This paper introduces the concept of certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC). In contrast to traditional public key cryptographic systems, CL-PKC does not require the use of certificates to guarantee the authenticity of public keys. It does rely on the use of a trusted third party (TTP

of the major families of PKCs that could resist potentially even the powerful quantum computers of the future. There has been fast and intensive development in Multivariate Public Key Cryptography in the last two decades. Some constructions are not as secure as was claimed initially, but others are still

easily be understood and manipulated by students of cryp-tography, and (2) it is an excellent example of how a functional program-ming language such as Haskell can be used to implement real applications. While the main goal of our implementation is clarity rather than effi-ciency, no treatment of public-key

In this paper we try to estimate the real influence of public key cryptography (PKC) to the lifetime of a sensor node in wireless sensor networks.

How can and why should the Kerberos authentication standard (RFC1510) be extended to support public-key cryptography? These are the questions which we explore in this paper. We outline three proposed extensions to integrate public-key cryptography into Kerberos, and make some basic performance

With a public key cryptosystem, the key used to encipher a message can be made public without compromising the secrecy of a different key needed to decipher that message.

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In this work, we show a model for a case where extreme security is needed. In such case steganocryptography (steganography and cryptography) is used. In this model we use Diffie-Hellman, RSA and cryptography with ir-rational numbers. We use also steganography in DCT coefficients to send a message

This section comprises of an introduction to cryptography, the various problems and cryp-tographic primitives. 1.1 Brief History Cryptography is a science with a long history. Although it has recently been transformed to conform to the rigorousness of a science, its applications can be traced back

S uppose you want to buy something over the Internet with your credit card, You might simply send the 16-digit Visa number and four-digit expiration date over the Net via e-mail. But this approach has its risks: A crook might break into the company's computer and learn your credit card number. Using the World Wide Web isn't much better. Today, some companies are inviting customers to type their credit card numbers into forms displayed by WWW clients such as Mosaic or Lynx. But when the content of those forms is sent back over the Internet to the Web server, it can be "sniffed out " by a packet-sniffer application, placing both the buyer and the seller at financial risk. Some businesses don't worry about stolen credit card numbers-they think their bank, or credit card companies, will cover any