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... political, economic, and energy-related institutionss28 Balsiger and VanDeveer 2010, but see Thompson 1973. 29 Selin 2010. 30 Selin 2007. 31 Balsiger 2009. 32 Ansell and Balsiger 2011; Betsill 2005; =-=Keohane and Victor 2011-=-; and Raustiala and Victor 2004. 33 Biermann et al. 2009. 34 Young 2002. 9 are generally more robust than global ones.35 Another perspective has been offered by gamestheoretic and economic analyses th...

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... aim of having the agreement cover the largests14 Smith 2000; Raustiala 2005; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008; Hug and Konig 2002.s15 E.g., Card and Daschle 2011.s16 Kahler 1992; Alter and Meunier 2009; =-=Keohane and Victor 2011-=-.s7sfraction of world trade, the extra voices would make bargaining more complicated and introducesadditional risks that the content of the agreement would be diluted.17 Responses were recorded insa c...

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...7(3) and the creation of a “global” market. At this same time, the broader institutional context of climate governance became unstable and fragmenteds(Abbott, 2012; Biermann, Pattberg, & Zelli, 2010; =-=Keohane & Victor, 2011-=-),smultiple actors (e.g., firms, states, regions, subnational political units) camesto see responding to climate change as within their authority, and adopted ETsas a policy tool to achieve their own ...

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...l. 3 and the creation of a “global” market. At this same time, the broader institutional context of climate governance became unstable and fragmenteds(Abbott, 2012; Biermann, Pattberg, & Zelli, 2010; =-=Keohane & Victor, 2011-=-),smultiple actors (e.g., firms, states, regions, subnational political units) camesto see responding to climate change as within their authority, and adopted ETsas a policy tool to achieve their own ...

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...ssue complexity, and its distribution across states, is critical to our understandings of international (environmental) cooperation. In these respects, it is argued below that measuring the full number and scope of UNFCCC pre-agreement topics, and their divergence from core climate change concerns, will help us to better answer questions as to whether the UNFCCC’s near-global membership has indeed led to a negotiation-forum marked by excessive dimensionality, and hence also whether a “club” based approach8 to international climate change negotiation, as is often advocated (e.g., Stavins 2010; Keohane and Victor 2011, 17), would be a realistic solution to the current UNFCCC stalemate. Furthermore, if a club based forum is indeed identified as ideal, then a comprehensive understanding of countries’ UNFCCC preagreement positions could also potentially allow researchers and policymakers to identify the optimal subgroup(s) of countries—that, for example, maximize legitimacy while minimizing complexity—for such a club. Finally, developing an accurate measure of the full dimensionality of recent UNFCCC climate change negotiations would likewise improve scholars’ abilities to test theories of, or more generally ...

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...nternational regimes: implications for biodiversity and climate change Steinar Andresen and Kristin Rosendal, the Fridtjof Nansen Institute 1. Introduction For long the study of international environmental regimes focused on single regimes. Over the last few years there has been an increasing trend to study regime complexes. Analytically this approach is fruitful as it captures the reality, demonstrated both regarding the problems of climate change and biodiversity. It has also been argued that the climate regime complex represents a more promising avenue than the stand-alone (UNFCCC) regime (Keohane and Victor 2011). In this paper it is argued that it is an empirical question whether this is the case. Studying some of the main supplementary (or alternative) approaches to the UNFCCC we argue that this regime-complex is more hierarchical than pictured by Keohane and Victor (2011). Also, there is scant empirical evidence that some of the main alternative approaches have so far been more effective that the UNFCCC. Experience from key aspects of the issue area of biodiversity strengthens this argument. The Access and Benefit (ABS) part of the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) was fleshed out in the Nag...

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...ontemporary global governance, many issue areas are governed by various governance organizations at the same time. Not only do different spatial levels of governance interact in policymaking, but so do governance organizations on similar levels (Biermann et al. 2009). Such interactions, authors hold, may either work in favour of the effectiveness of & Luc Fransen l.w.fransen@uva.nl 1 Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 166, 1018 WV Amsterdam, The Netherlands 123 Policy Sci (2015) 48:293–317 DOI 10.1007/s11077-015-9219-8 governance or to its detriment (Keohane and Victor 2011). One category of such governance interactions is the interaction between private sustainability standard organizations regulating social and environmental standards in global production chains, in for instance the forestry, tea, cocoa, coffee, and apparel sectors. These private standard organizations (PSOs) have proliferated in many sectors, and have often assumed competitive relationships with each other (Fransen 2011). The coordination problems that arise because of horizontal interactions among governance organizations may be addressed through so-called meta-governance. Public policy liter...