• Documents
  • Authors
  • Tables
  • Log in
  • Sign up
  • MetaCart
  • DMCA
  • Donate

CiteSeerX logo

Advanced Search Include Citations

Tools

Sorted by:
Try your query at:
Semantic Scholar Scholar Academic
Google Bing DBLP
Results 1 - 10 of 3,488
Next 10 →

Secret Sharing

by Jayanta Poray
"... Abstract: This document provides the basic concept of Secret Sharing technique in practice. Main overview of some current secret sharing schemes are discussed according to the papers, provided during the course. Future scope and possibilities of secret sharing schemes are also introduced. 1 ..."
Abstract - Add to MetaCart
Abstract: This document provides the basic concept of Secret Sharing technique in practice. Main overview of some current secret sharing schemes are discussed according to the papers, provided during the course. Future scope and possibilities of secret sharing schemes are also introduced. 1

Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing

by Markus Stadler , 1996
"... . A secret sharing scheme allows to share a secret among several participants such that only certain groups of them can recover it. Verifiable secret sharing has been proposed to achieve security against cheating participants. Its first realization had the special property that everybody, not only t ..."
Abstract - Cited by 140 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
. A secret sharing scheme allows to share a secret among several participants such that only certain groups of them can recover it. Verifiable secret sharing has been proposed to achieve security against cheating participants. Its first realization had the special property that everybody, not only

Generalized secret sharing and monotone functions

by Josh Benaloh, Jerry Leichter - in Proceedings on Advances in cryptology. Springer-Verlag , 1990
"... Secret Sharing from the perspective of threshold schemes has been well-studied over the past decade. Threshold schemes, however, can only handle a small fraction of the secret sharing functions which we may wish to form. For example, if it is desirable to divide a secret among four participants A, ..."
Abstract - Cited by 184 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
Secret Sharing from the perspective of threshold schemes has been well-studied over the past decade. Threshold schemes, however, can only handle a small fraction of the secret sharing functions which we may wish to form. For example, if it is desirable to divide a secret among four participants A

Secret Sharing

by Arianna Novaro
"... Secret sharing • Method for dividing a secret S into n pieces of information (shares or shadows) s1, s2,..., sn, where each si does not reveal anything about S. • The shares can be distributed among a group of participants or kept by a single person (depending on the purpose of the computation). • W ..."
Abstract - Add to MetaCart
Secret sharing • Method for dividing a secret S into n pieces of information (shares or shadows) s1, s2,..., sn, where each si does not reveal anything about S. • The shares can be distributed among a group of participants or kept by a single person (depending on the purpose of the computation

Anonymous Secret Sharing Schemes

by C. Blundo, D. R. Stinson - Designs, Codes and Cryptography , 1996
"... In this paper we study anonymous secret sharing schemes. Informally, in an anonymous secret sharing scheme the secret can be reconstructed without knowledge of which participants hold which shares. In such schemes the computation of the secret can be carried out by giving the shares to a black box t ..."
Abstract - Cited by 85 (7 self) - Add to MetaCart
In this paper we study anonymous secret sharing schemes. Informally, in an anonymous secret sharing scheme the secret can be reconstructed without knowledge of which participants hold which shares. In such schemes the computation of the secret can be carried out by giving the shares to a black box

On secret sharing systems

by Ehud D. Karnin, Student Member, Jonathan W. Greene, Student Member, Martin E. Hellman - IEEE Transactions on Information Theory , 1983
"... time for all neighbors m of j and hence Zj will become (S + 1). Since j has no nodes at hop-distance (S + l), (7) will hold and this completes the proof of the lemma. Lemma MH-1 a) and Lemma MH-2 a), b) are exactly Theorem MH-1 and this completes the proof of the theo-rem. REFERENCES [ 1] R. G. Gall ..."
Abstract - Cited by 146 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
time for all neighbors m of j and hence Zj will become (S + 1). Since j has no nodes at hop-distance (S + l), (7) will hold and this completes the proof of the lemma. Lemma MH-1 a) and Lemma MH-2 a), b) are exactly Theorem MH-1 and this completes the proof of the theo-rem. REFERENCES [ 1] R. G. Gallager, “A shortest path routing algorithm with automatic resynch, ” unpublished note, March 1976. [2] A. Segall, P. M. Merlin, and R. G. Gallager, “A recoverable protocol for loop-free distributed routing, ” Proc. ICC, June 1978. [3] S. G. Finn, “Resynch procedures and a failsafe network protocol

Compounding Secret Sharing Schemes

by E. Martínez-Moro, J. Mozo-Fernández, C. Munuera , 2003
"... this paper we introduce the class of composite access structures for secret sharing. We also provide secret sharing schemes realizing these structures and study their information rates. As a particular case of this construction, we present the subclass of iterated threshold schemes, a large class of ..."
Abstract - Cited by 4 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
this paper we introduce the class of composite access structures for secret sharing. We also provide secret sharing schemes realizing these structures and study their information rates. As a particular case of this construction, we present the subclass of iterated threshold schemes, a large class

On the Size of Shares for Secret Sharing Schemes

by R. M. Capocelli, A. De Santis, L. Gargano, U. Vaccaro - Journal of Cryptology
"... A secret sharing scheme permits a secret to be shared among participants in such a way that only qualified subsets of participants can recover the secret, but any non-qualified subset has absolutely no information on the secret. The set of all qualified subsets defines the access structure to the se ..."
Abstract - Cited by 78 (8 self) - Add to MetaCart
A secret sharing scheme permits a secret to be shared among participants in such a way that only qualified subsets of participants can recover the secret, but any non-qualified subset has absolutely no information on the secret. The set of all qualified subsets defines the access structure

Secret sharing made short

by Hugo Krawczyk , 1988
"... Abstract. A well-known fact in the theory of secret sharing schemes is that shares must be of length at least as the secret itself. However, the proof of this lower bound uses the notion of information theoretic secrecy. A natural (and very practical) question is whether one can do better for secret ..."
Abstract - Cited by 61 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract. A well-known fact in the theory of secret sharing schemes is that shares must be of length at least as the secret itself. However, the proof of this lower bound uses the notion of information theoretic secrecy. A natural (and very practical) question is whether one can do better

Rational Secret Sharing, Revisited

by S. Dov Gordon, Jonathan Katz - IN SCN (SECURITY IN COMMUNICATION NETWORKS) , 2006
"... We consider the problem of secret sharing among n rational players. This problem was introduced by Halpern and Teague (STOC 2004), who claim that a solution is impossible for n = 2 but show a solution for the case n >= 3. Contrary to their claim, we show a protocol for rational secret sharing ..."
Abstract - Cited by 49 (4 self) - Add to MetaCart
We consider the problem of secret sharing among n rational players. This problem was introduced by Halpern and Teague (STOC 2004), who claim that a solution is impossible for n = 2 but show a solution for the case n >= 3. Contrary to their claim, we show a protocol for rational secret sharing
Next 10 →
Results 1 - 10 of 3,488
Powered by: Apache Solr
  • About CiteSeerX
  • Submit and Index Documents
  • Privacy Policy
  • Help
  • Data
  • Source
  • Contact Us

Developed at and hosted by The College of Information Sciences and Technology

© 2007-2019 The Pennsylvania State University