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Efficient generation of shared RSA keys
 Advances in Cryptology  CRYPTO 97
, 1997
"... We describe efficient techniques for a number of parties to jointly generate an RSA key. At the end of the protocol an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. None of the parties know the factorization of N. In addition a public encryption exponent is publicly known and each party holds a share of the ..."
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Cited by 150 (5 self)
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We describe efficient techniques for a number of parties to jointly generate an RSA key. At the end of the protocol an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. None of the parties know the factorization of N. In addition a public encryption exponent is publicly known and each party holds a share
Fair Encryption of RSA Keys
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF EUROCRYPT 2000, VOLUME 1807 OF LNCS
, 2000
"... Cryptography is more and more concerned with elaborate protocols involving many participants. In some cases, it is crucial to be sure that players behave fairly especially when they use public key encryption. Accordingly, mechanisms are needed to check the correctness of encrypted data, without comp ..."
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Cited by 21 (2 self)
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if needed. Our emphasis is on size; we believe that the proof should be of the same length as the original key. In this paper, we propose such proofs of fair encryption for El Gamal and RSA keys, using the Paillier cryptosystem. Our proofs are really efficient since in practical terms they are only a few
Experimenting with Shared Generation of RSA keys
, 1999
"... We describe an implementation of a distributed algorithm to generate a shared RSA key. At the end of the computation, an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. All servers involved in the computation are convinced that N is a product of two large primes, however none of them know the factorization of ..."
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Cited by 40 (0 self)
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We describe an implementation of a distributed algorithm to generate a shared RSA key. At the end of the computation, an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. All servers involved in the computation are convinced that N is a product of two large primes, however none of them know the factorization
New weak RSA keys
"... Let N = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2q. In this paper, we analyze the security of RSA with the class of the exponents e satisfying an equation eX − NY = ap + bq + Z with ap ..."
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Let N = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2q. In this paper, we analyze the security of RSA with the class of the exponents e satisfying an equation eX − NY = ap + bq + Z with ap
Shared Generation of Shared RSA Keys
, 1998
"... The paper considers the problem of distributed key generation for sharedcontrol RSA schemes. In particular: how can two parties generate a shared RSA key in such a way that neither party can cheat? The answer to this question would have significant applications to, for example, key escrow systems. ..."
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Cited by 8 (0 self)
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The paper considers the problem of distributed key generation for sharedcontrol RSA schemes. In particular: how can two parties generate a shared RSA key in such a way that neither party can cheat? The answer to this question would have significant applications to, for example, key escrow systems
Two Party RSA Key Generation
 In Crypto ’99, LNCS 1666
, 1999
"... . We present a protocol for two parties to generate an RSA key in a distributed manner. At the end of the protocol the public key: a modulus N = PQ, and an encryption exponent e are known to both parties. Individually, neither party obtains information about the decryption key d and the prime fa ..."
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Cited by 34 (0 self)
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. We present a protocol for two parties to generate an RSA key in a distributed manner. At the end of the protocol the public key: a modulus N = PQ, and an encryption exponent e are known to both parties. Individually, neither party obtains information about the decryption key d and the prime
RSA Key Generation with Verifiable Randomness
 In Public Key Cryptography 2002, LNCS 2274
, 2002
"... Abstract. We consider the problem of proving that a user has selected and correctly employed a truly random seed in the generation of her RSA key pair. This task is related to the problem of key validation, the process whereby a user proves to another party that her key pair has been generated secur ..."
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Cited by 9 (2 self)
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Abstract. We consider the problem of proving that a user has selected and correctly employed a truly random seed in the generation of her RSA key pair. This task is related to the problem of key validation, the process whereby a user proves to another party that her key pair has been generated
Simple Backdoors for RSA Key Generation
 in Topics in Cryptology  CTRSA 2003, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
, 2003
"... 10555 avenue de BoisdeBoulogne ..."
Generation of Shared RSA Keys by Two Parties
 in Asiacrypt’98
, 1998
"... At Crypto'97 Boneh and Franklin proposed a protocol to efficiently generate shared RSA keys. In the case of two parties, the drawback of their scheme is the need of an independent third party. Furthermore, the security is guaranteed only if the three players follow the protocol. In this paper, ..."
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Cited by 20 (2 self)
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At Crypto'97 Boneh and Franklin proposed a protocol to efficiently generate shared RSA keys. In the case of two parties, the drawback of their scheme is the need of an independent third party. Furthermore, the security is guaranteed only if the three players follow the protocol. In this paper
Efficient Generation of Shared RSA keys (Extended Abstract)
 In Kaliski [103
"... We describe efficient techniques for three (or more) parties to jointly generate an RSA key. At the end of the protocol an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. None of the parties know the factorization of N . In addition a public encryption exponent is publicly known and each party holds a share o ..."
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Cited by 7 (1 self)
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We describe efficient techniques for three (or more) parties to jointly generate an RSA key. At the end of the protocol an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. None of the parties know the factorization of N . In addition a public encryption exponent is publicly known and each party holds a share
Results 1  10
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