first legislative appearance of cooperatives is an 1869 measure that permitted general incorporation for lending companies. The 1931 general law on cooperatives, which was the first act permitting ..."
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Studies of Spanish cooperatives date their spread from the Law on Agrarian Syndicates of 1906. But the first legislative appearance of cooperatives is an 1869 measure that permitted general incorporation for lending companies. The 1931 general law on cooperatives, which was the first act permitting the formation of cooperatives in any activity, reflects the gradual disappearance of the cooperative’s “business ” characteristics. In this paper we trace the Spanish cooperative’s legal roots in business law and its connections to broader questions of the freedom of association, the formation of joint-stock enterprises, and the liability of investors in business and cooperative entities. Our account underscores the similarities of the organizational problems approach by cooperatives and business firms, while at the same time respecting the distinctive purposes cooperatives served.
that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Effects of Welfare Reform on Vocational Education and Training
, 2011
"... #R01HD060318). The authors are grateful for helpful information on welfare policies vis-à-vis education from Julie Strawn and Elizabeth Lower-Basch, as well as Gilbert Crouse and Don Oellerich of the ..."
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#R01HD060318). The authors are grateful for helpful information on welfare policies vis-à-vis education from Julie Strawn and Elizabeth Lower-Basch, as well as Gilbert Crouse and Don Oellerich of the
Editorial Offi ce
"... The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors ’ own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors. Ruhr Economic Papers #364 Timothy Guinnane and Jochen ..."
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The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors ’ own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors. Ruhr Economic Papers #364 Timothy Guinnane and Jochen Streb Incentives that Saved Lives:
