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111
What is self-specific? Theoretical investigation and critical review of neuroimaging results
- Psychological Review
, 2009
"... The authors propose a paradigm shift in the investigation of the self. Synthesizing neuroimaging results from studies investigating the self, the authors first demonstrate that self-relatedness evaluation involves a wide cerebral network, labeled E-network, comprising the medial prefrontal cortex, p ..."
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Cited by 65 (2 self)
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The authors propose a paradigm shift in the investigation of the self. Synthesizing neuroimaging results from studies investigating the self, the authors first demonstrate that self-relatedness evaluation involves a wide cerebral network, labeled E-network, comprising the medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus, temporoparietal junction, and temporal poles. They further show that this E-network is also recruited during resting state, others ’ mind reading, memory recall, and reasoning. According to these data, (a) the profile of activation of the E-network demonstrates no preference for the self, and (b) the authors suggest that activity in this network can be explained by the involvement of cognitive processes common to all the tasks recruiting it: inferential processing and memory recall. On this basis, they conclude that standard ways to tackle the self by considering self-evaluation do not target the self in its specificity. Instead, they argue that self-specificity characterizes the subjective perspective, which is not intrinsically self-evaluative but rather relates any represented object to the representing subject. They further propose that such self-specific subject–object relation is anchored to the sensorimotor integration of efference with reafference (i.e., the motor command of the subject’s action and its sensory consequence in the external world).
When the self represents the other: A new cognitive neuroscience view on psychological identification
- Consciousness and Cognition
, 2003
"... Abstract There is converging evidence from developmental and cognitive psychology, as well as from neuroscience, to suggest that the self is both special and social, and that self-other interaction is the driving force behind self-development. We review experimental findings which demonstrate that ..."
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Cited by 61 (5 self)
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Abstract There is converging evidence from developmental and cognitive psychology, as well as from neuroscience, to suggest that the self is both special and social, and that self-other interaction is the driving force behind self-development. We review experimental findings which demonstrate that human infants are motivated for social interactions and suggest that the development of an awareness of other minds is rooted in the implicit notion that others are like the self. We then marshal evidence from functional neuroimaging explorations of the neurophysiological substrate of shared representations between the self and others, using various ecological paradigms such as mentally representing oneÕs own actions versus othersÕ actions, watching the actions executed by others, imitating the othersÕ actions versus being imitated by others. We suggest that within this shared neural network the inferior parietal cortex and the prefrontal cortex in the right hemisphere play a special role in the essential ability to distinguish the self from others, and in the way the self represents the other. Interestingly, the right hemisphere develops its functions earlier than the left.
Agency, simulation and self-identification
- Mind & Language
, 2004
"... Abstract: This paper is concerned with the problem of self-identification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms invo ..."
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Cited by 49 (11 self)
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Abstract: This paper is concerned with the problem of self-identification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in self-identification and in agencyascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are centrally simulated by the neural network, and that this simulation provides the basis for action recognition and attribution. In this paper we will be concerned with the problem of self-identification as it arises in the domain of action, which we will take to include both overt and covert or simulated actions. Talk of a problem of identification presupposes a contrast set, and the possibility that, in seeking to identify one self, one picks out something in the contrast set instead. With self-identification, two contrast sets must be considered: the world at large and the set of other selves. The problem of self-identification therefore
Narrators and comparators: the architecture of agentive self-awareness
, 2007
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Motivation
- HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (5TH ED., PP. 268-316). NEW YORK: WILEY. CHAPTER 8
, 2010
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A logic of Intention and Attempt
- Institute of Cognitive Science and Technologies-CNR
, 2006
"... Abstract. We present a modal logic called LIA (Logic of Intention and Attempt) in which we can reason about intention dynamics and intentional action execution. By exploiting the expressive power of LIA, we provide a formal analysis of the relation between intention and action and highlight the pivo ..."
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Cited by 20 (12 self)
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Abstract. We present a modal logic called LIA (Logic of Intention and Attempt) in which we can reason about intention dynamics and intentional action execution. By exploiting the expressive power of LIA, we provide a formal analysis of the relation between intention and action and highlight the pivotal role of attempt in action execution. Besides, we deal with the problems of instrumental reasoning and intention persistence.
The Shared Circuits Model: How Control, Mirroring and Simulation Can Enable Imitation, Deliberation, and Mindreading
"... To be published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (in press) ..."
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Cited by 20 (0 self)
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To be published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (in press)
Thinking as the control of imagination: a conceptual framework for goaldirected systems
- Psychological Research
, 2009
"... This paper offers a conceptual framework which (re)integrates goal-directed control, motivational processes, and executive functions, and suggests a developmental pathway from situated action to higher level cognition. We first illustrate a basic computational (control-theoretic) model of goal-direc ..."
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Cited by 17 (10 self)
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This paper offers a conceptual framework which (re)integrates goal-directed control, motivational processes, and executive functions, and suggests a developmental pathway from situated action to higher level cognition. We first illustrate a basic computational (control-theoretic) model of goal-directed action that makes use of internal modeling. We then show that by adding the problem of selection among multiple action alternatives motivation enters the scene, and that the basic mechanisms of executive functions such as inhibition, the monitoring of progresses, and working memory, are required for this system to work. Further, we elaborate on the idea that the off-line reenactment of anticipatory mechanisms used for action control gives rise to (embodied) mental simulations, and propose that thinking consists essentially in controlling mental simulations rather than directly controlling behavior and perceptions. We conclude by sketching an evolutionary perspective of this process, proposing that anticipation leveraged cognition, and by highlighting specific predictions of our model.
Authorship Processing
"... Participants watched themselves in a mirror while another person behind them, hidden from view, extended hands forward on each side where participants ’ hands would normally appear. The hands performed a series of movements. When participants could hear instructions previewing each movement, they re ..."
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Cited by 15 (4 self)
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Participants watched themselves in a mirror while another person behind them, hidden from view, extended hands forward on each side where participants ’ hands would normally appear. The hands performed a series of movements. When participants could hear instructions previewing each movement, they reported an enhanced feeling of controlling the hands. Hearing instructions for the movements also enhanced skin conductance responses when a rubber band was snapped on the other’s wrist after the movements. Such vicarious agency was not felt when the instructions followed the movements, and participants ’ own covert movement mimicry was not essential to the influence of previews on reported control. When you wave your hand in the air, how do you know you’re the one who did it? And when someone else’s hand waves, how do you know you’re not the source of the movement? These questions seem absurd to the normal human, of course, but their very absurdity suggests that each of us has in place an efficient system of mind that gives us an immediate sense of authorship for some actions and not for others. This system seems likely to draw on the fact that we usually know what we are going to do before we do it, and we thus experience a sense of conscious will for actions we know in advance. The present studies explored the role of such prior knowledge of action by examining whether knowing what another person’s hands will do can enhance the sense that we are vicariously controlling the other’s hand movements—even when such control is objectively impossible.
Phenomenology and delusions: Who put the ‘alien’ in alien control
- Consciousness and Cognition
, 2006
"... 3 (148 words) Although current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusions are based on unusual experiences, they differ in the role that they accord experience in the formation of delusions. On some accounts, the experience comprises the very content of the delusion, whereas on other ac ..."
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Cited by 11 (5 self)
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3 (148 words) Although current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusions are based on unusual experiences, they differ in the role that they accord experience in the formation of delusions. On some accounts, the experience comprises the very content of the delusion, whereas on other accounts the delusion is adopted in an attempt to explain an unusual experience. We call these the endorsement and explanationist models respectively. We examine the debate between endorsement and explanationist models with respect to the 'alien control ' delusion. People with delusions of alien control believe that their actions and/or thoughts are being controlled by an external agent. Some accounts of alien control (e.g. Frith et al., 2000a) are best thought of in explanationist terms; other accounts (e.g. Jeannerod, 1999) seem more suited to an endorsement approach. We argue that recent cognitive and neurophysiological evidence favours an endorsement model of the delusion of alien control.
