This paper explores Intel’s strategy with respect to complements. We find that, as the literature predicts, Intel’s entry decisions are shaped by the belief that it does not have the capabilities to enter all possible markets, and thus that it must encourage widespread entry despite the fact that potential entrants (rationally) fear Intel’s ability to “squeeze ” them ex post. We explore the ways in which Intel addresses this issue, highlighting in particular the firm’s use of organizational structure and processes as commitment mechanisms. Our results have implications for our understanding of the dynamics of competition in complements and of the role of organizational form in shaping competition. 1.

The accelerated development in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) and Grid computing has positioned them as promising next generation computing platforms. They enable the creation of Virtual Enterprises (VE) for sharing resources distributed across the world. However, resource management, application development

of the following: Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons who infringe their copyright. A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a copyright infringement. A court may impose penalties and award damages in relation to offences and infringements relating

. Allowing incumbent platform owners to exclude potential entrants hurts buyers but can raise welfare. (JEL: L10, D40) 1.

for free while they post content voluntarily. Recently, turning the user-generated content into profit has become increasingly important for platform owners, as the operational cost (e.g., bandwidth, energy, marketing) for managing user-generated content platforms is skyrocketing. In this chapter, we study

On a “marketplace ” platform, where two sides of users trade, the platform owner has an incentive to regulate its marketplace for a higher profit. This study focuses on a monopoly platform’s nonpricing, regulatory strategies in governing quality heterogeneity of competing sellers. In contrast

of innovation. To align external innovation with company goals and protect the platform integrity, companies need to take a more active role in coordinating participation of external parties and controlling the quality of innovation outcome. This research examines strategies adopted by platform owners to manage

are of particular relevance because of the light they shed on debates about the motivations and effects of actions by a dominant platform owner. Re-cent examples of such debates include those about Microsoft’s behaviour both in relation to its operating system and its media player, Apple’s behaviour in relation

Platform technology owners often nurture their innovation ecosystems to seek complementary invention and exploit indirect network effects. In this study we examine whether participation in ecosystem partnership creates business value and impacts their business performance for small independent

Abstract-Mobile platform owners are faced with a tension. On one hand they foster generativity to enable third parties to innovate compelling services. On the other hand they regulate innovation on their platforms in order to protect their commercial interests. This tension leads to complex