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Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
, 2007
"... We investigate the “generalized secondprice” (GSP) auction, a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising. Although GSP looks similar to the VickreyClarkeGroves (VCG) mechanism, its properties are very different. Unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally does not have an equilib ..."
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Cited by 555 (18 self)
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an equilibrium in dominant strategies, and truthtelling is not an equilibrium of GSP. To analyze the properties of GSP, we describe the generalized English auction that corresponds to GSP and show that it has a unique equilibrium. This is an ex post equilibrium, with the same payoffs to all players
On the Private Provision of Public Goods
 Journal of Public Economics
, 1986
"... We consider a general model of the noncooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good. Howe ..."
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Cited by 564 (9 self)
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We consider a general model of the noncooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling
 Rand Journal of Economics
, 1986
"... This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement: the ..."
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Cited by 563 (1 self)
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: the bargainers ' time preference and the risk of breakdown of negotiation. Each of the models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the motivation to reach agreement is made negligible, in each model the unique perfect equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution, with utilities that reflect
Quantal Response Equilibria For Normal Form Games
 NORMAL FORM GAMES, GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
, 1995
"... We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility, and assume other players do so as well. We define a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) as a fixed point of this process, and establish e ..."
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Cited by 647 (28 self)
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We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility, and assume other players do so as well. We define a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) as a fixed point of this process, and establish
A model of growth through creative destruction
, 1990
"... This paper develops a model based on Schumpeter's process of creative destruction. It departs from existing models of endogeneous growth in emphasizing obsolescence of old technologies induced by the accumulation of knowledge and the resulting process or industrial innovations. This has both ..."
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Cited by 1941 (27 self)
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a tendency for laissezfaire economies to generate too many innovations, i.e too much growth. This "businessstealing" effect is partly compensated by the fact that innovations tend to be too small under laissezfaire. The model possesses a unique balanced growth equilibrium in which
Fusion, Propagation, and Structuring in Belief Networks
 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
, 1986
"... Belief networks are directed acyclic graphs in which the nodes represent propositions (or variables), the arcs signify direct dependencies between the linked propositions, and the strengths of these dependencies are quantified by conditional probabilities. A network of this sort can be used to repre ..."
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Cited by 484 (8 self)
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with the task of fusing and propagating the impacts of new information through the networks in such a way that, when equilibrium is reached, each proposition will be assigned a measure of belief consistent with the axioms of probability theory. It is shown that if the network is singly connected (e.g. tree
Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium
 Games and Economic behaviour
, 1999
"... We reconsider Stackelberg’s classical critique of the Cournot duopoly, in the framework of endogenous timing for twoplayer games. For quantity duopoly we provide different sets of minimal conditions, directly on the demand and cost functions, yielding respectively the simultaneous and the two sequ ..."
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Cited by 31 (4 self)
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We reconsider Stackelberg’s classical critique of the Cournot duopoly, in the framework of endogenous timing for twoplayer games. For quantity duopoly we provide different sets of minimal conditions, directly on the demand and cost functions, yielding respectively the simultaneous and the two
Equilibrium in Generalized Cournot and Stackelberg Models
, 1996
"... A model of an oligopolistic market with a homogeneous product is examined. Each subject of the model uses a conjecture about the market response to variations of its production volume. The conjecture value depends upon both the current total volume of production at the market and the subject's ..."
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Cited by 4 (0 self)
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's contribution into it. Under general enough assumptions, the equilibrium existence and uniqueness theorems are proven. Furthermore, a particular assumption  namely, constant elasticity,  is considered, and the generalized Stackelberg model comprising several leaders is investigated.
ON THE UNIQUE D1 EQUILIBRIUM IN THE STACKELBERG MODEL WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION*
, 1997
"... This note studies a version of the Stackelberg model in which the Leader has more information about demand than the Follower. We show that there exists a unique D1 equilibrium and that this equilibrium is perfectly revealing. We also give a full characterization of the equilibrium in terms of the p ..."
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This note studies a version of the Stackelberg model in which the Leader has more information about demand than the Follower. We show that there exists a unique D1 equilibrium and that this equilibrium is perfectly revealing. We also give a full characterization of the equilibrium in terms
Multiagent Reinforcement Learning: Theoretical Framework and an Algorithm
, 1998
"... In this paper, we adopt generalsum stochastic games as a framework for multiagent reinforcement learning. Our work extends previous work by Littman on zerosum stochastic games to a broader framework. We design a multiagent Qlearning method under this framework, and prove that it converges to a Na ..."
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Cited by 331 (4 self)
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Nash equilibrium under specified conditions. This algorithm is useful for finding the optimal strategy when there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the game. When there exist multiple Nash equilibria in the game, this algorithm should be combined with other learning techniques to find optimal
Results 1  10
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